From Sensory Biology to a Philosophy of Perception by Feenstra, L.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/132849
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
Sensory systems are specialized cells of plants and animals sensitive to swift 
variations in the environment. To Aristotle’s five human senses (vision, hear-
ing, taste, smell and touch) comparatively recent research added many more 
structures with the capacity to react upon internal or external events or stim-
uli. Beyond his senses man has several extrasensory ways to gather knowledge 
such as reason, intuition, introspection, the mind’s eye and mysticism.
The combined activity of sensory systems and the brain leads to assembly 
of information from the environmental bombardment of 4-D stimuli. This 
results in experience most of which remains unconscious. 
As a relatively late spandrel like phenomenon of evolution consciousness 
arose. This brain’s action does not cause consciousness, it ìs consciousness. 
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Wretched mind, after receving your knowledge from us, do you try to overthrow 
us? Your overthrow will be your downfall
Democritus (fr 125)
But do not confuse the sound idea that philosophy is not science with the mis-
taken idea that philosophy is independent of science…. [D]iscourse no longer 
appears as one plane parallel to another, but as a tangle of intersecting dimen-
sions whose relations with one another and with extra-linguistic fact conform to 
no single or simple pattern
WS Sellars (1963,171)
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 Preface
0.1 The spark
In 2002 my medical school1 modernized the curriculum. In this process, 
among other things the teaching units of oto-rhino-laryngology, ophthal-
mology, dermatology, neuroscience and psychiatry were amalgamated to 
form a new unit called ‘Brain and Senses’. I was invited to write an introduc-
tory note for the ‘Senses’ part of this unit.
During the writing of my text I began to realize how inadequate my 
understanding of the senses was. This motivated me to amass as much 
information on structure, function and type of the presently known senses, 
a study that initiated this essay.
0.2 The process
Trained as an oto-rhino-laryngologist I became especially interested in 
otology (hearing, equilibrium) and pediatric oto-rhino-laryngology. Hence, 
the (clinical) examples which sparsely appear in the text.
After my retirement I obtained a Masters degree in philosophy. During 
this study I became aware of the different ways in which philosophers and 
scientists think about similar subjects although Bennett and Hacker (2003) 
show that this is not always the case. Constantly being aware of the different 
ways of thinking I take great pains to take Wissenschaftliche opinions, 
judgements and knowledge to philosophical puzzles and visa versa on the 
subject-matter of the senses.
As the exploratory f ield gradually widened I came across seers with closed 
eyes, non-sensory sensing, introspection, thinking without the use of language 
and the rôle of senses in ‘knowledge’, ‘know how’ and ‘consciousness’. Because 
these topics partly overlapped with the factual senses, the boundaries often 
were hazy, preconceived opinions crumbled, I decided to partly draw them 
into this essay.
1 Erasmus Medical Centre, Rotterdam.
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0.3 The form
Each chapter of this essay deals with one or more subset questions; together 
they describe my present understanding of the senses. The overall picture 
presents a delta of branching and reconnecting streams. Readers consider-
ing some branches or backwaters less interesting are advised to steer their 
own course. (see the paragraph 0.5 on ‘reading’)
0.4 The design
This essay consists of three parts and six addenda. Part I mainly deals 
with the life scientif ic view of the senses, Part II treats subjective and 
philosophical views of the sensory systems and Part III tries to establish 
the relationship(s) between the two parts.
In Part I (chapters 1-5) I survey the way sensory systems (the term I will use for the 
senses) are explained by the life-sciences. Chapter 1 presents a general introduc-
tion and tentative definitions of sensory systems and perception. Chapters 2 and 
3 describe in more detail the scientific views of the sensory systems that started 
with Aristotle and are now based on Naturwissenschaft and evolutionary theory 
(neo-Darwinism). An overview of evolutionary theory (chapter 4), a number of 
‘sixth senses’ to be added to Aristotle’s five (chapter 5), as well as the principle of 
the – usually unconscious – collaboration of all sensory systems are presented. 
In these chapters I also touch on a few more obvious philosophical concepts 
such as that of mereological fallacy and the false nature/nurture-dichotomy. In 
the life sciences, a definition that allows a clear distinction between sensory 
systems and other other body systems is only arbitrary.
Part I concludes with an answer to the question of how life sciences look 
upon the cooperation of the sensory processes in conscious perception: (1) the 
brain continuously integrates all sensory processes of which only a relatively 
small part becomes conscious, (2) differentiation between sensing and per-
ception is vague, and (3) the relation of consciousness with the continuous 
processing of the sensory systems and the brain is not yet completely clear; 
most of the incoming stimuli are processed without reaching consciousness.
Part II (chapters 6 -9) mainly deals with the subjective aspect of sensory 
systems’ operation.
It starts (chapter 6) with an overview of the concept of sense-data which 
was a major philosophical subject of the first half of the twentieth century and 
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is still supported by some philosophers. I argue that this concept is redundant 
as viewed from the perspective of the life sciences. Chapter 7 discusses the 
so-called ‘problem of perception’ which in my view is not a problem at all 
since most if not all of it can be explained by the life-sciences. The chapter 
continues with the relation between perception and environment, the world 
out there. The brain constructs a subjective impression of the outside world 
from the data the sensory systems supply. The artificial and/or loosely ex-
pressed dichotomy between the operation of (central) nervous tissue and the 
non-nervous tissue of the body induces a brain-body dichotomy which may 
even re-introduce the obsolete and redundant mind-body problem.
Chapter 8 introduces the oxymoron of non-sensory sensing and its corollary, 
the ancient philosophical concepts of introspection and intuition, accepted in 
classical rationalism as true but as unreliable by science. The chapter proceeds 
with the concept of ‘the mind’s eye’ as extensively used in technology and art 
which demonstrates beyond doubt that valuable nonverbal communication 
exists, can be learned and is based on cooperation of the sensory systems. 
Finally, the chapter introduces the concept of non-linguistic thought which 
includes meditation and contemplation. Chapter 9 describes mysticism, a 
way of non-sensory ‘seeing’, that is often said to lead to deeper understanding.
My conclusion is that neither intuition nor mysticism are helpful to clarify 
the sensory systems although these modalities of cognitive activity may lead 
to knowledge and might turn someone into a seer. The mind’s eye on the other 
hand is crucial for artists and the technical professions. It has relatively little 
status in Western philosophy – although exceptions exist – but it is held in 
high esteem in many Asian religious and philosophical traditions.
Part III (chapters 10-13) deals with the relation of the sensory systems and the 
brain, information, experience and knowledge. Chapter 10 opens with the 
argument that the dividing line between sensing without and sensing with 
awareness is gradual; discrimination between the two is a matter of degree 
rather than of kind. Experience is discussed and finally defined as the outcome 
of the continuous process of adding unconscious, subconscious and conscious 
new signals, stimuli, and information from outside and inside the body. My 
preference here is Sellars’ (1963,173) dictum; “natural science is the measure of 
all things, of what is that is, and of what is not that it is not”. Chapter 11 presents 
an analysis of the term ‘information’ which is generally taken as the principal 
function of sensory systems. This analysis culminates in the description of 
biosemiotics, a naturalistic2 scion of biology with roots in linguistic concepts.
2 I follow John R Searle’s (1997,xiv) term, i.e., biological naturalism.
16 FROM SENSORY BIOLOGY TO A PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION 
Chapter 12 follows Chisholm’s solution to ‘the problem of the criterion’, i.e., 
knowledge needs information through perception, understanding perception 
needs knowledge. I am aware that with this statement I tend to enter the trap 
of circular reasoning. I accept van Fraassen’s (1980) constructive empiricism, 
more specific his scientific agnosticism. Three criteria for classifying sensory 
systems are proposed. The discussion then turns to the mind (a set of opera-
tions carried out in the brain), to consciousness and to self-awareness.
Consciousness, I argue is the traditional, folk psychological term for an 
emerging, continuously changing process of the material brain. Conscious-
ness is probably a spandrel-like [Addendum 14.1] phenomenon of evolution, 
a neuronal circuits spin-off which combines incoming sensory stimuli 
facilitating survival of the organism and the species. Sensory systems thus 
control behaviour and may induce perception.
Chapter 13 tries to integrate the major points of the earlier chapters, 
adhering to ‘eliminative physicalism’. Moreover I admit the provisional 
character of scientif ic conclusions, including mine.
Box 0-1 The metaphor of ‘The mountains and water’*
An ancient Buddha said, “Mountains are mountains, waters are waters.”
These words do not mean mountains are mountains; they mean mountains are 
mountains.
Qingyuan Weixin (ca. eleventh-twelfth century A.D.)
[….] Observing the different aspects of all things is the beginning […] At this 
stage, discriminatory observation is functional. Without noticing the difference 
between awakening and delusion or between those who are awakened and 
those who are not, a person cannot arouse the wish for enlightenment [….] The 
first step is discrimination, the second is denial of discrimination, and the third is 
beyond discrimination and denial of it.
Explanation by Eihei Dogen (1200-‘53)
We see a three-step demonstration: affirmative, negative, and affirmative. This 
tripartite elucidation of the [….] perspective, unlike Hegel’s thesis, antithesis and 
synthesis, does not develop from a lower to a higher level; rather, each step is 
given an absolute value, and each step is inclusive of the others.
* Quoted from Tanahashi (1985:16,17,107,309)
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0.5 The reading
Parts of this essay may be less accessible to some readers. Recapitulations 
and cross-references may help to overcome this problem. Number codes 
between square brackets refer to sections. For example, [§ 3.1 (p.43)] should 
be read as ‘see/compare section 3.1 that begins on page 43’. References such 
as [Box 2-1 (p.28)] are used to direct the reader to textboxes, which func-
tion as illustrations but take the shape of notes. I omitted ellipsis dots and 
adjusted punctuation for easy reading.3
At the end, indexes are provided: the f irst for names of persons, the 
second for subjects, the third for abbreviations used throughout the book, 
the fourth for ‘powers of ten’.
The structure and the goal of this essay can be summed up, too, with the 
ancient metaphor of ‘The mountains and water’. [Box 0-1]
3 This subsection including the system of references is derived from van Brakel 1998, 2000.
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Part I 
 
What common sense and the life-sciences tell us about 
sensory systems

1 General introduction
1.1 Senses and their operation
The Oxford iIllustrated Dictionary (1975,775) gives seven meanings of the 
word ‘sense’ of which I will use the f irst. It says: Any of those faculties, each 
dependent upon specialized groups of receptors connected to the brain, by 
which animal and man are aware of their environment or recognize changes 
in their own bodily condition.
We are familiar with our eyes, ears, nose, tongue and touch. Most of 
us have some experience of a (temporary) failure of one or more of them 
for instance loss of smelling or hearing due to a cold. We probably know 
someone with a more permanent loss of function such as in an old person 
and we are also aware of the much better ears and noses of dogs and cats. 
Some more reflection brings to mind colour blindness, distinctions between 
seeing and understanding and even remnants of half forgotten biology 
from school learning. We may rummage through the latter, may hunt after 
some other written text, and, nowadays we may consult the internet. Taken 
together, such daily practices bring home to us some general knowledge 
which philosophy calls with a slightly conceited term ‘naïve’ (no offense) 
or, more friendly ‘common sense-like’.
Another way to study sensory systems is to follow Henry David Thoreau’s 
trail and experience each sense deliberately and intensively through train-
ing. (Friesen 2005) Less time consuming would be to train only one sense 
such as vision through painting, hearing through music, smell and taste 
through cookery, or propriocepsis through ice skating. Learning about 
perception should ideally be based on, or at least incorporate, the study of 
one’s own bodily experiences.
As second best option, such experiences may be studied, second hand as 
it were, by reading famous authors like Marcel Proust’s fascinating story on 
‘petites madeleines’ [p.38] since they often are able to describe their own 
experiences so much better than scientists and philosophers.
An entirely other way for learning about perception consists of studying 
life sciences like psychology, biology or medicine. (viz. Sacks 1986; Kandel 
et al. 2000)
Some people seemingly restrict their musings about perception on gazing 
through the window or intently looking at their desk. Such practices easily 
lead to overemphasis of vision, however, as anyone will readily notice when 
browsing a few books on the philosophy of perception.
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To obtain a better understanding of the sensory systems, combined use 
of science, life sciences and philosophy, is favoured by neurophilosophers 
(and myself), although some doubt the wisdom of this approach. Finally 
of course, one can use any combination of the mentioned approaches and 
one’s own common sense.
I will neither present a review of all past philosophical views about the 
sensory systems nor will I extensively discuss consciousness, memory, 
emotions and feelings. [Box 8-1 (p.98)] Various excellent historical reviews 
of the philosophical literature of perception (Hamlyn 1966; Dicker 1980) and 
the turbulent neuro-philosophical f ield of consciousness exist. (Blackmore 
2006; Pockett et al. 2009) Wherever appropriate I will mention some (histori-
cal) philosophical views on consciousness and on emotions.
1.2 Some definitions
As a tentative def inition I suggest that sensory systems are those special-
ized systems of an organism that enable the connection between the 
environment and the organism’s body, the so called interface between 
milieu extérieur and milieu intérieur. To perform such an activity a sensory 
system should meet several conditions:
(1) the majority of the receiving parts of sensory systems are situated on 
the surface and relative surface1 of a living structure,
1 The lining of the digestive tract and the repiratory tract are considered to be body surface 
because both systems are basically invaginations.
Box 1-1 Definitions of visible ‘light’*
Visible light – for humans – consists of electromagnetic waves with a wave 
length of 390 nm to about 750 nm and with an intensity of 10-6 cd/m2 to 107 cd/m2
(nm is 10-9 m, cd is short for candela, the unity of light intensity).
Light is often ‘defined’ as that which makes the environment visible for human eyes.
Light is sometimes ‘defined’ as absence of darkness.
Comparable descriptions apply to other human sensory systems.
* List of abbreviations and powers of ten. […]
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(2) sensory systems are more sensitive to changes2 in their environment 
than other surface structures. Such environmental changes can be 
defined in chemical and/or physical terms. There is a hidden tautology 
in this statement.[Box 1-1] Most of the information exchange in the own 
body is not consciously perceived, but sometimes it is (hunger, thirst, 
movements and the like),
(3) if a sensory system is triggered by any environmental change (called 
stimulus), a sequence of interrelated reactions in the living structure 
is started. When active, a sensory system is involved in a process,
(4) sensory systems usually are indispensable for initiating those (biologi-
cal) (re)actions that are needed to preserve the specimen and/or the 
species,
(5) sensory systems that are not indispensable to preserve the life of the 
specimen and/or the sort tend to wither and eventually disappear, be 
it gradually in the course of neo-Darwinian evolution or during the 
life-time of some species, [Box 1-2]
(6) in other species, certainly in humans, sensory information may in part 
become conscious but this does not need to do so.
I will def ine perception tentatively as that part of information that results 
in awareness of (objects and events in) the environment.3 Thus, there is a 
relation between sensory systems’ activities and perception; they are not 
synonymous.
2 The term ‘change’ is used deliberately. For instance, the eyes make micro-movements (micro-
saccades) all the time although we are never aware of it. [Box 2-5 (p.40)] If the environment 
moves simultaneously in exactly the same manner in laboratory conditions, the eye rapidly 
looses its sensitivity and turns ‘blind’. Only specif ic changes in the environment or within the 
body can become stimuli.
3 ‘Consciousness’ and ‘to be aware’ are here taken to be synonymous.
Box 1-2 The free-swimming larvae of the sea squirt
The larvae of ascidians or sea squirts, a subphylum of the urochordata are free-
swimming. They possess a statocyst (organ for balance), a primitive eye, and a 
notochord (primitive spinal cord). These structures inform a brain-like ganglion 
with which the larvae learn about their environment. After finding a suitable 
rocky substrate the larva implants its head onto the rock and becomes sessile 
thus changing from the larval stadium to the adult stadium. In doing so, the 
animal loses its vision and (almost) its entire central nervous system.
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So far nothing has been said about the relation of some physical object 
or event and the awareness one has, although as a start I tend to agree with 
Robinson’s (1994,1) observation that the majority of modern philosophers – 
that is, the majority of philosophers writing since the seventeenth century 
– has believed that in perception one is aware of some item other than the 
physical object one takes oneself to be perceiving. In the next chapters I 
will return to most points.
1.3 Defining the problem
My basic question is ‘What are sensory systems?’
Two (sub)questions will be dealt with more specif ically:
– How do life sciences – based on Naturwissenschaft and Theory of 
Evolution – def ine sensory systems and what are the philosophical 
foundations.
– What is the basis of the unity of (conscious) perception.
2 What the life sciences tell about the 
sensory systems
2.1 Introduction
We can think of various approaches to study the perception process: an 
observer can examine the responses of some organism to its environment, 
an observer can study the process by analysing his or her1 personal experi-
ence or an observer can look at it as part of his cognitive processes. Prior to 
digging deeper into philosophy, in this chapter, I will use the f irst approach 
heavily relying on selected f indings of the life sciences, more specif ically of 
ecology and largely ignoring, for the time being, the other two approaches.2
Sensory systems are a prerequisite of life. In small living organisms like 
bacteria that can only be viewed with a microscope, organelles and specif ic 
surface proteins may be activated by changes in their environment resulting 
in changes of their behaviour. It is largely a matter of convention whether 
the term perception may be applied to such interactions that are linked to 
appropriate behavioural responses without intervening conscious episodes. 
(Shimony 1971,577)
Ecology, a word coined by Ernst Haeckel in 1869 describes the interactions 
of organism and environment (inanimate objects and animate organisms),3 
(environment understood in its daily use), with emphasis on transmission 
of information between organisms and environment.
Man has many reasons for paying attention to the way organisms ob-
tain and use information about their environment. Hunting and f ishing, 
for instance, became more effective when our ancestors understood the 
sensory abilities of their prey. Organisms have ‘experimented throughout 
evolution with’ many strategies to obtain and use information retaining 
the information that was most effective. (Dusenbery 1992,2)
Dretske (1971), used the bottom-up approach to isolate knowledge of 
the senses in a pure form, not yet obscured by irrelevant details. Using 
1 I will only use ‘he’ and ‘his’ also meaning ‘she’ and ‘her’.
2 Some accept only the last two approaches as philosophy (Locke 1967,14-5) but I side with 
CUM.Smith’s statement cited by Hahlweg (1989,532f) that “just as Descartes, consciously and 
unconsciously, built his epistemology on the basis of seventeenth-century visual physiology, 
we should do this also”, i.e., on the basis of our times.
3 Animate agents are living substances, ranging through the spectrum of biological taxa 
from micro-organisms to plants and animals. (Hacker 2007,130)
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Dretske’s approach, I will present two examples of reactions to specif ic 
sensory stimulation. I will subsequently discuss (the importance of) sensory 
systems without pleading for sensationalism.4 Finally, I will argue that 
the larger part of human ‘knowledge’ is acquired through perception that 
remains unconscious.
2.2 Two examples
The examples are presented to demonstrate ethological bottom-up results of 
research on specific sensory stimulation. Ethology is taken here as synonym 
of the biology of behaviour. [Box 2-1]
1. Tinbergen’s classic study of the stimuli [Box 2-5] that release the begging 
response of the herring gull chick is one of an extensive series of investiga-
tions to determine which features of the visual stimulus of the parent’s 
beak are used to elicit the response of a chick.(Tinbergen and Perdeck 1951) 
This study belongs to the f ield of ecology, more precisely to ethology that 
addresses questions such as what strategies are used by living organisms 
to locate resources, what information they use and how it is obtained. 
(Dusenbery 1992,8)
Largely borrowed from Ramachandran’s (2004,46f) lively account of 
Tinbergen’s study, the story of the begging response runs as follows: As 
soon as the herring gull chick hatches, it sees its mother’s yellow beak 
with a red spot on it. It starts pecking at the red spot, begging for food. The 
4 Sensationalism is understood as the doctrine which maintains that only sensations of 
individual qualities can be given; that the perceptual awareness of entities is derived from 
sensations; and that it is derived by means of processes which are cognitive in the sense that 
they involve the logical synthesis of information given. (Kelley 1986,50)
Box 2-1 Ethology*
Ethology is the scientific study of behaviour. The term was first used by the nine-
teenth-century French zoologist Isidore Geoffroy Saint Hilaire but later changed 
to its present meaning by the American zoologist Wheeler (1902): a biological 
perspective including causation, development, survival value and evolution. It is 
known today as ‘biology of behaviour’.
* Bolhuis and Giraldeau 2005,1
WHAT THE LIFE SCIENCES TELL ABOuT THE SENSORY SYSTEMS 29
mother then regurgitates half-digested food into the chick’s gaping mouth 
and the chick swallows the food. Tinbergen started by asking himself how 
the chick recognizes its mother and found that it doesn’t need a mother; a 
hatchling reacts in exactly the same way to a disembodied beak with no 
mother attached.
In this case the goal of vision is to do as little processing or computation as 
is necessary for the job on hand, recognizing the source of food. Obviously, 
through evolution the chick has acquired the ‘knowledge’ that this long 
thing with a red spot always has a mother attached to it. It can thus take 
advantage of the statistical redundancy in nature and reacts somewhat 
like ‘Long yellow thing with a red spot equals food’ thereby simplifying the 
processing and saving much computational labour.
Indeed, Tinbergen found that the chick didn’t even need a real beak. A 
long yellow stick with three red stripes, which looked nothing like a beak 
to humans was pecked at even more than a real beak. Chicks preferred it 
to a real beak, even though to us it didn’t resemble one. Tinbergen thus 
discovered a kind of super-beak for the chick’s perception. Why this occurs 
is not exactly known, but obviously there are neural circuits in the visual 
pathways of the chick’s brain that are specialized to detect a beak as soon 
as the chick hatches. It turns out that they f ire upon the visual stimulus 
of red spots or red stripes on a yellow stick-like back-ground. Because of 
the way they are wired, they may actually more powerfully respond to the 
stick with three stripes than to a real beak. The neurons’ receptive f ield 
possibly embodies a rule such as ‘the more red contour the better’. Even 
though the stick doesn’t look like a beak to humans, this strange object (a 
supernormal stimulus)5 actually is more effective in driving ‘beak detectors’ 
than a real beak; and a message from the ‘beak-detecting neurons’ travels 
to the emotional (limbic) centres in the chick’s brain, giving it a big jolt and 
the behavioural reaction of pecking at that very spot.
2. Although olfaction in humans has drawn relatively little interest 
compared to vision and hearing, Doty’s (2003) ‘Handbook of Olfaction and 
Gustation’ still numbers 1150 pages or approximately 22.100 words to cover 
the f ield. The following is predominantly drawn from this textbook. (ibid. 
312-6)
5 Supernormal stimulus: artif icial stimulus (dummy) that elicits a particular behavioural 
pattern more easily than the appropriate natural sign-stimulus. In such a stimulus (also called 
a supra-normal stimulus) certain characteristic features of the natural sign-stimulus are exag-
gerated.(Bolhuis and Giraldeau 2005)
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In the human nose at least four chemoreceptor systems are located, 
all of which develop early during prenatal ontogeny: the main olfactory 
system with the f irst cephalic nerve (CN I), the trigeminal nerve system 
(CN V), the vomeronasal organ and the terminal nerve (CN 0). The relative 
contributions of these four different chemoreceptive systems to smell is 
unclear. It is generally accepted that the olfactory system is tuned to detect 
low concentrations of volatile odourant molecules, whereas the trigeminal 
system is mainly sensitive to the irritant effects of higher intensity chemical 
stimulation. The vomeronasal organ is sensitive to pheromones in many 
animals but has probably few or hardly any functions6 in humans and the 
human terminal nerve is entirely rudimentary.
Odorous compounds enter the amniotic f luid via transfer of tracheal 
and gut wastes and the ever-increasing urination of the foetus. The volume 
and composition of these substances f luctuate throughout gestation and 
even display daily cycles. Additional sources of such olfactory stimuli 
include the mother’s metabolic activity, immunogenetic constitution, and 
diet. Thus, before birth, each neonate is likely to be exposed to a unique 
prof ile of dietary aromas and other compounds related to foeto-maternal 
metabolism. Research data suggest that they are involved in early sensory 
processing by the foetal and neonatal brain and that at 31-37 weeks gesta-
tion, premature infants detect and discriminate among lower intensity 
odourants that primarily activate either the olfactory or the trigeminal 
system.
Presumed signif icance of breast and milk odours produced by nursing 
mothers can be found in documents dating to antiquity and reviewed by 
Fildes (1986). Interestingly, Charles Darwin already remarked in 1877 that 
his one-month-old son behaved as if he perceived his mother’s bosom when 
three or four inches from it. He expressed doubt that the baby’s response 
was based on visual cues, but speculated that it may have been guided 
through smell. Experimental evidence in support of his hypothesis started 
to appear in the early seventies of the 20th century.
After birth, infants show that they are active participants in the 
nursing process and that maternal odours contribute to successful early 
nipple attachment and suckling. Experiments with human newborns 
demonstrate that breast-fed infants remain attracted during a limited 
postnatal period towards odour stimuli from the uterine environment. 
6 Opinions differ. Scientif ic experiments have demonstrated beyond any doubt, however, 
that pheromones may influence behaviour of Homo sapiens without reaching awareness.
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This suggests inborn responsiveness.7 When one of a mother’s breasts was 
moistened with amniotic fluid and not the other, signif icantly more babies 
selected, minutes after birth, the moistened breast over the non-moistened 
breast. Such early orientation to the odour of amniotic f luid may have 
been adaptive throughout the evolutionary history of our species, since 
women presumably handle(d) their babies during and immediately after 
expulsion from the birth canal. The mother’s hands would then have 
been in contact with the birth f luids, which in turn would have been 
transferred to her breasts when she f irst attempted to nurse her newborn 
infant. Attraction to the odour of amniotic f luid would therefore have 
facilitated nipple localization. After repeated exposure to milk during the 
f irst three to f ive days its odour is preferred over that of amniotic f luid. 
This change in preference is suggestive of olfactory learning. More research 
demonstrated that (1) babies turn their head towards the mother’s breast 
before any physical contact has been made, (2) bottle fed babies prefer any 
lactating breast over their familiar formula, (3) the own mother’s breast is 
preferred above some other lactating breast and (4) an unwashed areola 
of the nipple and the nipple itself is preferred above a thoroughly cleaned 
one. These f indings may indicate that the newborn‘s sense of smell is 
highly selective right from birth and that its preferences change within 
the f irst few weeks of life.
From this and similar research some conclusions may be drawn:
(1) neonates seemingly have inborn systems for discriminating certain 
aspects of their environment. Such an inborn ability of newborn hu-
mans that obviously makes use of sensory systems might be viewed as 
some kind of inborn knowledge making the hypothesis of John Locke’s 
tabula rasa untenable or in need of redefinition,
(2) human infants (and those of other species as well) seem to acquire 
preferences after repetitive stimulation of the same kind of stimuli.
We may conclude that these two organisms (chick of the herring gull and 
the newborn human) seem born with preformed learning mechanisms 
consisting of detection systems for specif ic phenomena (information and 
discrimination) and mechanisms to rearrange incoming information into 
new meaningful schemes. The observation that some organisms are ap-
7 Because neonates of a wide range of mammalian species respond preferentially to particular 
odours shortly after birth (before they have the opportunity to gain signif icant postnatal 
chemosensory experience), such discriminative responsiveness may be termed ‘inborn’. (Doty 
2003,314)
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parently able to recognize behaviourally meaningful stimuli never before 
experienced in their environment, and to adequately respond to them 
is called ‘innate releasing mechanism’. This concept focuses on the close 
correspondence between stimulus and appropriate behavioural response. 
(Ewert 2005,25 citing Tinbergen 1951) Alternatively stated: genes, internal 
factors and external factors continuously interact. (Crews and Groothuis 
2009,55)
The f irst part of the learning apparatus I call sensory system, the second 
part learning (in a narrower sense) or cognition which is thought to be 
located in the brain. Later I will return to these interactions.
Interestingly, these conclusions do not contain any reference to conscious-
ness or to the mind that so predominantly occur in most philosophical 
writings on perception. Perceptive abilities and the learning apparatus 
differ between species. Both evolved during evolution and are instrumental 
to survival.
2.3 Sensory systems: information and stimulus
To the preceding example of the visual stimuli for the herring gull and 
the olfactory stimuli for the human neonate many others can be added. 
Other sensory systems are stimulated by specif ic stimuli that also can be 
def ined in terms of physics or chemistry [Box 2-2; Box 2-5]. Such stimuli 
characterize other features of the environment like presence of objects 
or events that are of importance to the owner of the sensory systems. 
Such specif ic features are usually called information. Sensory systems 
are thus thought to be the instruments of all species of animals and 
plants with which they passively receive and/or actively seek informa-
tion. [Chapter 11] ‘Information’ is a relatively new concept the science of 
which (Informatics) emerged after experience with telephone systems 
and computers. Right after World War II mathematicians laid out a set of 
rules that attempted to def ine information and describe its ‘behaviour’. 
(Gleick 2011)
The transmission of information is thought to be an interaction between 
a source or transmitter (part of the environment and the organisms in it) 
and a receiver (the sense system of the organism). Between them energy 
or material is transferred from source to receiver. (Dusenbury 1992,33f) 
The signif icance of the transferred information is determined by compar-
ing the change in behaviour of the receiving organism with knowledge 
of its requirements and estimates of what type of behaviour would be of 
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adaptive advantage in the particular situations. The transferred energy 
is usually def ined in terms of chemical or physical energy such as light, 
sound, vibrations, electrical or magnetic f ields, temperature, pressure, et 
cetera. [Box 2-2] Some of the transferred energy contains non-informational 
energy too. Light, for instance, provides metabolic energy to photosynthetic 
plants, as well as information allowing them to determine length of day and 
consequently season. In practice, more channels may operate simultane-
ously. (Dusenbury 1992,35f)
Environmental events outside the range of sensitivity of the sensory 
systems can not be perceived. Instruments that amplify stimulus energy, 
turning weak signals into strong ones have been invented, for example a 
microscope amplifying visual discrimination. Other instruments convert 
energy outside the normal range of human sensory systems to a perceptible 
form, like a Geiger counter that transforms information about radioactivity 
into sound.
Patterns in the energy transport that acquire signif icance as a result of 
an association with some state of the environment that is relevant to the 
receiving organism are called the code. A pattern carrying information to 
the organism is usually called a signal (by technicians and physicists) or a 
stimulus (by life scientists).
Box 2-2 Stimulus and the effect of some exteroceptors of animal and plant*
stimulus sense/reaction/response
heat flow, thermal stimulus thermoreceptor, infrared organ, klinotaxis, 
tropotaxis
light organ of vision, eye, photoreceptor, 
infrared organ
sound organ of hearing, ear
change in magnetic field sense of direction
change in electrical field electroreceptor
change in field of direct current galvanotaxis
gravitation statolith
change in posture organ of equilibrium, muscle spindle
angular acceleration semicircular canals, sense of rotation
change in external pressure, touch lateral line organ, organ of touch
tissue injury nociceptor, pain
chemicals; olfactory-,taste-, gustatory 
stimuli
chemoreceptors, chemotaxis, olfaction, 
taste, smell, vomeronasal organ
* Feenstra and Borgstein 2003, adapted from Fay and Popper 1994.
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2.4 Classification of sensory-systems and some aspects of 
stimuli
Tradition, going back to Aristotle, holds that man was endowed with f ive 
sense organs: vision, hearing, smell, taste and touch. To these a number 
of other senses were added at various times. For instance the sense of 
equilibrium, propriocepsis (the sense of our own position and movement), 
Jacobson’s organ (vomeronasal organ), the immune system according to 
some and the skin as biggest of all. The skin contains receptors of a variety 
of different sensory systems: pain, cold and warm defined in relation to 
body temperature and mechano-receptors or touch.[§ 5-3 (p.69)]
Classif ication of sensory systems may be conveniently based on the 
nature of their specif ic stimulus. It is impossible to present an exhaustive 
list of all the senses since this list yearly grows but a brief overview may be 
helpful. [Box 2-2; § 12-4 (p.147)] Most sensory systems can be stimulated in 
more ways than one but each has only one specific stimulus. For instance, 
pressure on the eyeball, cutting of the optic nerve and electrical stimulation 
of some parts of the cerebral cortex may all lead to a light-like experience. 
The stimulus, specif ic for a sensory system is the one that needs the least 
stimulus energy to be effective. For the human eye the specif ic stimulus 
is visible light if we may be permitted a mild circular argument but the 
stimulus is usually described in the scientif ic literature in physical or 
chemical terms. [Box 1-1 (p.24)]
A second classif ication of the sensory systems is based on the distance 
between the percipient and the object of perception. Touch and taste are 
then called the near sensory systems, while seeing and hearing are (also) 
far or distance sensory systems.8 This distinction has behavioural conse-
quences. Food that tastes bad or is painful in the mouth is quickly spit out. 
No time is wasted in reflection on other peculiarities of the stuff. In case of 
touching a hot plate one acts f irst by withdrawing the hand and body and 
then begins to analyze the situation. With the far sensory systems there is 
usually some time to evaluate the coming event.
A third classif ication discriminates between stimuli that reach sensory 
systems from outside the body and those that originate in the body. The 
stimuli coming from outside the body are called exteroceptive, the other 
ones have been named interoceptive.
8 Vision can pick up information originating from as far away as distant galaxies making it 
possible to observe events located in the past due to the time needed to cover the distance from 
event to the observer. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as time-lag. 
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Proprioception, the ability to sense the position, location, orientation or 
movement of the body and its parts is a subsection of interoception. [Box 5-3 
(p.69)] A great deal of the earlier misunderstanding of ‘sensing’ was based 
on confusion between different meanings of the term.
The sensitivity of sensory systems in the animal kingdom differs con-
siderably. [Box 2-3] Different species therefore may have access to different 
kinds of information. They experience different environments and interact 
with them in ways that reflect their unique requirements and capabilities. 
Although all animals inhabit the part of the world that is usually referred 
to as biosphere, their perceptual worlds may differ radically as was already 
pointed out by von Uexküll (1909) and beautifully described in Nagel’s (1974) 
classical paper. [§ 3-2 (p.43); § 10-4 (p.127)] Not only the kinds of experience 
(understood in its daily use) of different species can not be identical, also 
the experiences of different people may differ as for instance between 
the colour blind and a normal seeing person, and between people from 
different environments, languages and cultures as anthropologists have 
shown us.
The sensitivity of a similar sensory system among different species may 
be almost identical as is beautifully illustrated in the example of prey and 
Box 2-3 The range of sound frequencies in kHz (1000 cps) audible to various species 
at a fixed intensity of 50 dB
SPL
*
animal lower limit optimum higher limit
fish 0,05 1
amphibians 0,1 4
reptiles 0,01 5
birds 0,75 2-4 12
mammals 0,1 150
human 0,02 3 18
elephant 0,02 6
horse 0,20 22
dog 0,2 36
cat 0,125 60
rat 1 59
bat 7 10-30 100
seal 0,5 1-40 58
dolphin 0,4 20-100 145
moth 18 30 120
* Feenstra and Borgstein 2003
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predator like moth and bat [Box 2-3] and also in the example of Dretske 
and his dog Fido. (Dretske 2000,2006)
2.5 Some aspects of stimuli and learning-machinery
That sensory systems are not merely windows is demonstrated by the 
herring gull chick opening its bill widely when triggered by its mother’s 
yellow-beak-with-red-spot. The chick is not only using its eyes and 
neurological wiring, it also opens its mouth; it acts. The human infant 
starts nosing when smelling the breast; its mouth moves immediately 
in the direction of the nipple when the lips touch the breast. It starts 
to suckle as soon as the lips close around the nipple. Smell and touch 
direct the motions of head and mouth. The nose, the lips, the mouth 
with tongue and cheek-with-corpus buccinator (the infant’s fat pad in 
the cheek), and the relatively high position of the larynx and epiglot-
tis compared with the adult, allow the infant to feed and breathe at 
the same time. All parts must act as one system to f ind the nipple and 
start feeding. Somehow this system is also able – within a few days – to 
recognize its mother’s breast (mamma, also pars pro toto for mother). The 
young human organism is perfectly able to adapt to its new environment 
that considerably differs from the amnionf luid containing womb a few 
days earlier. The baby seems to have a kind of built-in knowledge and 
expectancy of its new environment where the sensory systems act as tools 
with which its expectancies, its ‘hypotheses’, are tested. The answers to 
these hypotheses are within a few days incorporated in its body as new 
experience. This incorporation of new bodily experience presupposes 
re-organization of the relation between organism and its environment. 
While the olfactory system can provide specif ic information about the 
chemical nature of the environment, the preference and reaction of the 
baby is largely dependent on experience of a variety of sub-systems of 
the baby.
A human infant also learns to turn its head towards the source of the 
sensory information of sound in the course of the f irst nine months of 
extra-uterine life. Based on this phenomenon a psycho-physical screening 
test for hearing acuity has been developed. (Ewing & Ewing 1994)9 The 
turning-the-head-to-the-source-of-noise is learned knowledge obviously 
9 This screening test has been introduced in the Netherlands in the early f ifties of the last 
century. Its use was terminated after the introduction in the eighties of objective audiometry 
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pre-linguistically acquired, is usually performed automatically for the rest of 
one’s life and is rarely if ever connected with conscious motivation. Indeed, 
it is harder not to turn one’s head towards some sudden (un)known noise. 
Such action remains unconscious most of the time although one may later 
call it into consciousness with some effort.
Similarly the eyes have learned to follow some slow moving object after 
only three to four months of life though vision only reaches maturity by age 
three. (Bishop 1998) The (other) functions of vision such as depth-, form- and 
colour-perception do not seem to mature simultaneously.
These kinds of learned behaviour can be viewed as organization of the 
bodily system that allows actions. The organism in this way learns parts 
of its new environment(s) and gradually seems to f it into it with growing 
confidence. I unhesitatingly consider this to be even vital knowledge, albeit 
not consciously acquired (see also Thelen & Smith 1994). Consciousness or 
‘mind’ doesn’t seem to be required for this process.
This knowledge may later be used to consciously acquire more knowl-
edge. At the initial stage of World War II the British, for example, used 
the above mentioned – very basic – orientation to sound by constructing 
an instrument consisting of two extended auditory canals that made it 
possible to spot enemy aircraft with greater accuracy, thus demonstrating 
how unconsciously acquired information can be made conscious.
It should be stressed that in turning the head, not only the receptors 
(sensors) act but the whole organism does, i.e., perception and motor organs 
cooperate as one (coordinated) system triggered by some stimulus or stimuli. 
This cooperation of sensory systems with large parts of the locomotor parts 
based on the registration of electrophysiological phenomena originating in the cochlea (snail 
or inner ear, ie., part of the laybrinth) and hearing nerve after acoustic stimulation.
Box 2-4 Polanyi’s tacit knowledge*
Someone learning a skill from a teacher must try to mentally combine the move-
ments which the performer combines practically and he must combine them in 
a pattern similar to the performer’s pattern of movements. Two kinds of indwell-
ing meet here. The performer co-ordinates his moves by dwelling in them as 
parts of his body, while the watcher tries to correlate these moves by seeking to 
dwell in them from outside by interiorizing them. By such exploratory indwell-
ing the pupil gets the feel of a master’s skill and may learn to copy that skill.
* Polanyi 1966,29-30.
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of the body functioning as a unit, is the main conclusion of the f indings of 
Thelen’s group. (Thelen & Smith 1994) It may also be considered as (part 
of) the way Polanyi’s (1966) ‘tacit knowledge’ is brought about. [Box 2-4]
The infant, thus gradually acquires bits of knowledge by acting as one 
single unit in which sensory systems, predominantly touch and smell in the 
example of nipple f inding, cooperate with the motor systems. The infant-
‘system’ (or rather conglomerates of sub-systems) in this way collects much 
basic experiential ‘knowledge’ without having consciousness or language 
at its disposal. Consciousness gradually develops with age. Intellectual 
knowledge – not further outlined here – and emotional knowledge differ. 
Taking smell as an example again, we know that some scents evoke vivid 
long-buried and obscure memories, which always appear to be emotionally 
charged. It relates to information apparently forgotten and probably at least 
partially subliminal or unconsciously retained. The frequently cited story 
in the (olfactory) literature is Marcel Proust’s (1928,58). He muses that it is 
impossible to recapture one’s past merely by trying. True recapture requires 
that one re-experiences the sensations one originally felt. He then describes 
that once, when visiting his mother, he is given a cup of tea into which some 
crumbs of a little cake called ‘petite madeleine’, had fallen. He then f inds 
himself overcome with an ‘all-powerful joy’, which he does not understand 
at f irst. The memory comes back gradually:
In that moment all the flowers in our garden and in M.Swann’s park, and 
the water-lilies on the Vivonne and the good folk of the village and their 
little dwellings and the parish church and the whole of Combray and of 
its surroundings, taking their proper shapes and growing solid, sprang 
into being, town and garden alike, from my cup of tea.
It seems diff icult to decide with confidence which part of Proust’s memory 
was unconsciously or sub-consciously acquired and which was not. Clearly, 
the emotional part is recalled coupled to the olfactory system, a well known 
phenomenon. The accompanying scenery was probably sub-consciously 
acquired with the olfactory stimulus. The original scenery gradually re-
turns, forcibly and consciously. Humans can recall events that had earlier 
gone by unnoticed.
Many philosophers have paid attention to one such example of uncon-
scious perception called blind sight.10 Some years ago a similar f inding has 
10 Due to a brain lesion awareness/consciousness of vision is lost although the eyes are perfectly 
normal and unconscious vision remains intact. (Weiskrantz et al. 1991)
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been demonstrated for smell which was consequently described as blind 
smell. (Sobel et al. 1999) Both ‘blind sensations’ allude to a behavioural effect 
of sensory stimuli that are not consciously perceived. In a fascinating review 
Weiskrantz described six such different ‘performances without awareness’.11 
Unconscious ‘perception’ clearly does exist. It is important for many aspects 
of life, to some of which I will return later.
The sensory systems do not only assist in the transmission of information 
but they facilitate direct connections between organism and environment. 
Sensory system-processes are activities of the whole organism that obtain 
new information leading to experience [§ 10-3 (p.126)] resulting in new 
behaviour, usually viewed as – experientially collected – knowledge. This 
occurs at an unconscious level in infants, and may become conscious later, 
but clearly not in all circumstances. Indeed conscious perception rather 
is the exception or more cautiously formulated the top of the iceberg of 
perception. By focusing on the top of this iceberg its larger unconscious 
part has mainly been neglected until quite recently.
2.6 Perception as the origin of knowledge
By unconsciously acquiring experience the infant demonstrates its abil-
ity to gradually obtain new knowledge. After some repetition the same 
stimulus or experience leads to a comparable response, a phenomenon 
based on behavioural expectancy well known from the experiments of 
Pavlov. Expectancy (cf. the olfactory milk stimulus) leads to the response 
(suckling).12 Pavlov’s f inding, conditioning, is based on induction – since 
Hume highly suspect – is partly innate as demonstrated by the olfactory 
example. [§ 5-2 (p.66)] George Santayana (1923,49-62) called this process 
‘groundless faith’, an animal’s faith that is unquestionably embraced in 
very early youth. Alston (1993,7) introduced for this ‘attitude’ the formula 
‘sense perceptual practice’, which he def ined as the activity of forming 
beliefs (perceptual beliefs) about the physical environment on the basis of 
sensory perception. He also called such behaviour doxastic practices, which 
are “ineluctably rooted in our lives and are loosely def ined as a family of 
individual dispositions in order to be able to pursue our daily activities, reli-
11 Weiskrantz L. To have but not to hold. (In: Bolhuis 2000,311-25)
12 Nursing mothers generally do not cheat their babies. Indeed, if babies are regularly cheated 
early in life in their inborn expectancies, predictable character-defects develop as has been 
demonstrated by the notorious experiments of Harlow. (Haraway 2005)
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able as it provides mostly true beliefs in a suff iciently large and varied run 
of employments in situations of the sorts we typically encounter”. (ibid.8) 
Shimony (1971,575) – in the same vein – speaks about the cognitive state of 
the percipient, consisting of the entire network of sensations, perceptions, 
memories, dispositions to organize information, inferences, et cetera, 
that constitutes a partial specif ication of the complete state. He takes the 
causal theory of perception as hypothesis; its validation, like that of any 
well-established scientif ic hypothesis, is its power to predict and explain 
facts of our experience with greater accuracy, comprehensiveness, and 
simplicity than any alternative one. He uses the evolutionary point of view 
supportive of the causal theory of perception by providing quasi-teleological 
Box 2-5 Stimulus, signal, signal-to-noise ratio, information and homeostasis
Stimulus (plural: stimuli) something, e.g., an environmental change – more spe-
cifically the pattern of physical or chemical energy caused by an object or event 
– that directly influences the activity of living organisms (response) by exciting 
a sense organ or evoking other bodily structures such as glandular secretion. In 
this essay stimulus, the term used by life scientists, is considered synonymous 
with signal, the term used by technicians.
Signal-to-noise ratio is the ratio of the signal’s energy to the energy of (un-
wanted) random interference.
Information consists of facts or data, especially pertaining to a particular 
subject or regarded as significant from a transmitter and to a recipient. Informa-
tion about the environment of a living thing to which it has been exposed is 
obtained through sensory systems and is called sensory information. With the 
acquired information organisms solve a wide variety of problems (timing activi-
ties, locating resources or threats et cetera). [Chapter 11]
Homeostasis refers to the processes by which a stable state of certain condi-
tions in the body (milieu intérieur) is maintained in spite of environmental (milieu 
extérieur) changes. [Box 5-4 (p.72)]
Behaviour is/are an organism’s response/s to stimulation. The part that is 
observable to an observer is the realm of behavioural biology, the part that is 
internal that of physiology. The boundaries between the two are not sharp.
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explanations for many features of the perceptual powers of human beings 
and other animals.
The environment of an animal is almost completely independent of the 
animal.13 The other way around, the animal’s life-strategy determines which 
aspects of its environment are important. The senses need to recognize 
these important aspects with suff icient accuracy and speed so that the 
animal can behave effectively. In practice, the evolutionary explanation of a 
feature of an animal’s perceptual faculties consists of reasonably exhibiting 
its eff iciency in performing the required function of recognition. (Shimony 
1971,577)
Dretske (1971) in discussing Shimony’s paper states that the evolutionary 
point of view has little to offer epistemology and that “Darwin does not 
help us with Descartes”. Basically, Dretske dissociates correct “answers” 
(his shorthand for correct perceptual judgments about the surroundings 
of an individual) from cognitive achievement on the part of the respondent 
(emphasis in the original). I do not agree with Dretske as he seems to limit 
cognition to its conscious part. Judgments are usually cognitive and the 
nipple-finding mouth of the infant is not, but it is definitely an achievement. 
This discussion is largely semantic and seems to centre on the meaning of 
the word cognitive. Dretske’s theory confirms my objection in his statement 
that whether or not this achievement is an epistemologically significant fact 
will depend […] on how liberal […] we want to be in classifying something 
as ‘cognitive’ or ‘epistemic’. Dretske then argues that Shimony’s ‘cognitive 
states’ do only statistically correlate with the character of man’s surround-
ings. He considers this insufficient to satisfy a skeptic. Dretske then attempts 
to support Shimony by a progressive assimilation of a causal account into 
an epistemological view of perception through staging. The f irst stage in 
his view is scientif ic and (therefore) only useful “in explaining certain 
phenomenological and psychological features of perception.” The second 
stage centres on “the view that part of what it means to say is that someone 
sees (hears, feels, smells, et cetera) something is that there is a certain causal 
relationship between the percipient and (some phase of the history of) the 
object allegedly seen (heard, smelled et cetera). Dretske hesitates to accept 
this stage as of great philosophical importance and even seems inclined to 
reject it. He considers the third stage, i.e., pondering the causal relationships 
between the object and ourselves in perceptual situations and the fourth, 
13 This statement should be differentiated. Many animals influence their environment, i.e. 
birds build nests, beavers construct dams, rabbits dig holes, not to speak about the actions of 
Homo sapiens.
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speculating on the possibility of building the outcomes of the third stage 
“into the very meaning of those verbal constructions which entail that we 
possess knowledge” really as epistemological theories of perception. He 
ends with the lamentation that “if one f inds this classif ication overly rigid, 
leaving out much that one would like to put into epistemology, he can only 
invite clarif ication on what epistemology is supposed to be about”.
Twenty years later Dretske (1991) stated that knowledge (emphasis added) 
is an early arrival on the evolutionary scene, “needed by animals to coor-
dinate their behaviour with the environmental conditions on which their 
survival and well-being depend.”
Ten years later again, Dretske (2000) follows this up with an article mean-
ingfully entitled Perception without Awareness. In this paper he cites many 
(supportive) life science publications, addressing medical questions like 
split brains, change blindness and other neuro-/psycho-logical deficits and 
knowledge, and psychological problems such as attention deficit disorders. 
He introduces a new objective test, by looking “in the most varied possible 
conditions, at what an agent f inds it reasonable to do, at what, therefore, 
given suitable desires and circumstances, the agent is motivated to do.” 
Dretske thus seems to gradually change his ground by finely accepting 
perception without awareness.
In summary, neither a herring gull chick nor an infant is a tabula rasa 
at birth. Science has confirmed that both acquire knowledge even prior to 
birth. Both have innate ways of behaviour provoked by stimuli, i.e., specif ic 
signals that can be defined in chemical or physical terms. An infant of even 
a few days demonstrates changes in its behaviour that can be interpreted 
as unconsciously acquiring experiential knowledge. Knowledge therefore 
should not automatically be taken as consciously acquired. Much basic 
experiential knowledge needed for survival of every organism is acquired 
straight after birth and some of it even earlier than that. Alston, Dretske, 
Santayana and Slurink, among others, examined this early experiential 
cognition, although using different terms. I will return to this in chapter 5.
3 What the life sciences tell about the 
sensory systems (continued)
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I proceed with the life-scientif ic view on sensory systems. 
Sensory systems are our body parts most sensitive to changes in forms of 
physcial or chemical energy in the environment. If such energy reaches 
the sensory system it may lead to a cascade of processes in the organism. 
The form of energy that evokes the cascade is called signal (by techni-
cians and physicists) or stimulus (by life scientists). A stimulus carrying 
some signif icance for the organism is usually called information (about 
the environment) although it may also be intepreted as mere noise or a 
mixture of both. The signif icance of the information for the organism may 
be activily sought or passivily received, consciously, sub-consciously or 
even not-consciously.
In the preceding chapter I argued that all living entities are endowed 
with (sets of) inborn maxims. Chick and infant, for instance, start to feed 
after some – retrospectively judged adequate – stimulus. They thus have 
specif ic inborn systems called ‘innate releasing mechanism’ of feeding. 
Another inborn maxim is the change of the human baby’s behaviour after 
a few days exposure to identical stimuli. I def ined that change somewhat 
loosely as ‘learning’ (acquiring knowledge).
3.2 Scope of human sense-systems
Environmental events can only affect sensory systems if the chemical or 
physical stimuli are in the range for which the systems of the organism are 
sensitive1. A form of energy that is out of bounds of the sensory systems 
of Homo sapiens must f irst be converted to a form that is in his perceptual 
potential with for instance a Geiger counter that processes information 
about the presence of radioactivity, or an infrared camera that converts 
infra red into visible light. The energy of other events’ may be amplif ied to 
a level that can stimulate the sensory systems, such as a microscope that 
amplif ies phenomena otherwise not perceptible.
1 Apart from a few exceptions of non-specif ic stimuli as mentioned earlier.[§ 2-4] 
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Such events, processes that happen in the universe def ined in physical 
or chemical terms may even pass through human bodies unnoticed and 
gradually become manifest later as for instance the sequellae of (too much) 
radioactive or ultra violet radiation. Homo sapiens only notices a fraction 
of all (possible) forms of electromagnetic energy in the universe. Stated 
differently Homo sapiens is not able to notice each and every aspect of his 
environment. Some physical processes not perceptible by humans may be 
noticed by other animals, though. Gradually other forms of chemical and 
physcial energy became uncovered by science and, undoubtedly, many 
more will follow. Even if manifestly causing reactions some decennia later, 
such events can not be noticed immediately or, taken here as synonymous, 
experienced consciously by the human organism.
Only part of the electromagnetic energy2 in the universe may be ex-
perienced by humans without technical aid. It is largely semantics if one 
chooses to call the former or the totality ‘reality’. We can safely conclude 
that no sentient being is able to experience all aspects of the totality 
which we might call universe-reality (RU). Any organism can notice with 
the limited number and scope of his sensory systems only part of the 
former reality which we might call animalX-reality (RA)3. Finally the RA 
reality for Homo sapiens we may call human-reality (RH). Not all aspects of 
some object, event or phenomenon in RU can thus be experienced as there 
may be more to it than sensory systems of our species can grasp. This of 
course reminds us of Kant’s Ding-an-Sich. We may know and understand 
that a bat has different sensory systems and we may try to form an idea 
of its echolocation but we are not able to share the subjective character of 
the experience of What it is like to be a bat. (Nagel 1974,83)[§ 10-3 (p.126)]
Incidentally, the scientif ic knowledge about some structures of the 
environment that cannot be directly experienced by humans may lead 
to errors in reasoning. These consist of taking results of science about 
structures that cannot be experienced to those that can. For instance 
the statement that some table-top ‘in reality’ is empty based on the 
empty structure of molecules and atoms is wrong as the table-top is 
clearly solid when eyed with normal functioning human eyes and us-
ing normal daily language. Little doubt remains if you were to hit your 
elbow against its edge. Indeed, the word solid has received its meaning 
2 Left out in this discussion are the sensory systems that are sensitive to – say volatile – 
chemicals, such as smell for Homo sapiens and the intricate communicative ways through 
pheromones of many insects. They do not influence the essence of this discussion. 
3 Viz. von Uexküll’s Umwelt [§ 11-5 (p.138)]
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in the society of – as Austin (1962,9-12) would say – normal man and 
in normal circumstances. This kind of error in reasoning was coined a 
‘mistake of category’ by Gilbert Ryle (1947,17ff, and passim) and is due to 
imprecise contextual use of words, essentially a semantic error. As van 
Brakel (2000,v) says the manifest, macroscopic image [..] is prior to the 
scientif ic, micro-reductionist image, not only in a methodological, but also 
in an epistemological and ontological sense. In my terminology, human 
experience, i.e., the manifest (noticable) image precedes the scientif ic 
(knowable, understandable) image.
3.3 Some observations on the (human) animal’s awareness of 
his environment
The word perception has been tentatively def ined [p.25] as that part of 
the information presented through the sensory systems to the brain that 
leads to one’s awareness or consciousness of the objects and events in the 
environment and of one’s own body. One of the curious phenomena of 
the philosophical literature on perception is that – apart from some rare 
exceptions – the discussion has been overwhelmingly confined to one single 
sense system only, i.e., vision. Occasionally hearing, smell, touch or pain 
are described albeit even then generally in contrast with or as an addition 
to vision. Except the sensus communis posit introduced by Aristotle and 
also used by Thomas Aquinas, Leonardo da Vinci, Descartes and more 
lateley by Hannah Arendt (1958)4 little thought was given to cooperation of 
the senses. Recently (Clark 2008) paid attention to cooperation of senses 
calling it multimodal perception.
Normally every organism including Homo sapiens uses all his sensory 
systems simultaneously and continuously although not all of them continu-
ously at the same intensity. The variable intensity of each sensory system 
depends among other things on the kind of activity of its owner and the 
level of attention given to that specif ic activity (concentration). Thereby all 
normal functioning organisms have a three or rather four dimensional (4-D) 
awareness of their environment based on the (total) – mostly unconsciously 
acquired – information received through their sensory systems. In fact, it 
is the totality of this concert or rather cacophony of information that keeps 
animals constantly functioning (body-reacting) and occasionally even 
aware of (some part of) their (constantly changing) environment. This 
4 See also Borren,2013
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capacity, the usually unconsciously or subliminal but continuous awareness 
of the relation of one’s body to its environment, is gradually formed within 
the f irst few years of childhood. [§ 2-5 (p.36)] This self-evident observation 
should be one of the most basic statements to start discussions of human 
perception.
Many life scientists take for granted that such awareness concerns the 
brain. Indeed it is one of the fundamental objections (mereological fal-
lacy5) [Box 3-1] of Bennett and Hacker against neuroscientists. In general, 
they state, neuroscientists have a strong tendency to speak about a brain 
that knows things, reasons inductively, and constructs hypotheses on the 
basis of arguments, and its constituent neurons that are intelligent, can 
estimate probabilities, and present arguments. (italics in the original). This 
logical fallacy leads to a form of re-importing Cartesian dualism or even 
re-importing the concept of a homunculus into neuroscience, such as ‘my 
brain and I’.
Thelen and Smith (1994,xxii-xxiii) even widened the concept of ‘co-
operation’ of the human senses. Based on the principles of nonlinear 
dynamic systems, they tackled the development of the child as a whole 
system that fundamentally is an inextricable causal web of perception, 
action and cognition. They conclude that one cannot separate (parts of) 
perception, action and cognition without considerable loss of understand-
ing each of them.
Other criticism of the viewpoint that cognition is conf ined to one’s 
brain is coming from those researchers that advocate externalism in the 
philosophy of mind. (Clark 2008; Noë 2009) Some scientists advocate 
drawing the line still wider and further. Hutchins (1995), for instance, 
studied navigation teams of the USA navy by thoroughly analysing the 
way in which (changing) members of such teams interact, using almost 
all faculties and every possible navigational instrument they had at 
their disposal. He compared the people interacting with each other and 
their navigational instruments to the various parts of the human body, 
broadening the concept of human cognition and its usually accepted 
borders. He compares those instruments to the cane of a blind man, 
which gradually develops into an extension of his proprioception and 
functions as the blind man’s tool for spatial orientation. Another example 
of the similarity between humans and their instruments as information 
5 Mereology (μερος = part) is the theory of parthood relations, i.e., the relations of a part to 
the whole and those of part to part within a whole.
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processing systems has led to the symbiotic hybrid called cyborg. (van 
Brakel 1998,9) [Addendum 14-2 (p.167)]
In summary, along with the reductive approach to study or analyse 
one sensory system separately, particularly vision, there are also other 
approaches feasible. They pay attention to the cooperation of all sensory 
systems and even to the interconnection with other bodily systems. Some 
extend this line of thought by connecting extra-corporeal systems with the 
human body thus ‘incorporating’ hardware and/or software.
Nothing of this is new. We are aware of the cooperation of our sensory sys-
tems even if we are very much focused on one specific activity which heavily 
relies on the use of one sense only. Compare for instance the concentrated 
intellectual activity of reading Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit. Even then, the 
reader remains aware of the environment in a (almost)-subconscious way by 
the continuous cooperation of all his sensory systems although some of them 
seem to be in a semi-dormant state. As soon as some strange event occurs in 
his environment, even when he is highly concentrated, the sensory system 
sensitive to that specif ic stimulus reacts to the sudden change in arriving 
Box 3-1 Mereological fallacy*
Aristotle
For it is surely better not to say that the soul pities, learns or thinks, but that the 
man does these with his soul.
ryle
[I]t is improper to speak of my eyes seeing this, or my nose smelling that; we 
should say, rather, that I see this, or I smell that, and that these assertions carry 
with them certain facts about my eyes and nose.
Wittgenstein
Only of a human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human be-
ing can one say: it has sensations; it sees, is blind; hears, is deaf; is conscious or 
unconscious.
Bennett and HAcker
Mereological fallacy is the mistake of ascribing to the constituent parts of an 
animal attributes that logically apply only to the whole animal.
* Quotations from Aristotle (DA 408b 12-5), Ryle (1949,161), Wittgenstein (1953, § 281), Bennett 
and Hacker (2003,68ff)
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signals, occasionally overruling all other sensory systems. Take a sudden 
noise. The hearing of the reader of Sein und Zeit remained sub-conscious 
(not aware of it) during the time the environmental signals were steady 
and expected. As soon as a signif icant change occurs in the environmental 
sounds the reader is immediately alerted. If the signal is strong enough 
in relation to the concentration on the task at hand, in our case reading 
philosophy, the body rushes into alertness with attention to the origin of 
the stimulus; when the qualities of the sounds and its interpretation proof 
to be severe, a so called fight or flight reaction may even follow. A similar 
example is the normal functioning nose of a sleeping human that almost 
immediately awakes its owner if it notices smoke.6,7
It thus is clear that paying attention to one single sensory system without 
taking into consideration the cooperation of them all is a form of (biased) 
reductionism. We should thus be cautious in drawing conclusions about 
the functioning of any human or animal from analysis of one single sensory 
system only.
In the example of reading Heidegger’s book I alluded to the mechanism by 
which information is selected, commonly referred to as attention. According 
to William James’ classic description (quoted by Bisley et al. 2010,2) attention is
the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of 
what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. 
Focalization, concentration, or consciousness is of its essence. It implies 
withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively with others.
James discerns two attention varieties, i.e., passive (reflex, non-voluntary, 
effortless) and active (and voluntary). In modern terms these are classif ied 
‘bottom-up’ ‘top-down’, respectively. (ibid.) The change from a current course 
of action to respond to potentially advantageous or threatening stimuli 
(on which survival may depend) is called the reorienting response. This 
involves switching from a (virtual) network in the brain that concentrates 
on some focused activity to another one that interrupts the former and resets 
on-going activity as a reaction to a vital environmental stimulus. (Corbetta 
et al. 2008,306)
6 One of the causes of very signif icant differences between young and old deaths through 
f ire – well known within circles of insurance companies – is the loss of smell of the elderly. The 
normal nose of the young is generally much better than the normal nose of an older person. 
Decline of function of any sensory system related to age is normal.
7 Normal function: any individual subject with all sensory systems functioning according 
to the norm of that species at that space and time.
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3.4 ‘Reality’ is not?
Only part of the chemical or physical changes in the environment of any 
species will stimulate his sensory systems; only part of the total reality 
may thus be directly experienced unconsciously (for each sentient being) 
or consciously, i.e., perceived.
Some of the chemical or physical changes that stimulate the sensory 
systems is used as signif icant information; some of it is consciously noticed, 
but most of it is not. Together with and through inborn (learning) maxims 
or algorithms this information gradually leads to the development of (new) 
behavioural rules. I call this a learning process the results of which are 
somehow stored into memory.
Diff iculties arise if we try to analyse in what form the incoming informa-
tion is organized and in what way it is put into storage (memory). These 
questions have been hotly debated and are intensely researched by life 
scientists (Roediger III et al.2007) and philosophers.
We know that during the cascade of processes in an organism after 
stimulation of some sensory system, many transformations occur. A one 
to one representation of that part of reality in the body therefore is highly 
questionable. Some sort of – distorted – end-result is obtained in the body 
(memory and knowledge) which provisionally can be taken as some kind of 
(probably distorted) representation.[Box 3-2] The distorted representations 
build the way the world presents itself to us. Is Berkeley right with his Esse 
est percipi after all? 8 Is everything that is perceived only illusion(s)? My 
objection to such conclusions is that it is generally reached after analysis 
8 Esse est percipi (to be is to be perceived). Berkeley asserts of ‘unthinking things’ that ‘their 
esse is percipi’ (Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, 1710, par 3)
Box 3-2 Mental representation*
The classical answers to the question of mental representation can conveniently 
be divided into three types: (1) picture theories, (2) causal and/or informational 
theories, (3) – in the terms of W.Sellars – PMese theories (symbolic logic). All 
three run into the problem of accounting for cognitive errors, like mispercep-
tions, false beliefs, confused concepts, bad inferences, unrealized intentions 
and so forth, summarized as the normativity problem of making the distinction 
between the fact of cognition and its norms.
* Millikan 1993,3
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of one single sense system only which is, as I have argued, an unrealistic 
approach. No sentient being is ever using one single sensory system only. 
Moreover, Homo sapiens has survived so far with his sensory systems and 
his central nervous system that somehow developed during evolution. Thus 
the information we gather with our sensory systems must be suff icient for 
our survival and can not be entirely wrong. In the next chapter I will turn 
to evolution.
Sceptical philosophers have told us that our sensory systems often de-
ceive us. Others aimed at absolute certainty (or truth) as one of the alleged 
goals of Western philosophy. Scientists have followed Hume, in that scien-
tif ic knowledge is acquired inductively and therefore always provisional. 
 Science’s consequential view is that absolute certainty of knowledge is 
highly questionable if not impossible. I will return to this later.
4 Darwin, anti-Darwin and Evolutionary 
Epistemology
Darwinism is the cornerstone for a fully naturalistic theory of persons. The 
theory of evolution by natural selection provides prospects for philosophical 
unif ication of all the sciences that pertain to human being.
O Flanagan 2009,3
4.1 Introduction
As already mentioned in the previous chapters behavioural biology, 
comparative anatomy, physiology, neuroscience et cetera, in short all life 
sciences and many other disciplines (vide infra) are solidly united in their 
acceptance of evolutionary theory which I take as synonymous with neo-
Darwinism. It is of paramount importance to understand the varieties and 
different states of development of sensory systems and the central nervous 
system in evolutionary context, both in se as in relation to the habitats in 
which they function. Wholly endorsing the quote from Flanagan above, I 
deem it necessary to add a chapter on this topic as I have noticed too many 
varieties of opposition and misunderstanding on the one hand and an 
almost religious idolization of neo-Darwin(ism) on the other.
Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913) discovered the theory of evolution 
through natural selection about the same time as Darwin.1 Wallace sent 
his manuscript on the subject, accompanied by a letter to Darwin from 
the Moluccas where he was collecting specimen of natural life. In this 
letter which reached Darwin in June 1858 Wallace asked him to read the 
manuscript and submit it to some journal if he found it acceptable. Charles 
Robert Darwin (1809-‘82) asked advice of his friends, the geologist Charles 
Lyell (1797-1875) and the botanist Joseph Dalton Hooker (1817-1911), who 
together presented Wallace’s manuscript, accompanied by excerpts from 
Darwin’s own manuscript and letters on July 1, 1858 at a meeting of the 
Linnaean Society of London, amounting to a simultaneous publication 
of the f indings of Wallace and Darwin. (Mayr 1991,7) On 24 November 
1 Wallace AR independently invented the principle of natural selection during a malarial 
f it on the island of Ternate eighteen years after Darwin had devised the idea but before its 
publication. (Gould 1990,52)
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1859 Darwin’s On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the 
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle of Life was f irst published, 
followed in 1871 by The descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex.
Darwin’s theory or hypothesis (vide infra) has led to many controversies 
because it seems to occupy a special place at the crossroads of science, 
philosophy and religion. Even before On the Origin of Species was printed, 
Asa Gray, a Harvard botanist, after receiving an advance copy sent to him 
by Darwin, wrote a review for the American Journal of Sciences and Arts. He 
prepared a series of articles to defend evolution from the anticipated charges 
of atheism. (Gross 1996) Orthodox (mono-theistic) religious thinkers have 
attacked Darwin’s theory of evolution to this day. Apart from the religiously 
rooted objections several other ones have been formulated. I will start with 
the former and will subsequently say a few words on the latter.
4.2 Creationism and Intelligent Design2
All things were made by Him, and without Him was not anything made that was made. 
John 1:23, 4
Creationism comes in many varieties that are characterized according to the 
degree of biblical literalism and ranges from strict biblical literalist young-
earth creationism which hardly accepts modern science, through a variety 
of old-earth creationists (gap-creation, day-age creationism) to progressive 
creationism, continuous creationism, and theistic creationism, the least 
literal and hardly distinguishable from nonreligious evolutionists. Specif ic 
terms may have slightly different connotations depending on who uses them.
In general, young-earth creationism posits that the universe was created 
at one time, within the last 10,000 years. Noah’s flood is an essential element 
to both young-earth theology and creation science. Both have it that this 
f lood was a historical occurrence, in which water covered the whole globe. 
2 Most of the information on Creationism in the following paragraph has been drawn from 
a review of Scott (1966,505-22)
3 It seems mandatory to start a survey of Creationism with some text from the Holy Book, the 
Holy Script, the Bible, the special revelation from God himself, demanding our absolute trust 
and allegiance as Plantinga (1998,674) has it. 
4 Now we Reformed Christians are wholly in earnest about the Bible. We are people of the 
Word; sola Scriptura is our cry; we take Scripture to be a special revelation from God himself, 
demanding our absolute trust and allegiance. (ibid.)
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During the year that the flood waters receded, all the geological features of 
the world were established.
Old-earth-creationists accept modern geology and radiometric dating 
and their implication of earth being an old planet. One version of old-
earth-theory, gap-creationism, allows for a long period of time before the 
six days of creation described in Genesis, or alternatively for the six days in 
Genesis to be separated by thousands or hundreds of thousands of years. 
Day-age-creationism accommodates some modern geology by claiming that 
each of the six days in Genesis is actually an immensely long period of time.
In progressive creationism, God is supposed to have created the original 
species, which subsequently have progressed by evolving into new forms. 
Noah’s f lood is considered a local, not a universal event. Continuous-
creationism and theistic evolutionism are further along the continuum, 
referring to a Christian perspective that accepts a considerable amount 
of evolution. In continuous creationism, God plays a very active role in 
directing evolution from the created kinds.
Theistic evolution in the most general sense is the idea that God created, 
but that His creation had the inherent property of evolution. By and large, 
theistic evolutionism accepts the evidence of science, and f ine-tunes the 
theology if necessary. It takes Noah’s f lood not as a historical event, but as 
a metaphor of the importance of obedience to God, ultimately of God’s love 
for humankind. Theology varies as to how involved God is in guiding the 
Box 4-1 Fundamentals and fundamentalism*
Fundamentals is a testimony, published during the years 1909-1912. Three million 
copies were distributed to ‘every pastor, evangelist, missionary, theological stu-
dent, Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. secretary in the English speaking world.’(Kennedy 1957)
Fundamentalism is the term derived from the writings of the group of Presbyteri-
ans at Princeton university (1910) who wrote the series of pamphlets called The Fun-
damentals [..] In them they spoke out against the modernist drift of some churches, 
especially efforts to understand the Bible as a historical document rather than as 
the literal and infallible truth they believed in: the direct creation of the world and 
humanity by God from nothing, miracles, and the life of Jesus, his virgin birth, his 
death to atone for human sin, his resurrection and imminent return. In 1920, a uSA 
Baptist editor coined the term ‘fundamentalist’ to describe those beliefs. Christians 
who hold such beliefs prefer the label ‘evangelical’ (MacKenzie 2005,40-3)
* Y.M.C.A. & Y.W.C.A. = Young Men’s Christian Association & Young Women’s Christian Association.
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evolutionary process, although this is not the main issue in the creation/
evolution debate.
Special creation believes that God created according to the literal in-
terpretation of Genesis, i.e., all at one time in its present form. The theory 
or – according to creationists – the hypothesis of evolution in their opinion 
entails that God did not specially create mankind, therefore mankind is 
not special to God and the fall of Adam and Eve is irrelevant. Without 
Adam and Eve’s sin the death of Christ is irrelevant and therefore the 
foundation of Christianity is irrelevant. If the Bible is not (literally) true, 
then Revelations cannot be true and salvation is in jeopardy. Moreover, 
as evolutionary theory denies God, it removes the source of morality. It is 
clear therefore why their children’s souls should be protected from this 
evil.
The points of view of creationists have been formulated (summarized) 
in the f ive fundamentals [Box 4-1] against evolution: the infallabillity of 
the Bible, the virgin birth, the atonement, the resurrection and the second 
coming of Christ. The root of all evil according to the f ive fundamentals is 
materialism and its parent science.
It is clear from the foregoing that Creationism, if it seeks to gather 
scientif ic evidence, it does so in order to f ind evidence in support of the 
Bible. By starting from a pre-conceived conclusion and selectively using 
evidence to back it up, creationists ’science’ is clearly not very scientif ic. 
(Holmes 2005)
The heaviest Flak5 and opposition against evolution occurred in the USA, 
usually in Court, motivated by the way evolution or Creationism should 
or should not be taught at school. Creationism won a few battles in USA 
courts, but f inally lost the war. As a phoenix it nevertheless reappeared 
under the name of “many splendoured” Intelligent Design (ID). All its 
varieties can again be def ined with the degrees of biblical literalism as 
Creationism.
There is an irreconcilable contradiction between science and religious 
belief as the standard by which scientif ic facts are accepted or rejected. 
Scientists wish to understand how the universe works. Their theories are 
based on inference. On the other hand, it is also incorrect to use evolution 
for a deductive line of reasoning leading to a particular world-view as, for 
instance, Richard Dawkins is never tired of repeating. (McGrath 2004)
Neo-Darwinism [§ 4-3] still is the theory of evolutionary mechanisms 
that has great explanatory power, is based on observation, is open to 
5 FLAK = Flug(zeug)abwehrkanone = (the f ire from) anti-aircraft gun(s).
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modif ication and is the best account we have of the origins of species. 
But bear in mind that in principle any theory can and must be refuted 
in the light of further observations. To call neo-Darwinism a theory or 
hypothesis is mainly semantics. Nowadays, life scientists accept neo-
Darwinism as one of the cornerstones of science, in the words of Ernst 
Mayr (1991,162) “The basic theory of evolution has been conf irmed so 
completely that modern biologists consider evolution simply a fact”. 
Neo-Darwinists, of course, are as wrong as creationists if they impose 
their theory as absolute truth. We can state that the evidence f its the 
theory very well indeed but that it should not be embraced as a religion 
nor accepted as absolute truth.
4.3 Darwinism and neo-Darwinism
Darwinism is the scientif ic theory originally called ‘natural selection’ by 
Darwin. After incorporation of the Mendelian laws and modern molecular 
biology that did much to support and buttress the theory it was renamed 
neo-Darwinism. Synonyms are evolutionary theory (Hull et al.1998; Ridley 
2004a, 2004b) and evolutionary synthesis (introduced by Julian Huxley 
in 1942). Neo-Darwinism has f irm roots in many if not all (life) sciences 
(geology, paleontology, embryology, taxonomy, comparative anatomy, 
physiology, molecular biology, immunology, ecology, population biology, 
psychology, anthropology et cetera) abundantly providing examples of 
Whewell’s consilience of inductions.[Box 4-2]
Evolutionary theory or neo-Darwinism, as I will call it, consists of 
a whole bundle of (sub)theories. Point zero of the following list does 
Box 4-2 Consilience, triangulation, robustness*
Consilience, a term coined by Whewell, happens when inductive explanations 
of two or more different kinds of phenomena are discovered which separately 
corroborate one another.
Triangulation, defined as the use of multiple procedures, methods, or assump-
tions to get at the same putative object, trait, or regularity is commonplace in 
ordinary cognition and in science. Occasionally triangulation is also referred to 
as robustness.
* Whewell 1840, ii.65-80; Goldman 1986,49; Wimsatt 1981,124-63
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not belong to the evolutionary theory properly speaking. It is usually 
mentioned in its introductory paragraphs though, occasionally with the 
observation that ‘everything and everybody is star dust’.
(0) the universe is about 13,7 x 109 years old taking its start with the Big 
Bang6; the earth is about 4,56 x 109 years old,
(1) evolution, the theory that the biological development is steadily chang-
ing from its very beginning, is a scientif ic fact,
(2) life on earth started spontaneously about 3,8 x 109 years after the planet 
formed,7
(3) life developed from that simple start to many and more complex forms, 
increasing the total biomass of animals, plants and microorganisms,8
(4) thereby gradually building a ‘tree of life’ (a concept originally con-
structed from fossils),9
(5) natural selection operates on the abundant production of genetic vari-
ation in every generation and on random genetic mutation; therefore 
it is not goal-directed; it is a process of trial and error (or stochastic 
process), leading to maturing and procreating of relatively few indi-
viduals. Survival ensures a well-adapted combination of inheritable 
characters producing the next generation,
(6) Homo sapiens, the human species, has his place in the ‘tree of life’ just 
like every other living thing.10
From an evolutionary perspective we may take for granted that Homo sapiens 
gradually developed his phenotype. This is thought to have adapted as the 
6 The Big Bang is the dominant cosmological theory about the genesis of the universe, an 
event that occurred about 13,7 x 109 years ago. 
7 There are different hypotheses of the origin of life and how life became so diverse and 
widespread. Darwin believed that life appeared by some wholly unknown process, and therefore 
is unsoluble. I think this statement is still valid.
8 The oldest traces of life are about 3,85 x 109 years old (some material called clinopyroxene 
found in Akilia Island in Greenland). This – nucleated – oldest marine sediments are thought 
to contain some residue of organisms. The oldest still surviving creatures are Stromatolites 
f irst arriving around 3,5 x 109 years ago. They look like grey coli-f lowers, are conglomerates of 
cyanobacteria and rock-dust and survive at Shark Bay on the northwest coast of Australia. They 
are prokaryotes (= pre-nucleated).
9 Species divided, evolved and died out. The sequence of the species is not known so that the 
unknown number of species that have lived over the past 4 billion years could be arranged in 
many ways. For instance, with a mere twenty species there are some 2 x 1018 possible trees (of 
life), but some are more likely than others.
10 Circa 5 million years ago the family of two-legged primate animals (hominids) appeared 
on the scene. Some 3-2 million years ago there existed about half a dozen types of them. Finely 
only our species, i.e., Homo sapiens remained.
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result of continuous interaction of the genotypes of his ancestors in relation 
to their continuing changing environment. The human animal proved quite 
successfull. Those ancestors or side branches of the hominids trajectory of the 
tree of life that were less successful – and/or possibly had less luck – became 
extinct. This competitive process of selection – so far advantageous for each 
species that still exists – is generally known as survival of the fittest (Darwin’s 
serendipitous trouvaille when reading Malthus on population).11 Homo sapiens 
thus belongs to one of the surviving species because his specific qualities have 
contributed to his survival, like in other – still – surviving species.
Which characteristic(s) have caused this survival of Homo sapiens? Many 
features have been proposed, such as the reproductive system, the erect posi-
tion, the hand with the opposing thumb, the sensory systems, the hairless skin 
with abundance of sweatglands, the spoor reading capacity,12 socialisation, the 
central nervous system and language development. Not without reason, the 
combination of all of them contributed to the survival of Homo sapiens. The 
human phenotype is, in the words of Dawkins (1976), merely a survival ma-
chine. A holistic approach should, I suppose, pay attention to each (sub)system 
of the human animal but that would take too far. Leaving out of consideration 
the reproductive system, the erect position, the skin’s peculiarities and the 
hand with the opposing thumb, I will focus predominantly on the sensory 
systems and (the embodiment of) cognition. (see also Thelen et al 1994)
4.4 Neo-Darwinism yes, but…
I leave the religious scruples to what they are and will not touch on the 
objections to Darwinism from Stalin’s Russia (the Lysenko affair). The 
distinction between these antagonists on the one hand and scientif ic objec-
tions on the other occasionally is a little blurred as some representatives of 
both anti-Darwinist varieties were trained scientists.
11 “Fifteen months after I had begun my systematic enquiry, I happened to read for amusement 
Malthus on Population, and being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for existence which 
everywhere goes on, from long-continued observation of the habits of animals and plants, it at 
once struck me that under these circumstances favourable variations would tend to be preserved, 
and unfavourable ones to be destroyed. The result of this would be the formation of new species. 
Here, then, I had at last got a theory by which to work.” (Darwin C and Wallace AR 1858:[evolution 
by natural selection] Linn. Soc.London [also G.de Beer, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1958] 120) 
12 Liebenberg 1990, Liebenberg 2012
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Another introductory comment to this paragraph is that some opponents of 
Darwinism have a tendency to overplay their hands, or, as Stephen Jay Gould 
(1976,24ff) succinctly observed that Darwin’s theory of natural selection has 
been a perennial candidate for burial. Gould himself introduced additions 
to evolutionary theory, as in his renowned paper The Spandrels of San Marco 
and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme 
(1979).[Addendum 14-1 (p.167)] He also raised critique, as for instance in his 
theory of punctuated equilibrium. (Eldredge et al 1972) Nevertheless the 
last book summarizing the evolutionary beliefs of that amazing polymath 
(Gould, 2002) is an extensive, scholarly and supportive survey of Darwin’s 
life, the development of his thinking, his worries and his evolutionary theory.
I will here briefly comment on Susan Oyama’s developmental systems 
theory. Her philosophical outlook can probably be pictured best by the 
story of Jorge Luis Borges. [Box 4-3] She herself refers to him as master of 
multiple embeddings, inf inite branchings, and ambiguous boundaries. 
Oyama vehemently opposes Francis Crick’s dogma of molecular biology13 
that advocates the one-way flow of information from genes to proteins acting 
as the ruling metaphor for development. Crick’s dogma, she says, is used as a 
metaphor taking many forms such as programs, blueprints and instruction 
algorithms, all of them involving the emanation of basic developmental 
causation from the DNA. (Oyama 2000b,50) A subtle transition is thus made 
from ‘messages’ about molecules to messages about bodies and minds. This 
shift from gene transmission to trait transmission she calls genetic imperial-
ism. (ibid.52) Oyama believes in a multiplicity of entities, influences and 
environments, interconnected and measurable on more than one scale of 
time and magnitude. Instead of Crick’s dogma she advocates a heterogeneous 
array of processes, entities, and environments – chemical and mechanical, 
micro- and macroscopic, social and geological. What is transmitted between 
generations is not traits she says, or blueprints or symbolic representations 
of trait, but developmental means or resources, or interactants. These means 
include genes, the cellular machinery necessary for their functioning, and 
the larger developmental context, which may include a maternal reproduc-
tive system, parental care, or other interactions with conspecif ics, as well 
as relations with other aspects of the animate and inanimate worlds. This 
context, which is actually a system of partially nested contexts, changes with 
13 This general rule emphasized the order of events from transcription through translation 
and provided the basis for much of the genetic code research in the post double-helix 1950s. 
The central dogma is often expressed as the following: “DNA makes RNA, RNA makes proteins, 
proteins make us.”(Nirenberg 2010)
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time, partly as a result of the developmental processes themselves. (ibid. 29) 
The benefits of seeing evolution as a succession of developmental systems 
restores the organism as such, allows us to appreciate the role of the genes 
without turning them into wise little homunculi and affords us a way out 
of the multiple versions of the nature-nurture dialogue. (ibid.31)
Philosopher naturalist John Dupré (2012) agrees with Oyama. The life 
cycle is what is basic, the egg, child and adult each form a particular time 
slice. Indeed, each step should be taken as a process, he says, cyclical more 
often than not, which makes possible the recurrence of the various stages. 
The genome is not a mere repository of biological form, but a full participant 
in biological process.
Dupré, moreover, draws our attention to the large proportion of the history 
of life during which all species were asexual. The image of the Tree of Life, he 
says, has been rendered at least partially obsolete by recent developments, 
especially in microbiology, where so-called lateral gene transfer,14 the passage 
of genetic material not from ancestors, but from sometimes distantly related 
organisms on widely separated branches of the Tree of Life, is endemic 
among Bacteria, Archaea and Eukarya. (ibid.145ff) In that case, the metaphor 
of a web or a net would partially cover the development better than that of 
the Tree of which branches always diverge and never merge. Within the 
Eukaryotes (animals, plants and fungi) with a more complex cell structure 
including a nucleus that houses the genetic material, the Tree of Life still 
holds since in this class the lateral gene transfer seems to be uncommon. 
The transfer of genetic elements by a virus does continue though. (ibid. 149)
Epigenetics is the collective noun used to refer to both the experiential 
effects and their underlying molecular mechanisms – supplanting the 
‘simplistic view’ of Crick’s dogma – in which gene activity can be modif ied 
by environment, history and experience.15 Epigenetics is an evolution of the 
theory of neo-Darwinism based on continuing research revealing excep-
tions and qualif ications. It turns out that a gene may also be subjected to 
modif ications in its chemistry, or in its chromosomal environment, which 
do not change the coding DNA sequence but do affect its eff iciency. These 
epigenetic modif ications come in two main varieties. First, the DNA itself 
may be modif ied by a process called methylation and second, the DNA in 
chromosomes is wrapped around special proteins called histones, that in 
14 A variety of mechanisms are described such as conjugation (a tube from one cell is inserted 
into another one passing on genetic material), transformation (uptake of free DNA from the 
environment by a cell) and transduction (transfer mediated by a virus). (Dupré 2012,147ff)
15 Carey (2011), Hodgkin (2012)
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Box 4-3 [T]he wholeness and interconnectedness of the universe, a unity that 
undoes individuality*, **
The god, foreseeing that at the end of time there would be devastation and ruin, 
wrote on the first day of Creation a magical sentence with the power to ward off 
those evils. He wrote it in such a way that it would reach the most distant gen-
erations and not be subject to chance. No one knew where it was written nor 
with what characters, but it is certain that it exists, secretly, and that a chosen 
one shall read it. I considered that we were now, as always, at the end of time 
and that my destiny as the last priest of the god would give me access to the 
privilege of intuiting the script. The fact that a prison confined me did not forbid 
my hope; perhaps I had seen the script of Qaholom a thousand times and need 
only to fathom it.
Throughout the earth there are ancient forms, forms incorruptible and 
eternal; any one of them could be the symbol I sought. A mountain could be the 
speech of the god, or a river or the empire or the configuration of the stars. But 
in the process of the centuries the mountain is levelled and the river will change 
its course, empires experience mutation and havoc and the configuration of the 
stars varies. There is change in the firmament. The mountain and the star are 
individuals and individuals perish.
What type of a sentence (I asked myself ) will an absolute mind construct? I 
considered that even in the human languages there is no proposition that does 
not imply the entire universe; to say the tiger is to say the tigers that begot it, the 
deer and turtles devoured by it, the grass on which the deer fed, the earth that 
was mother to the grass, the heaven that gave birth to the earth. I considered 
that in the language of a god every word would enunciate that infinite concat-
enation of facts, and not in an implicit but in an explicit manner, and not pro-
gressively but instantaneously. In time, the notion of a divine sentence seemed 
puerile or blasphemous. A god, I reflected, ought to utter only a single word and 
in that word absolute fullness.
Then there occurred what I cannot forget nor communicate. There occurred 
the union with the divinity, with the universe (I do not know whether these 
words differ in meaning). Ecstasy does not repeat its symbols.
I saw infinite processes that formed one single felicity and, understanding all, 
I was able also to understand the script of the tiger.
It is a formula of fourteen random words (they appear random) and to utter it 
in a loud voice would suffice to make me all powerful.
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turn may be altered by methylation or other simple chemical additions. 
Both kinds of epigenetic change add only a few atoms to the giant DNA or 
protein molecules and are generally not inherited, but exceptions occur that 
can have signif icant consequences: sometimes resulting in the complete 
silencing of a gene or even a whole chromosome. One example of epigenetic 
changes in eukaryotic biology is cellular differentiation in which the zygote 
through various divisions and cell lines delicately turns into a variety of 
fully differentiated cells. It does so by activating some genes while inhibiting 
others. Another example of epigenetic changes in eukaryotic biology are 
the effects of the ‘natural experiment’ of the Dutch Hunger Winter of 1944 
that even brings back to mind a Lamarckian touch into human genetics. 
[Box 4-4]
Summarizing: all points of the list of neo-Darwinism [§ 4-2] remain 
valid except the later addition of Crick’s dogma [note 13 (p.58)] which should 
be mitigated into Crick’s general rule. The metaphor of the Tree of Life 
could be accomodated to incorporate asexual reproduction as John Dupré’s 
suggested. There are indications that some Lamarckism may still occur.
Siding with Stephen Jay Gould that neo-Darwinism is alive and kicking 
we can endorse Mayr’s statement [§ 4-2] that the basic theory of evolu-
tion has been conf irmed so completely that modern biologists consider 
evolution as simply a fact. Being a scientif ic theory it stands to reason that 
neo-Darwinism still evolves; the writings of Gould, Oyama, Dupré and 
epigenetics should be considered as adjustments to neo-Darwinism that 
underline and strengthen rather than bury (t)his evolutionary theory.
4.5 Evolutionary epistemology
Evolutionary epistemology, a term coined by Donald Campbell (1974), is 
def ined as a naturalistic approach to epistemology, which emphasizes 
the importance of natural selection in two kinds. In the f irst, selection is 
the generator and maintainer of the reliability of our senses and cognitive 
May the mystery lettered on the tigers die with me. Whoever has seen the 
universe, whoever has beheld the fiery designs of the universe, cannot think in 
terms of one man, of that man’s trivial fortunes or misfortunes, though he be 
that very man.
* Oyama 2000a,238  
** Borges 2000,203-7 (In South America the word ‘tiger’ is often used for ‘jaguar’ as in this story).
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mechanisms, as well as the f it between those mechanisms and the world. 
In the second kind, trial and error learning and the evolution of scientif ic 
theories are construed as selection processes. (Bradie 2008) Both varieties 
of evolutionary epistemology accept neo-Darwinism as a given and both 
argue that it is indispensable for understanding the nature and origin 
of knowledge. Both accept human beings and their cognitive faculties 
as natural phenomena. Both take the view that there is no sharp divide 
between epistemology and science. (Buskes 1998,8) There is thus little 
reason why epistemological questions should be left to philosophy and 
should not also be studied by psychology, cognitive science and evolution-
ary biology.(ibid.)
Many philosophers are reluctant or even decisively sceptical to accept 
science within their domain. Fumerton (1985,7) even states that “I am one 
of those who thinks science has no light to shed on either the epistemologi-
cal or the metaphysical problems of perception.” In line with John Dewey 
Box 4-4 ‘Nature’s experiment’ of the Dutch Hunger Winter of 1944*
The Dutch Hunger Winter of 1944 in Amsterdam had a sudden onset and a sud-
den relief from famine imposed on a previously well-nourished population.
Effects on prenatal under-nutrition on later health appeared to depend on its 
timing during gestation, and the organs and tissues undergoing critical periods 
of development at that time. Early gestation appeared to be the most vulnerable 
period. People who were conceived during the famine were at increased risk of 
schizophrenia and depression; they had a more atherogenic plasma lipid profile, 
were more responsive to stress and had a doubled risk of developing coronary 
heart disease. They also performed worse on cognitive tasks which may be a 
sign of accelerated ageing. People exposed during any period of gestation had 
more type 2 diabetes.
Future investigation will expand on the finding that the effects of prenatal 
famine exposure may reach down through generations, possibly through epi-
genetic mechanisms. Recent evidence suggests that similar effects of prenatal 
under-nutrition are found in Africa, where many are undernourished. Hunger is 
a major problem worldwide with one in seven inhabitants of this planet suffer-
ing from lack of food. Adequately feeding women before and during pregnancy 
may be a promising strategy in preventing chronic diseases worldwide.
* Roseboom et al. 2011
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and Otto Neurath,16 Willard Van Orman Quine (1969,126-7) claims that 
philosophy (epistemology) is on a par with science:
My position is a naturalistic one; I see philosophy not as an a priori pro-
paedeutic or groundwork for science, but as continuous with science. I 
see philosophy and science as in the same boat – a boat which, to revert 
to Neurath’s f igure as I so often do, we can rebuild only at sea while 
staying afloat in it. There is no external vantage point, no f irst philosophy. 
(Italics in original)
Finally, Quine’s book Pursuit of truth (1990) is a clear, concise formulation 
of his philosophical position, in which he defends that epistemology is part 
of natural science and by consequence philosophers and scientists should 
join forces in their quest for understanding how knowledge is achieved and 
how reliable its products are.
Of course the view that everything Homo sapiens encounters belongs 
to his/the world and consequently is accessible to investigation by (the 
appropriate methods of) the natural sciences has met with opposition. I will 
not explore the discussions pro and contra but refer the interested reader 
to others who did. (Buskes Chapter 1 & 2,1998; Haack 1993 & 2003; Shimony 
1981; Slurink 2002; Vollmer 2002).
As for evolutionary epistemology, already in 1987 Callebaut and Pinxten 
constructed a ‘complete evolutionary epistemology bibliography’ of almost 
six hundred entries. Like my introductory notes on neo-Darwinism and 
natural science, this summary also will therefore be brief.
The second kind of evolutionary epistemology, the one that uses neo-
Darwinism mainly as a metaphor of evolutionary-like processes in other 
domains, is taken by some philosophers as a real exponent of evolution, with 
Popper (1978) and Wuketits (1986) notably as Godfathers of this concept. In 
the words of Wynne (2001,351ff):
Evolutionary epistemology is the idea that evolution is a knowledge-
gaining process. Universal Darwinism holds that processes of variation 
and selection can be observed at different levels from the primary level 
of biological evolution (where genes code for phenotypes) through to 
16 Otto Neurath’s anti foundationalist boat metaphor: “There is no way to establish fully 
secured, neat protocol statements as starting points of the sciences. There is no tabula rasa. 
We are like sailors who have to rebuild their ship on the open sea, without ever being able to 
dismantle it in dry-dock and reconstruct it from the best components”. (Neurath 1983)
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individual learning and culture (where the units of variation and selec-
tion are not so clear cut).
This type of evolutionary epistemology (and its varieties like sociobiology), 
does not seem to be correct to me. Its flaw lies in exporting to the analysis of 
human culture, the apparatus of the strictest form of Darwinian orthodoxy.
Stephen Jay Gould criticised this school of thought, especially sociobiol-
ogy, most eloquently.17 He argued that orthodoxy locates all evolutionary 
mechanics in the struggle for reproductive success among organisms. But 
effective behaviour needs not have a specif ic genetic ground, yet Darwin-
ism is a theory of genetic change. The fallacy of inferring historical origin 
from current utility is best expressed, Gould says, by noting that many, 
if not most, biological structures are co-opted from previous uses, not 
designed for current operations. Legs were f ins; ear bones were jaw bones 
and jaw bones were gill-arch bones; incipient wings could not power f light 
but may have served for thermoregulation. The same error undermines 
the central claim of ‘this cardboard Darwinism’. (ibid.) The human brain 
became large by natural selection (and who knows why). Many shapes 
and behaviours are f it for other functions. The continued success of 
f lying f ishes, as George Williams once noted (ibid.), depends upon their 
propensity for falling back into the water after they emerge. But no one in 
his right mind would argue that mass was constructed by natural selection 
to ensure a timely tumble.
Evolutionary epistemology, def ined by Bradie (1986,403) as the at-
tempt to account for cognition as a biological phenomenon in animals 
and humans is correct. Cognition is a straightforward extension of the 
biological theory of evolution. This viewpoint also accepts science as the 
currently most promising, indeed best way to understand the universe. 
Evolutionary epistemology accepts neo-Darwinian evolution. To this I 
wish to add that (any) scientif ic theory is always provisional and induction 
is its method of choice.
17 Gould 1990,26-50
5 The unacceptable legacy of Aristotle’s 
holy five
5.1 Introduction
In order to learn normal speech every human child needs a social and teach-
ing environment. Pre-linguistic children who grow up in an environment 
without normal speaking humans will never acquire normal language. The 
French (le) sauvage de l’Aveyron and some other well documented so-called 
‘wolf-children’ support this thesis. Another example are the experiences 
with deaf1 children who are unlikely ever to develop normal spoken lan-
guage (see below).
Deafness also has a huge impact on social, cognitive and emotional de-
velopment of a child, that has to be taught every new word by its parents or 
a specilized teacher: these children do not learn by hearing them. (Archbold 
2010,5ff) Those are strong motives for the attempt to equip deaf infants 
with a so called cochlear implant during their linguistic ‘window’, the few 
years in which infants and young children are able to learn to speak. The 
acquisition of normal spoken language post-linguistic – even after receiving 
a cochlear implant – is not possible anymore.
Such experiences are convincing arguments for the innate ability to 
development of language, the necessity of suff icient hearing to acquire 
normal language, the acquisition of language over a certain period and 
the withering of the f irst language acquisition potential after that period. 
This incidentally is not only the case with Homo sapiens: vocal imita-
tion in birdsong also relies on auditory-guided motor learning during 
a sensitive period of development in some singing birds. (Bolhuis et al. 
2010,747)2 The ability to development of language is comparable with the 
1 Deaf is taken absolutely, i.e., no (serviceable) hearing at all. It is not synonymous to hard of 
hearing or hearing loss which is only partial loss of hearing. With children deafness is mostly 
congenital or prelinguistically acquired, the latter usually (but not exclusively) due to menin-
gitis.
2 The fact that similar details of vocal learning arose in distinct evolutionary branches that 
parted ways some 300 million years ago underscores that evolutionary selection pressure can 
result not only in similar morphological but also in similar behavioural adaptations. Whether or 
not these similarities are the consequences of convergent neural architecture and information 
processing is one of the major challenges facing neurobiologists who study birdsong and human 
speech from an evolutionary perspective. (Bolhuis et al, 2010, 750)
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suckling ref lex, both being examples of innate releasing mechanisms of 
the human animal, which is apparently able to recognize behaviourally 
meaningful stimuli never before experienced and to respond to them 
adequately. This concept focuses on the close correspondence between 
sign/stimulus and the appropriate behavioural response. (Ewert 2005,25 
citing Tinbergen 1951)
5.2 Innateness
The issue of acquiring the ability to communicate in spoken words (lan-
guage) should be part of the controversy of rationalism and empiricism. 
(Markie 2008) Classical rationalism assumes that humans are equipped 
with reason, with intuition (and a capacity of deduction), with innate ideas 
and – by some rationalists – innate concepts. Empiricism, on the contrary, 
presumes that humans are equipped with sensory systems that provide 
knowledge through sensory experience. Both views accept that the human 
species has innate faculties.
Innateness itself, however, used to be a controversial concept. The ques-
tion of the dichotomy innateness versus acquired has been a philosophical 
issue since at least two and a half millennia. It is still with us carrying 
labels like innate versus learned, genes (or genetically determined) versus 
environment, instinct versus learning and nature versus nurture.
Scientific interest in this area began when Konrad Lorenz, Nico Tinbergen 
and Karl von Frisch established ethology, the Darwinian approach to behav-
iour now known as behavioural biology. [Box 2-1 (p.28)] It tries to answer the 
four scientif ic questions or four why’s, i.e., (1) causation, (2) survival value, 
(3) evolution as stated by Huxley (1914) and that of (4) ontogeny, added by 
Tinbergen. (Hogan and Bolhuis 2009,25) One can already sense a certain 
blurring of boundaries between innateness and acquired in Manning’s 
foreword to a book on behavioural biology3:
Each species exhibits a repertoire of behaviour patterns which are “in-
nate“, i.e., whose development is largely under genetic control, and whose 
performance is under the control of particular motivational states and 
sets of external stimuli. These latter are matched by “innate releasing 
mechanisms” in animals, which respond preferentially only to certain 
3 Bolhuis and Verhulst (2009,x)
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aspects (sign stimuli) in the external world – often sign stimuli are 
specially evolved structures or displays from conspecif ics (‘releasers’).
Bateson (1999,ix-xi) citing Lehrman (1970), pointed out that there are at least 
seven meanings of the word ‘innate’. He listed them as: (1) present at birth, 
(2) being a behavioural difference caused by a genetic difference, (3) adapted 
over the course of evolution, (4) unchanging throughout development, (5) 
shared by all members of a species, (6) present before behaviour serves any 
function, (7) not learned.
Behavioural biology is less interested in the dichotomy innateness 
versus acquired than in the development of behaviour. An animal, after 
an interaction with its environment, may have been changed by such 
experience and thus becomes capable of behaving differently thereafter; 
a change in the animal’s behaviour accepted as learning. The difference 
between learning and other forms of behavioural development is gradual 
and has to do with the specif icity of external experience. Laboratory ex-
amples of such learning processes are Pavlovian conditioning, Thorndike’s 
puzzle box and the Skinner box. The notion that learning may depend on 
the formation of associations has a long history in philosophy, a matter 
I let rest.
Apart from these acquired changes in behaviour, other examples of 
perceptual preferences may develop without any experience with the par-
Box 5-1 Behaviour system*, **
A behaviour system, described in detail in the Burmese jungle fowl (Gallus gallus 
spadiceus), the ancestor of the domestic chicken, consists of various elements: 
a central nervous-, a perceptual-, and a motor mechanism. These mechanisms 
correspond to structures in the brain, so that one can also call them cognitive 
structures.
The definition of a behaviour system is ‘any organization of perceptual, cen-
tral and motor mechanisms that acts as a unit in some situations’.
According to Hogan (1988), behavioural development essentially is the de-
velopment of these mechanisms and the changes in the connections between 
them. Many of them only develop after functional experience, i.e., experience 
with the particular stimuli involved, or with the consequences of performing 
specific motor patterns.
* Kruijt 1964 In: Hogan and Bolhuis 2009,94 
** Hogan 1988
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ticular stimuli. For this the term predisposition has been coined to denote 
the behavioural tendency or the underlying mechanism. Predisposition 
plays a role in birdsong learning, in auditory preferences in ducklings, in the 
perception of faces in neonatal human infants and in the development of 
f ilial preferences in chicks. This phenomenon, called imprinting by Konrad 
Lorenz (1935, 1937), was already known as f ilial imprinting described by 
Thomas More in Utopia and was experimentally investigated by Douglas 
Spalding in 1873. (Bolhuis 2000,119-45) Contemporary investigators def ine 
imprinting as the learning process through which the social preferences 
of young animals become restricted to a particular stimulus or class of 
stimuli. (ibid.)
The conclusions from study of behavioural biology so far, is that both 
innate and rational mechanisms are present at birth and that they may 
be triggered into action by a particular stimulus leading to a change of 
behaviour (learning). Any animal including man is born with genetically 
based predispositions or abilities. Experience(s) in many combinations and 
predispositions only manifest later in life (think of the sexual hormonal 
influences) may change behaviour. Predispositions and experiences, often 
in various combinations, may lead to learning and knowledge. Sentient be-
ings of many species are able to acquire new knowledge in very variable and 
complicated ways. Indeed, both empiricism and rationalism are outworn 
concepts if conceived of as the sole road to knowledge.
In addition to the notion of predisposition the concept of behaviour system 
has been developed. [Box 5-1] It seems to underline the kind of reasoning so 
dominantly present in the writings of Oyama’s developmental systems theory 
Box 5-2 Aristotle on the senses*
Aristotle summarizes the definition of sensory system as follows: (A) By a ‘sense’ 
is meant what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things 
without the matter. This must be conceived of as taking place in the way in 
which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or 
gold; we say that what produces the impression is a signet of bronze or gold, 
but its particular metallic constitution makes no difference: in a similar way the 
sense is affected by what is coloured or flavoured or sounding, but it is indif-
ferent what in each case the substance is; what alone matters is what quality it 
has, i.e., in what ratio its constituents are combined. (B) By ‘an organ of sense’ is 
meant that in which ultimately such a power is seated.
* Aristotle. On the soul DAII.5-12, DAIII.1 (Περί ψυχής, De anima)
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[§ 4-4 (p.57)] and her refusal of the nature versus nurture dichotomy, the 
same conviction as also manifest in Thelen’s dynamic system’s approach. 
Both authors seem to move away from reductionism and towards a more 
holistic kind of reasoning.
In my opinion much of the so called ‘play’ of (young) animals and 
children, Animal Ludens, can be viewed as nature’s way of gradually 
acquiring essential behaviour systems under relatively safe conditions; 
and secondly, the concept of behaviour system also seems to be an 
eclectic scientif ic answer to the old philosophic dispute4 about the 
priority of reason or sensory systems in the acquisition of knowledge; 
behaviour system encompasses both and moreover reconciles the other 
dichotomy of the knowing what and the knowing how. The description 
of the human neonate’s sucking reflex is a nice example of such a system 
and tacit knowledge as described by Polanyi may very well be another. 
[Box 2-4 (p.37)]
4 Democritus, after stating that “in reality there is no white, or black, or bitter, or sweet”, 
added: ”Poor mind, from the senses you take your arguments, and then want to defeat them? 
Your victory is your defeat”(Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker [4th ed., 1922], frag. B125, cited 
by Arendt,1958, note 31a,275.
Box 5-3 Somatosensory systems
Proprioception is the sense of self. The receptors are located in skeletal muscle, 
joint capsules and the skin. It enables us to have conscious awareness of the 
posture and movements of the body. Without them movements would be 
poorly coordinated, clumsy and inadequate.
Exteroception is the sense of direct interaction of the body with the external 
world. The principal mode is touch (contact, pressure, stroking, motion and 
vibration) used for identifying objects but it also includes thermal senses and 
nociception (pain).
Interoception is the sense of the body’s internal state and of the function of 
the major organ systems of the body. The receptors are primarily chemo- and 
stretch receptors used for homeostasis. [Box 2-5 (p.40); Box 5-4; § 5-4]
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5.3 Five (!) senses (?)
Aristotle’s biological papers are fascinating and precise accounts of 
methodologically meticulous scientific (avant la lettre) research.5 Though I 
seeminly attack his statements on the subject of the senses I intend to f ight 
his parroting followers, thus agreeing with Heidegger’s thoughtful statement 
about the differences between modern and antique science.6
Aristotle distnguished f ive human senses and even explicitly stated that 
there can be no sixth sense in addition to his f ive ones – sight, hearing, 
smell, taste, touch. Although clearly wrong this seemingly ‘divine’ number 
is still repeated daily in speech and written texts, even in (recent) scholarly 
ones7. Apart from the senses, it is often said that there are sensations like 
itches, tickling, and feelings such as hunger, thirst and pain. I will clear up 
the terminology a little, summarize a few facts taken from the life-sciences, 
point to some concepts in passing and try to untangle a few ‘Gordian- knots’.
In chapter 1 sensory systems have been defined as all (usually paired) 
specialized systems of every living structure that provide information from 
the environment and from within the body. Noting the existence of sensory 
systems within plants and also the huge variety of sensory systems in dif-
ferent species [Box 2-2 (p.33); Box 2-3 (p.35)] we will from now on primarily 
concentrate on those of man.
Homo sapiens is endowed with more sensory systems than Aristotle’s 
f ive. Exploring some of them takes us into interesting def initional and 
conceptual problems. Let me try to make this clear with a few small detours 
to sensory systems other than those of Aristotle, beginning with the paired 
organs of equilibrium.8 These organs are mirror-symmetric structures, 
called vestibules, f irmly connected to the cochlea (snail shell, organ of 
hearing). Together, cochlea and vestibular system build the (deservedly 
called) labyrinth (inner ear). Each vestibular labyrinth contains two differ-
ent senses of equilibrium. They pass information of movements and position 
of the skull. One gathers information on angular acceleration (semicircular 
canals), the other one on linear accelerations (utricle and saccule). This 
5 Aristotle. The history of animals (translation D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson)
6 Auf jeder Seite, der der alten und der neuen Wissenschaft, handelt es sich jeweils um beides, 
um Tatsachen und Begriffe; das Entscheidende ist aber die Art und Weise, wie die Tatsachen 
begriffen und wie die Begriffe angesetzt wurden. (Heidegger 1962,51)[Both old and modern 
science are concerned with facts and concepts; the decisive difference lies in the way facts are 
understood and concepts are established]
7 Steup 2012; Siegel 2011
8 For an extensive description, see Kandel et al. 2000
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description is not completely accurate. Each vestibular labyrinth comprises 
f ive clusters of hair cells that, complemented by those of the contra-lateral 
ear, can measure linear acceleration along and angular acceleration about 
any axis. All hair cells are, like the hair cells that mediate hearing in the 
cochlea, of roughly similar construction and act roughly in a similar man-
ner by converting mechanical stimuli of f luid movement into receptor 
potentials (neural signals). The neural signals travel along the vestibular 
nerve to different parts of the brain. This information remains largely 
unconscious but ‘automatically’ leads to a variety of, often unconscious, 
reactions. One example is the so called vestibular-ocular ref lex (VOR). 
Because the incoming stimuli are fed from the vestibular system into the 
motor nuclei of the eye muscles, movements of the head are compensated 
so that the eyes are kept focused on the scene of interest. If one for instance 
shakes one’s head while reading this sentence, one will still be able to keep 
it in focus thanks to this VOR. Most people will never become aware of their 
VOR as the actions of this system remain unconcious. The reflexes were not 
even noticed by Aristotle’s inquisitive eye and mind.
In summary, movements of the head are indirect stimuli to the hair cells 
in the organ of equilibrium. The hair cells transform the movements into 
neuronal signals travelling to different parts of the brain. Mainly uncon-
scious (compensatory) motor actions of (among others) the eyes muscles 
are then initiated to compensate for the linear and angular acceleration 
of the skull: the retina of both eyes remain f ixed on the scene of interest.
This is only part of the story. Largely quoting Cullen (2011), in everyday 
life as we move through the world, vestibular information is combined 
with cues from other sources in order to allow us to detect and perceive our 
self-motion and position. When self-motion is the result of an externally 
applied movement, such as riding as a passenger on the bus, the semicircular 
canals and otolith organs of the vestibular system encode rotation and linear 
acceleration information, while the visual system provides retinal-image 
motion (optic f low) cues. Furthermore, when self-motion is the result of 
voluntary movement, such as locomotion, sensory cues are not only provided 
by vestibular and visual systems, but also by the proprioceptive sensors of 
the muscles, tendons, and joints, which sense the relative position of neigh-
bouring parts of the body. In addition, during voluntary movement, a motor 
command is generated to produce the movement, and thus motor-derived 
information is also available for integration with the existing multisensory 
cues to contribute to the brain’s internal estimate of self-motion.
Multisensory integration plays several important roles in the nervous 
system. One of the most widely recognized benef its of multisensory in-
72 FROM SENSORY BIOLOGY TO A PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION 
tegration is the improvement in accuracy, precision or reaction times by 
simultaneous presentation of two or more sensory cues during sensory 
discrimination and/or detection tasks.
Before further analyzing the concept of sensory systems, I briefly turn 
to the skin, to interoception and to locomotion. ‘Somatosensory systems’ is 
the term used for (a conglomerate of) systems which are stimulated via a 
variey of receptors distributed throughout the body. [Box 5-3] Those of the 
skin (exteroception), those of movement (proprioception) and those of the 
physiological condition of the body also called interoception. (Craig 2002 & 
2009) They come in four major modalities: (1) discriminative touch required to 
recognize size, shape, and texture of objects and their movement across the 
skin mediated by so called mechano-receptors, (2) proprioception, the sense of 
static position and movement (kinaesthesia) of the limbs and body mediated 
by mechano-receptors in skeletal muscle and joint capsules, and also present 
in the skin, (3) nociception, the sense that signals tissue damage or chemical 
irritation, typically perceived as itch or pain; it consists of mechanical, thermal 
Box 5-4 Thermoregulation
structures response to temperature ↓ response to temperature ↑
smooth muscle in 
arterioles in the skin
muscles contract leading to 
vasoconstriction. Less heat 
is carried to the surface of 
the body 
muscle relax → vasodilation; 
more heat to the surface of 
the body where it is lost 
sweat glands no sweat produced sweat produced → evapora-
tion
erector pili muscles in the 
skin, attached to the hairs
muscles contract, raising 
skin hairs, trapping an 
insulating layer of still, 
warm air next to the skin → 
gooseflesh 
muscles relax, lowering the 
skin hairs allowing air to 
circulate over the skin
skeletal muscles alternating contractions 
and relaxations (shivering) 
→ heat by friction and 
metabolic reactions 
endocrine glands glands secrete adrenaline glands reduce secretion 
adrenaline 
behaviour curling up, huddling, finding 
shelter, putting on more 
clothes
stretching out, finding shade, 
swimming, removing clothes
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and polymodal nociceptors,9 (4) temperature sense as mediated by thermo-
receptors of which humans have four types: cold, cool, warm, and hot.
Thermoregulation is a primal evolutionary requirement for all animals, 
particularly homeothermic (or endothermic) mammals and birds. Affec-
tive aspects – feelings of pleasantness or unpleasantness – correspond to 
the motivations that are essential for behavioural thermoregulation and 
homeostasis [Box 2-5 (p.40); § 5-4], and therefore survival.
In addition to these four modalities of receptors, the viscera have 
mechano-sensory and chemo-sensory receptors. They are important in 
the control of visceral function. Under normal conditions humans do not 
experience conscious sensations from the intestines but abnormal disten-
sion and stretching of visceral muscle tissue may evoke sensations of pain. 
Most of the interoceptive information is directly related to homeostatic 
needs and is associated with behavioural motivations that are crucial for 
the maintenance of bodily integrity. Each of these modalities is mediated 
by a distinct system of receptors and pathways to the brain. Each of these 
modalities conveys a specif ic form of energy, which is related to differences 
in structure of the nerve endings and f ibres.
The foregoing detour shows that (1) def ining sensory systems is not an 
easy matter, (2) that the simple folklore division into eyes, ears, smell, taste 
and touch is no longer adequate as the term sensory systems includes more 
than Aristotle’s original f ive10 as argued above, maintenance of the body po-
sition comprises joint effort of vision, sense of equilibrium, proprioception, 
and a multitude of mechano-receptors in muscles and joints, together with 
the coordinating brain, (3) in practice single nerve fibre action is exceptional 
and intensive cooperation the rule; all sensory systems continuously work 
together. If we close our eyes, we do not fall down, we still hear the birds and 
if chewing gum, we still taste it. The other way around, when we intensely 
concentrate on the taste of the gum, we still do not fall down, we still hear 
the car coming around the corner, the viscera continue to work, the urine 
seeps into the bladder, in short, not only are we able to walk and chew gum 
at the same time, but we are also able to carry out many other activities.
Every sensory system sends its signals to the brain, which ‘automati-
cally’ coordinates the information with that of other sensory systems. The 
9 Pain is defined as an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or 
potential damage; like elsewhere in the sensory systems a consequence of the brain’s elaboration 
of sensory input.
10 Nota bene the eyes consist of a conglomerate of sensory systems conveying information on 
form, depth, brightness, colour and motion.
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maintenance of the body position would not be possible without somatic 
sensation, the sense of equilibrium, the coordinating brain, the muscles of 
the trunk, in short with the smooth and non-conscious activities of this 
entire human behavioural system. It does not need our attention since the 
process operates unconsciously. I will return to the subject of the sense of 
posture in 4-D and its relation with consciousness in chapter twelve.11
5.4 Homeostasis
Homeostasis is def ined as the maintenance of relatively stable internal 
physiological condition of the body (milieu intérieur) under environmental 
conditions that may vary in minutes, hourly, daily or seasonally. 12, 13
Without regulation homeostasis would be impossible. In the living organ-
ism regulation requires constant information of the variable (receptor) to 
be regulated, a ‘control centre’ which ‘knows’ what the optimal value of the 
variable should be and has the means to activate or inhibit mechanisms that 
increase or decrease its value. A comparable and easy to imagine example 
of such homeostatic regulatory systems is the thermostat that keeps room 
temperature at the regulated values, usually 200 Celcius. The control centre 
is informed about the room temperature by a sensor (comparable to a recep-
tor) in its immediate vicinity. When this temperature is less than 200 Celcius 
the centre orders the furnace to produce more heat so that the desired 
temperature is re-established at which time the furnace is switched off by 
the centre. Obviously, this control lacks f inesse. It can keep the temperature 
at 200 Celcius but it cannot cool the room.
The living control centre operates in a similar way. Variables like 
body temperature (37.40 Celcius), pH (7.365), ion concentrations, glucose 
concentration, f luid volume, et cetera are kept at the homeostatic level. 
Some such living centres do have f inesse. They often can actively change 
11 “My sense of ‘posture’ is not stored in my brain, but, rather, the ability to create one posture 
from another is, the ability to establish relations. And the senses of self and speech, like posture, 
are constantly evolving structures.” (Rosenf ield 1992,121f)
12 The attention in this paragraph is conf ined to endothermic animals (mammals and birds) 
which keep their body temperature within narrow limits leaving out ectothermic animals who 
exhibit wider body temperature variations (circa 350 – 400 C) and use behavioural mechanisms 
to change their body temperature.
13 Claude Bernard (1879) wrote “All the vital mechanisms, varied as they are, have only one 
object, that of preserving constant the conditions of life in the milieu intérieur.” The term 
homeostasis was coined by Walter Cannon (1932) 
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the level of the controlled variable as well as retrun it to normal when it 
is too low.
In our homes we determine the setpoint of the room thermostate. In 
living things, evolution ‘decided’ that for us. In some of these systems the 
setpoint is itself dominated by higher level systems that under special 
circumstances may decide that for instance a higher body temperature 
might be more opportune. The whole system constantly oscillates about 
the set points of the various control mechanisms, within specif ic (safe) 
boundaries. A correction usually consists of an increased or decreased 
inhibition (negative feedback) leading to a stronger or weaker feedback.
An example of negative feedback is the body temperature of humans; 
it f luctuates between 37.20 – 37.60 C (set point 37.40 C). Hypothermia 
(< 330 C) and hyperthermia (> 420 C) eventually lead to death. The body 
has a range of responses available, depending on the internal and external 
temperatures. Increased blood temperature is sensed by specialized 
neurons in the thermoregulatory centre of the hypothalamus in the 
brain. Receptors in the skin monitor the external temperature. Both 
sets of information lead to impulses sent to several different effectors. 
[Box 5-4]
An example of positive feedback is the response to injury which damages 
tissue and results in bleeding. This event causes release of ‘tissue factor’, 
activiation of thrombin, formation of the matrix of the blood clot and speeds 
up the production of more thrombin. This self amplifying process is the 
positive feedback. The entire process is tissue damage, bleeding, clotting. 
Stopping the haemorrhage is the negative feedback loop activated by bleed-
ing itself and ultimately acting to stop it.
A second example of positive feedback is childbirth, where stretching 
of the cervix uteri triggers the secretion of the hormone oxytocin which 
stimulates uterine contractions and accelerates labour. Positive feedback 
usually produces the opposite of homeostasis, i.e., the rapid loss of internal 
stability with – potentially – fatal consequences.
5.5 The tomato-illusion
As a thought experiment Price (1932,3) used a tomato that he compared to a 
“red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape”, a quite impossible com-
parison I feel. [Chapter 6] If we have any experience with tomatoes, what we 
see is a tomato (colour, form, depth, intensity of light, shades and the rest). If 
we see something that looks faintly like our former tomato-experience and 
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we are not sure, we approach it, we touch it with our Moore-like hand14, we 
smell it, we bite into it and we know that it is, indeed, a tomato. We know 
that we can squeeze it, that we can make soup or chutney with it or that 
we can fry it to prepare our full English breakfast.....In real life our sensory 
systems work together continuously, simultaneously, unconsciously and 
consciously.
If we see for the f irst time something that impresses us faintly as our 
tomato-experience but that in some aspect is quite different we tend to 
curiously approach the thing.15 We may then notice that it looks red and 
feels ripe on touch, smells and tastes like a tomato even though it may be 
rather small. Our green-grocer tells us that it is a “cherry tomato”, a new 
product. We thus have a new experience which does not only consist of a 
new single red bulging thing, but which is essentially and signif icantly a 
combination of vision, touch with the f ingers, smell, taste and touch with 
the tongue combined with cognitive part(s) of our brain. We learn and know 
for ever ceteris paribus what a cherry tomato is like. Leaving out all subtleties 
and theories of induction, inferential learning and scepsis we tend to trust 
our green-grocer who taught us a new word for this mix of old and new 
experiences. We may thereby arrive at the conclusion that this miniature 
variation of the ‘normal’ tomato is comparable to similar experiences like 
a bonsai tree among trees and the dinky toy or doll’s house of our past.
Being human and belonging to the inquisitive variety we may then ap-
proach our personal computer, type ’tomaat’ (June 2012; the Dutch word for 
tomato) and receive some 2.780.000 hits within 0.12 seconds with ‘Google’. 
We subsequently type the term ‘tomato’ and receive some 159.800.000 hits 
within 0.15 seconds. We may have learnt a lot more about the subject... and 
happily forget the amazing formula of some red bulgy object.
The sensory systems select and continuously ‘register’ staggering 
numbers of simultaneously incoming bits of information from outside 
and inside the body. The sensory systems are (inter)-connected to other 
parts of the body and wired into various feed-forward and feed-backward 
14 Referring to the highly influential philosopher GE.Moore (1873-1958) who was moved, not 
by any perplexities about ‘the world or the sciences’, but by the baff ling things said about the 
world and the sciences by other philosophers. Famously, he started one day with the proposition 
that he was sure of the existence of his own (right) hand and (left) hand. (Moore 1959,146) 
15 Innate releaser. Another example [than the red dot] [§ 2-2 (p.28f)]  is the stimulus for eliciting 
the rather stereotyped feeding behaviour shown by many animals: a small moving object f irst 
alerts a frog, then causes it to orient itself toward the stimulus, next to approach it, and f inally 
to snap at it. Long ago it was suggested that the retinal ganglion cells in the frog that respond 
to small moving objects might act as such, i.e., bug detectors. (Barlow 1999,311)
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loops, regulatory systems that ‘automatically’ coordinate (put differently, 
unconsciously, i.e., not reaching awareness) other bodily subsystems. A 
minor part of the incoming information from the sensory systems can be 
brought to awareness and may thereby be perceived, recognized and named.
Any sensory system in a narrower sense consists of a number of cells 
specialised to register some specific small change in its chemical or physical 
environment, be it stretch or pressure (mechano-receptors, touch), move-
ment of f luid (within the labyrinth), electro-magnetic waves (vision) et 
cetera. [Box 2-2 (p.33)] It seems reasonable to incorporate in any definition 
of one specific sensory system at least the basic constituting element; the 
single cell with (all) its connection(s) that depolarizes after receiving its 
specif ic environmental stimulus or signal.
Apart from the sensory systems, the body contains many other systems 
gathering information and delivering signals. Examples like the endocrine 
glands come to mind that send hormones through the blood. These act as 
instructional messages to other parts of the body which then start to read-
just their activity. A second example is the immune system that ‘recognizes’ 
intruding agents like parasites and micro-organisms and starts to defend 
the body against them; this system thus acts very much like a behavioural 
system after some – retrospectively – adequate stimulus. Characteristi-
cally the endocrine glands and the immune system predominantly react 
to biochemical instead of physical changes. Moreover, the actions of these 
systems are never directly perceived, although the consequences of their 
activity may. A third example is a sensory system-like ‘mechanism’ that has 
been recognized in mice and humans, situated on the relative surface of the 
body, i.e., the gut’s lining, with functions similar to other chemical sensory 
systems such as the vomeronasal organ and the taste buds of the tongue.16
Common to the more classic sensory systems and the three above 
mentioned ones is their influence on activity levels (behaviour) of cells, 
tissues, organs and organisms (whole body including brain/mind). The 
fundamental part in the actions of all these systems is the maintenance of 
homeostasis without which each system and by consequence the whole body 
would quickly perish. [Box 2-5 (p.40)]
16 Molecular sensing by gastrointestinal cells plays a critical role in the control of multiple 
fundamental functions in digestion and also initiates hormonal and/or neural pathways leading 
to the regulation of caloric intake, pancreatic insulin secretion, and metabolism. Molecular sens-
ing in the gastrointestinal tract is also responsible for the detection of ingested harmful drugs 
and toxins, thereby initiating responses critical for survival (vomiting). The initial recognition 
events and mechanism(s) involved are not yet completely understood. (Rozengurt 2006)
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In summary, to limit sensory systems to the conscious part of the Aristo-
telian (f ive) senses only is not acceptable. This approach:
– ignores the vast area of non-conscious information gathering and 
processing that is needed to keep the body going,
– ignores the continuous cooperation of all sensory systems that are 
coordinated in the brain,
– places the somatosensory systems in a non-sensory-systems category 
although they have similar construction and action as the f ive of Aris-
totle,
– pays little attention to the environment without which sensory systems 
do not make much sense anyway: if man is devoid of incoming stimuli 
(sensory-deprivation) he has a strong tendency to develop hallucinations 
and experiences like those induced by hallucinogenic drugs, similar to 
those of schizophrenia. In such situations delusions, loss of sense of 
reality and loss of personal identity usually occur. We obviously need 
a lifelong more or less continuous stream of (environmental) stimuli 
to function properly.
As for the information processing by any sentient being the sensory systems 
have much in common with the immune system, the endocrine glands and 
f inally, the chromosome.
The chromosome, not further discussed here, contains the molecular 
code script in DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid), the specif ication of develop-
ment or genetic information. The idea that a chromosome is a molecular code 
script containing a specification of development was beautifully formulated 
by Erwin Schrödinger (1944,19f,61f,68). This book inspired Francis Crick 
and, independently, James D. Watson to research the gene but the f irst one 
to formulate the principle of the ‘heredity molecule’ was Hermann Joseph 
Muller in 1922 and more elegantly in 1929. (Schwartz 2008)
Part II 
 
From objectivity to subjectivity

6 Sense-data, the bird’s eye view
6.1 Introduction
Many philosophers speaking about perception use terms like ‘sense-datum ‘, 
’impression’, ‘idea’, ‘quale’, ‘image’, ‘sensum’, ‘appearance’ and ‘phenomenon’. 
Admittedly, there are variations within and between the exact definitions 
of each term depending on the philosopher using them. I will not present a 
thorough analysis of sense data since other supporters and opponents did this 
before. In the following no full justice will be done to their arguments; mine 
will be little more than the bird’s eye view. People interested in this f ield may 
start by reading the admirable anthology compiled by Robert J. Swartz (1965).
Interestingly, not a single one of the aforementioned terms is found 
in neuroscience. In its ‘bible’, containing some 1400 pages, Kandel et al. 
(2000,398) refer only once to one of the more or less synonymous terms 
mentioned before:
Since considerable progress has been made in understanding the neural 
basis of perception of colour without having to account for its subjective 
qualities, or qualia, perhaps the question about qualia is itself not so 
meaningful within a neurobiological approach to behaviour.” He follows 
with “[T]he brain does indeed construct our perception of an object, but 
the resulting perception is not arbitrary and appears to correspond to 
independently determined physical properties of the objects. What we 
do not understand is how action potentials give rise to meaning. Why is 
it that you see a face when the neurons of the inferotemporal cortex f ire 
action potentials? (italics in original)
Sense-data (singular sense-datum) is a technical term that seems to have 
come into use in the beginning of the 20th century although the idea goes 
back to Berkely (sensations and ideas), Hume (impressions of the sense), 
Kant (Vorstellungen, representations) and even Plato (pathêmata, the ways 
of being effected). Bertrand Russell writes in Mysticism and logic (1918,143):
If we have been right in our contentions, sense-data are merely those 
among the ultimate constituents of the physical world of which we hap-
pen to be immediately aware; they themselves are purely physical, and all 
that is mental in connection with them is our awareness of them, which 
is irrelevant to their nature and to their place in physics.
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In a slightly more colloquial way, he said in Problems of philosophy (1912,17)
Let us give the name of “sense-data“ to the things that are immediately 
known in sensation; such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardness, 
roughness, and so on.
Sense-data, therefore, are supposed to enter into, and depend for their 
existence on our consciousness whenever we see, hear, feel, taste or smell 
things. It is the way in which things appear to the conscious subject, the 
irreducible phenomenological character of an experience. A sense-datum is 
what something seems like in consciousness. The term has not always been 
used in the same way; not every philosopher using the term has precisely 
def ined his particular view on the matter or on the relation sense data/
object.
6.2 The case of the penny
Often the concept of sense-datum is explained with the example of a penny. 
When one sees a penny on the table viewing it from nearby and above ‘head’ 
up it looks round, leading to the sense-datum round; or, ‘tail’ up, it also looks 
round, again leading to the sense datum round. When one sees the same 
penny from some distance and obliquely, one obtains in the appearance 
language an oval and in the sense-datum terminology an elliptical sense-
datum. Based on the consideration that an object cannot have two different 
forms some philosophers have characterized this phenomenon as a problem, 
which they have tried to solve in several ways. Some felt obliged to doubt the 
existence of the penny suggesting it could be an illusion. Others called only 
one of the views the illusion, the other view being the true or real shape of 
the coin. Scientif ic explanations with optics, perspectives and the like have 
also been proposed. Many philosophers feel that a scientif ic explanation 
should not be sought as the problem is one of experience, is subjective, is not 
quantifyable and therefore is impossible to solve with scientif ic methods.
George Edward Moore in writing on sense-data has drawn our attention 
to another problem of our penny although his example was not a penny but 
the inkstand on his desk. This observation translated to the penny is that 
one cannot see each side of the penny in one view. Therefore, at any time 
only that part of the penny’s surface turned to the eye of the observer will be 
contained in the sense-datum. The sceptic, on the other hand might think 
that the other side of the penny does not show the normal tail as it may be 
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a false specimen or part of a practical joke. It is a case of convention, habit 
or daily practice to speak of a penny when only seeing one of its surfaces, or, 
put differently, an act of trust. Others imagined themselves in the position 
of an unworldly person not acquainted with a coin and therefore unable to 
recognize the penny as a piece of money or even as a sort of dice to assist in 
making a decision by flipping it. Although such a person actually does see 
it, he does not understand what it is he is looking at. Finally, someone with 
a loss of memory might not recognize the penny as a penny at all.
6.3 Beyond the penny
The intense discussion about sense-data in the f irst half of the twentieth 
century has made clear that:
(1) every day language about perceiving, seeing, hearing, feeling, touching 
and the actions of all other sensory systems is not always precise,
(2) some situations of perception, seeing, hearing, feeling, touching and 
the actions of all other sensory systems cannot very well be grasped 
with daily language,
(3) each of the processes of perceiving, seeing, hearing, feeling, touching 
and the actions of all other sensory systems has subjective and objective 
aspects which can be distinguished,
(4) illusions of physical things and the perceiving of physical objects – as-
suming that such things do exist – may lead to the same (subjective) 
impressions.
The term sense-data has mainly been used to detect the subjective side of – let 
us concentrate on the visual system – the appearance of the penny, be it illu-
sion or reality, be it seen from above or obliquely. To state “I have an (elliptical) 
sense-datum of a penny” is always true given a truthworthy person. Such a 
statement is no more than a (subjective) description of an immediate aware-
ness and it doesn’t tell us anything more about the penny. It does not even tell 
us if there really is a penny at the moment one has such a sense-datum. It does 
not even confirm that there exists such a thing as a penny. It is no more than 
a description of a subjective impression. Indeed, the relation of a sense-datum 
with the material world has met with many different explanations.
The explanation of this subjective impression depends on one’s phi-
losophy. Reductionist philosophers tend to explain sense-data in terms of 
putative neurophysiological events in the brain and its interactions with 
the environment. Epiphenomenalists suppose that sense-data are causally 
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dependent or are ‘supervenient’ to the brain events, but cannot directly be 
identical with them. Dualists like Russell (see above) take sense-data to be 
independent of physics, an essentially autonomous, non-physical realm of 
the mind.
6.4 So...
I agree that there are problems in the theory of appearing. Sense-datum 
discussions and especially those conducted by logical positivists have made 
us more sensitive to the peculiarities of every day language that often may 
be imprecise but on the other hand can sometimes be very much to the 
point in its – literally – common sense. Sense-data have circumvented the 
problem of illusion, the sense-datum of an illusion and the one of the real 
thing being identical.
I agree with the conclusions of Kandel et al. (vide supra) and R. M. 
Chisholm (1965) that we need not use ‘this sense-datum terminology’.
Moreover, as sense-data are wholly f ictitious or theoretical entities, I 
consider its theory too far removed from common sense and scientif ic 
thought. Sense data look very much like a thought experiment that does 
not impress scientists, given the citation of Kandel et al.1 Indeed, it looks 
suspiciously like a metaphysical entity that reminds me of the race between 
the tortoise and Achilles, the fertilization theories of Aristotle and the earth 
centred cosmology prior to Galileo Galilei.
Thus, to paraphrase Laplace, “I don’t need that hypothesis” ( Je n’ai pas 
besoin de cette hypothèse).
1 About a year and a half after f inishing this chapter I discovered that Kandel et al. 2013 (5th 
edition) although 300 pages larger than Kandel et al. 2000 (4th edition) expunged even this single 
passage, entirely ignoring the term quale and its synonyms.
7 Sensory perception and the 
environment
7.1 Introduction
Philosophy has traditionally been interested in the relationship between 
the (objective) reality of the world out there (the environment) and the 
(subjective) knowledge of the world as we perceive it. In this context a 
question that received at least as much attention as ‘the-case-of-the-penny’ 
[Chapter 6] is the problem of the straight stick looking crooked when half-
way immersed in clear water and similar perceptual phenomena. Usually, 
such phenomena are taken together in philosophy under the heading of 
‘the problem of perception’. A related question is the form adopted by the 
alleged representations of the environment [Box 3-2 (p.49)] in the central 
nervous system.
Firstly, I will try to prove that ‘the problem of perception’ is much over 
rated. Secondly, I will argue that the idealistic aims of reaching true knowl-
edge or absolute truth are misconceived.
7.2 The ‘problem of perception’
‘The problem of perception’ or ‘the problem of illusion’ originates from the 
assumed similarity of (1) perceptual illusion or hallucination and (2) real 
perception understood as direct and immediate access to ‘reality’. Illusion as 
well as hallucination are thought to be experiences which may seem similar 
or even identical to the perception of a real, mind-independent object but 
in the case of illusion and hallucination without an actual object being 
present. If both experiences are identical, the argument goes, the concept 
of normal perception that takes experience to be solely dependent on the 
environment alone must be wrong. Notice that without argumentation the 
subject’s experience (or phenomenal character) of the ‘real observation’ as 
well as ‘the illusion or hallucination’ are taken to be identical. I will return 
to this argument that I consider to be false.
The common man, a realist, presupposes that objects of perception are 
mind-independent and may be perceived by any normal functioning sentient 
being. Theories of perception agree that our perceptual experience seems 
to be awareness of a mind-independent world. Moreover, most philosophers 
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believe the environment to be independent of our experience for its exist-
ence. We assume that there are real objects in a real world. We do not see 
‘some red colour’ but we perceive a tomato, we hear ‘die Forelle’ (trout) quintet 
of Franz Schubert rather than some noises and we smell our coffee, in short 
we perceive objects as objects and we take them to be objective. Some phi-
losophers feel though that this common sense story needs to be attacked or to 
be defended against the putative certainty of illusion and hallucination. This 
‘argument from illusion (or hallucination)’ leads to the view that even items 
we regard as basic to everyday life – material objects – are merely constructs 
of the brain. As Gilbert Ryle once said though, illusions cannot undermine the 
Box 7-1 Illusion, hallucination, pseudohallucination and delusion*
Illusion is a perceptual error strikingly inconsistent with what is accepted as 
true. It is an embarassment for those who would like to hold that knowledge is 
securely based on perception. Although illusions may occur with every sensory 
system, visual ones are known best.
Hallucination is a sensory perception in the absence of external stimuli. Its 
characteristics are thoughts or memory images experienced as if they are a 
perception and externalized but not corrected in the light of other information 
available.
Pseudo-hallucination is an imagery as vivid and immediate as perception but 
not mistaken as such. Pseudo-hallucinations are more likely to be perceived in 
response to isolation or an intense emotional need: for example, shipwrecked 
sailors may visualize boats coming to their rescue well before this actually oc-
curs.
Delusion is a fixed, idiosyncratic belief, unusual in the culture to which the 
person belongs. unlike normal beliefs, which are subject to amendment or cor-
rection, a delusion is held to, despite evidence or arguments brought against 
it. Delusions are usually taken to indicate mental illness, but something akin 
to them is occasionally observed in normal people. This – stubbornness – of 
someone insisting on the correctness of an idea he overvalues, denying any 
significance to evidence appearing to refute it, is usually accompanied by anger, 
whereas in mental illness the patient’s emotional response when a delusion is 
challenged tends to be bland or otherwise inappropriate.
* Definitions of delusion and pseudo-hallucination borrowed from Gregory 1988.
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truth of other experiences because “there can be false coins only when there 
are coins made of the proper materials by the proper authorities”. We can, of 
course, also imagine objects nearly as clearly as reality. There is one important 
difference though: in my mind’s eye I am quite able to change the ‘image’ 
in limitless ways while in reality I cannot. Moreover, and very importantly, 
reality can simultaneously be checked with all our (other) sensory systems, 
and not only with the one under scrutiny, and, as argued before, we always 
use all our sensory systems together. The big difference between reality and 
illusions/hallucinations – the one psychiatrists use in their diagnostics – is 
that reality is perceived by all sensory systems simultaneously and for the 
most part unconsciously, while the ‘illusion’ involves one single sense system 
only. We may have an auditory illusion or hallucination and we may have an 
olfactory illusion or hallucination but we do not have them at the same time.1 
Therefore, I challenge statements like the one of Crane (2011) that suggest 
“to accept [is] the uncontroversial idea of two experiences being such that a 
subject could not know, simply in virtue of having the experiences, whether 
they were having one or the other”.(italics added) All someone having such 
an experience needs to do is to check that experience using another sensory 
system, and if he is unable to do so a psychiatrist or neurologist can do that 
for him.2 Sometimes the argumentations are too far removed from common 
sense. As an example let me take the reader to the common sense approach 
of Shakespeare’s much quoted case of ‘Macbeth’s dagger’ and show a few 
common and repeatedly occurring misconceptions.
7.3 The case of Macbeth’s ‘dagger’
The case of Macbeth’s dagger has also been quoted as an illusion of a dagger 
and even Macbeth’s delusion of a dagger. It is neither, though! It is not even 
a hallucination! The text:
1 ‘Normal’ hallucinations, i.e., the Charles Bonnet Syndrome (CBS) type, are rather frequently 
occurring phantom phenomena based on partial loss of audition or vision; they are conf ined 
to one sensory system only. Degenerative neurological diseases, epileptic f its and a few other 
specif ic neurological disorders may be accompanied by complex and often multisensory illusions 
that more often lead to delusions. 
2 The neurologist O.Sacks (2012) discerns ‘oganic psychoses’ (transient phenomena associated 
with delirium, epilepsy, drugs use and a few other medical conditions, remembered in vivid 
detail of real waking time) from dreams (possessing their own, self-contained narrative set-
ting, without critical consiousness outside it) and hallucinations arising from mental diseases 
(schizophrenia, bipolar psychosis).
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Is this a dagger, which I see before me,
The handle toward my hand? Come, let me clutch thee.
I have thee not, and yet I see thee still.
Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible
To feeling, as to sight? Or art thou but
A dagger of the mind, a false creation,
Proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain?
I see thee yet, in form as palpable,
As this which now I draw. Thou marshal’st me
The way that I was going; and such an instrument
I was to use. Mine eyes are made the fools
Of the other senses, or else worth all the rest.
I see thee still;
And on thy blade and dudgeon gouts of blood,
Which was not so before. There’s no such thing.
It is the bloody business, which informs
Thus to mine eyes. Now o’er the one half world
Nature seems dead, and wicked dreams abuse
The curtain’s sleeper; Witchcraft celebrates
Pale Hecat’s offerings; and wither’d Murder,
Alarum’d by his sentinel, the wolf (…)3
Macbeth, planning to murder Duncan, sees a dagger. After the f irst line this 
could be an illusion as well as a hallucination, or even a delusion. [Box 7-1] He 
is not dreaming for he just said farewell to a servant. Macbeth, quite sensibly 
(no delusion by def inition) uses his other senses too: he tries to ‘clutch’ it. 
The thing proofs not to be ‘sensible to feeling’ after which Macbeth himself 
concludes quite correctly ‘A dagger of the mind, a false creation, proceeding 
from the heat-oppressed brain’. Quite, the dagger is a pseudo-hallucination, 
i.e., perceiving a thing that is not there, although he can see it clearly ‘in a 
form as palpable, as this which now I draw’. As a kind of overkill Macbeth 
states ‘Mine eyes are made the fools of the other senses, but (...) I see thee 
still.’ 4 The pseudo-hallucination or in Sacks’ terminology ‘organic psychosis’ 
[note 2] is quite strong! Note that the def inition of pseudo-hallucination 
3 Macbeth, Act II, Scene I
4 G.Harman (2004,645) beautifully describes Macbeth’s act in the same vein as I do. He writes: 
”Let us use ‘see†’ (‘see-dagger’) ‘for the sense of ‘see’ in which the object seen might not exist, as 
when Macbeth saw a dagger before him and let us use ‘see*’ (‘see-star’) for the sense of ‘see’ in 
which only things that exist can be seen. Macbeth saw† a dagger but he did not see* a dagger.” 
Harman paid no attention to Macbeth’s own conclusion that he did see† the dagger and not see* 
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states ‘more likely to be perceived in response to isolation or an intense 
emotional need’. I take it that most of us are satisf ied that this was, indeed, 
the case with Macbeth at the time of this act II, scene II.
I am not the only philosopher who feels that one should use common 
sense to deny the unrealistic way of talking about illusion and hallucination 
(see for instance Austin 1962,48-9 and McCulloch 2002 chapter 7). Although 
in itself discussions about delusion, illusion and hallucination are interest-
ing, they do not seem to take us far with our philosophy of sensory systems. 
One of the basic mistakes speaking about illusion and hallucination is 
disregarding the process side of these phenomena, ignoring the temporary 
state of mind (and/or one single sense system) that will subdue and may be 
corrected by the use of other sensory systems or, in case of toxic states of 
the mind, by waiting to come down or become sober again by consulting 
another person, preferably a psychiatrist who is trained in these matters.
7.4 Fruits of perception
Traditionally philosophy has approached the continuous activity of the 
sensory systems yielding information about the environment in the context 
of ‘the basic theory of knowledge’. Two of the questions most discussed have 
been (1) which of the human inborn instruments is the most important one 
for acquiring knowledge, i.e., the sensory systems or reason, and (2) whether 
absolutely certain Truth/Knowledge may ever be obtained in man’s quest 
for knowledge. The second question may be the centre of some theory of 
truth but is understood here as the problem of justif ication.
As to the f irst question, I have tried to make clear that in my view the 
age-old bickering between empiricism’s or rationalism’s primacy in acquir-
ing knowledge is obsolete [§ 5-2 (p.66)] as Homo sapiens has behaviour 
systems [Box 5-1 (p.67)] at his disposal, a concept that runs counter to the 
old dispute between empiricists and rationalists. Moreover, the fixed a priori 
that intuition is reliable as implicit in rationalism is antithetic to science. 
[§ 4-2 (p.52); § 8-3 (p.99)]
As to the second question of judgment and the acknowledged truth of (a 
piece of) knowledge, the answer has traditionally been ‘a justif ied belief’ 
until 1963, the year in which this answer was challenged by Gettier. It led to 
based on his own sense of touch. Harman missed the ‘diagnosis’ pseudo-hallucination within 
an ace.
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a stack of papers on ‘the Gettier problem’, basically a thought experiment in 
which one’s true ‘justified’ belief might have been founded too much on luck.
I admire the pragmatic solution of Bas van Fraassen (1998,213) [§ 12-3 
(p.144)] better. His approach is the ‘scientific agnostic’ one of trying to f ind 
the empirically adequate best answer/solution to some specif ic spacetime 
problem, not believing it to be true or false.5 This presumed best answer to 
any problem or question in the context of some four dimensional (4-D)6 
problem is also known as inference to the best explanation. Thus, truth will 
be understood as the pragmatic, temporary and tentative answer to some 
specif ic 4-D problem.
7.5 Sensory systems and the environment
The origins of the structure and functions of our sensory systems are [§ 4-4 
(p.57)] largely determined by our evolutionary history. The effects of the 
mechanisms of our sensory systems will (gradually) become manifest in the 
form of experiences [Chapter 10] and learning programmes. The effects of 
the ‘genetic knowledge’ is translated into behavioural systems. “If they do 
not function in the programmed way of the species, if in short they do not 
work correctly, its owner tends to die or with luck will continue to live but 
probably has less chance of offspring.” 7 In the latter case his evolutionary 
line will ‘conveniently’ end with him, others who have been born with better 
judgmental reactions taking care of the species offspring.
As for the behavioural part of the outcome of sensory systems a large 
difference exists between humans and species with less developed central 
nervous systems that will always react stereotypically. The more primitive 
reactions are inflexible, such that one specific stimulus always leads to the 
same reaction. Two examples borrowed from Slurink (2002) will illustrate this.
A wasp will always fly in the direction of light even if it would bring death: 
It has no choice. A small moving object within the visual f ield of a frog’s 
eye always leads to the frog jumping forward and shooting out its tongue in 
order to catch the object. In its natural environment this object is (always) 
5 The contrasting view is the ‘scientific gnostic’ one, someone who believes the science he 
accepts to be true.
6 I am aware of discussions about 2-D, 3-D, 4-D and even more D(imensions). The sensory 
systems of all (human) animals, together with the processing brain seem to be adapted to 4-D 
environments. (see also Markosian 2008)
7 Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praisworthy tendency 
to die out before reproducing their kind. (Quine 1969,126)
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a flying insect8 rather than the doings of a biologist in a laboratory setting. 
Both reactions are inflexible (neither wasp nor frog can act otherwise). 
Once the adequate stimulus is there, the animal’s reaction will follow. These 
f ixed reactions have mayor advantages as I already indicated in the herring 
gull chick’s begging response. [§2-2 (p.28)] It apparently only needs simple 
neurological wiring and thus saves much tissue and energy. Such rigidly 
pre-programmes have disadvantages too. A processionary caterpillar for 
instance has the habit to always follow the one before him. If one puts the 
foremost behind the last one, the procession will continue to walk in circles 
until the laboratory researcher ends his game. (ibid.2002,xv) The caterpillar 
is never able to unlearn this habit. Species with a more developed central 
nervous system are more f lexible in acquiring new behaviour through 
experiences post factum called learning, sometimes even after one ‘try’ (one 
trial learning for the psychologist, ‘once bitten twice shy’ for folk wisdom).
The ability to learn from experience is greater when young and decreases 
when growing older. The f irst lessons learned from experience are usually 
taught by the mother in many mammals and are intended to increase 
chance of survival. We can even def ine experiencing as nature’s way of 
teaching. [§10-3 (p.126)] Experience may be considered as a kind of half-
product of the sensory systems’ informational processing system in which 
learning acts as the closure of a feedback loop, i.e. sensing and learning 
form a continuous process.
Consider the way a child learns to raise its head, to sit, to walk, to notice 
that there is a world beyond his body, that a sound may arrive from different 
sides, that it may be able to notice what its hand does, that biting on its own 
f inger is not a good idea et cetera. Most people forget that all basic knowl-
edge has been learned (unconsciously) in infancy and has been incorporated 
through the information provided by the sensory systems and continuously 
managed by the coordinating central nervous system. Gradually, each child 
probably also learns that in general repeating the same action will yield 
the same effect, in short he learns to rely on induction, like any learning 
species. Animal research of the Pavlov’s variety ìs based on conditioning. 
If one studies an infant’s behaviour one immediately notices the child’s 
induced, spontaneous and seemingly stereotypical actions usually repeated 
a few successive days after which the specif ic actions will lose the child’s 
interest, gradually decline and stop. The infant has mastered a new action 
or trick, it has acquired (again, unconsciously) knowledge. [§ 2-2 (p.28); § 
8 Indeed, the frog would ignore a dead insect; the animal will only recognize an object as 
food if it is small and moving.
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2-5 (p.36); § 3-3 (p.45)] In the mere functioning self lies the achievement of 
the child which obviously is happy with each (new level of) achievement. 
New activities are thus learned through a process in which cognition, 
sensory and musculo-skeletal systems function as a totality. Gradually 
also, the child learns to rely on its achievements and will connect them with 
other experiences to construct more complex ones. This induces the child’s 
conviction of causality and induction, certainly the result of habituation. 
Anyone used to kittens and pups will notice the similarities between them 
and the human infant in their learning and in their acceptance of inference 
as a basic fact of life: Animal ludens => animal apprehendens. Russell’s quip 
of the daily fed chicken that should have been better versed in philosophy 
to have evaded its neck being wrung overlooked Pavlov’s experimental 
f indings, the economy and the eff iciency of animal behavioural systems.
Thus the ‘fruit of all (unconscious) perception’ is (unconscious) knowledge 
learnt through experience. Its acquisition is a complicated process which 
cannot scientif ically be reduced to smaller parts without loss. To exclude 
unconsciously acquired knowledge or focus on abstractly obtained fruits of 
sensory systems clearly is a biased restriction and reduction. This conclusion 
is similar to Millikan’s (1993,13-29) in that all of the basic norms applying 
to cognition are biological norms. Correct cognition is, much like all other 
biological activities, not what always or even on average happens. Millikan 
also concludes that the pragmatic question that connects a perception 
or a thought to the state of affairs it represents is more important than 
haggling about the normativity problem which she ascribes to evolution. 
The yield of a creature’s f irst encounter or experience with some situation 
is – pragmatically – the acquired knowledge or belief with which the next 
occasion, judged as similar, will be handled.
Dretske (1995,22) argued that the content of an experience is f ixed by the 
biological and phylogenetically determined function of the systems of which 
it is a state. His views are not far removed from mine except that I believe 
it to be less of a state than a continuing process and sub-processes that 
together may be taken as continuously developing maps or networks in the 
central nervous system. [§ 10-3 (p.126); § 12-4 (p.147)] The continuity of the 
development and partially change of the brain’s network representations in 
the brain contain – at least in part – some characteristics of the environment 
which implies the philosophical view of externalism.9 Experience viewed 
9 Externalism with regard to mental content says that in order to have certain types of 
intentional mental states (e.g., beliefs), it is necessary to be related to the environment in the 
right way.
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as the bodily representations or maps in the central nervous system will 
continuously be updated through new information and mechanisms that 
are composed of evolutionary ‘f ixed’ parts and parts that are acquired later 
in life.10 As said before, a sensory system should not be reduced to some 
information gathering instrument only. Rather, all sensory systems and the 
brain act as one continuously experience gathering and processing system. 
Together with the motor mechanisms of the body the sensory systems and 
the brain build behavioural systems. Consider the cerebellar processes that 
simultaneously run with the informational side to form continuous feed-
forward and feed-backward loops that make the otherwise jerky movements 
of conglomerates of active muscles smooth and supple. [§ 5-3 (p.70)]
7.6 The ‘fit’ of the sensory systems with the environment
The previous paragraph may be taken as the metaphysical realist point of 
view defined by Rescher (2000,71) as:
Metaphysical realism maintains investigation-antecedently that there 
is a physical state of natural reality, and scientif ic realism maintains 
investigation-consequently that science shows us what this state is like. 
[This] suggest that thus ‘what reality is like’ is nothing def initive and 
categorical but something contextual and limited to a particular state-
of-the-art level of sophistication in point of scientif ic technology.(italics 
in original)
All present-day existing species including Homo sapiens have managed 
to survive in their allotted and/or chosen environment(s). This argument 
seems to support scientif ic realism and points to a seemingly adequate 
attunement between the species bodies (including sensory systems and 
central nervous systems, if any) and their environments. If such a f it would 
have failed or if it would have been worse than the analogue fit of competing 
predators, the species would have become extinct. Or as Rescher puts it 
(2000,105):
10 Even the sensory maps of the body surface in the cerebral cortex are not hard-wired and 
the pathways from the receptors in the skin to the cortex are not completely f ixed early in 
development. The maps do change during life and details of the maps vary considerably from 
one individual to another. Training enlarges, disuse reduces. (Kandel 2013,378)
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If [human animals] did not assume from the very outset that [their] 
sensations somehow relate to an extra-mental reality, [they] could clearly 
make no use of them to draw any inference whatever about ‘the real 
world’. Experience would then lack any and all evidential bearing.
In extension of Rescher’s inference about the outside world is that of a body 
of experience which is continuously expanding because of the addition of 
new experiences. At any moment, the internal concept of the real world 
is the yield of all the animal’s know-how in the broadest meaning at that 
very moment.
Species with a central nervous system that is more developed than a 
ganglion, i.e., brains of sorts are continuous learning living processors. This 
ever changing and developing knowledge, this continuous process materially 
resides in the body, and is based on the experience of the usability of obser-
vational data as a source of (objective) information. As – again – Rescher 
(ibid.) says about ourselves, it “leads us to accept that what we take to be 
evidence ìs evidence”.
The only reasonable course is to heed Charles S. Peirce’s pivotal injunction 
never to bar the path of inquiry. Our commitment to realism pivots on a 
certain practical modus operandi, encapsulated in the precept: ’Proceed 
in matters of inquiry and communication on the basis that you’re dealing 
with an objective realm, existing quite independently of the doings and 
dealings of minds. ’And on this basis we also standardly operate on the 
presumption of objectivity reflected in the guiding precept: ’Unless you 
have good reason to think otherwise (that is, as long as nihil obstat) treat 
the materials of inquiry and communication as veridical – as representing 
the nature of the real.’ (ibid.107)
In the same vein, a belief may be considered to be an assumption based on 
the state of the then available personal knowledge that preludes one’s next 
action or thought. Justif ication then may be considered as the result of – or 
answer to – the best possible test of this belief.
Of course, knowledge and belief and justif ication are temporary phases 
within the knowledge-forming-processes, phases as parts of a continuing 
set of processes and not holy facts, ready to be rejected if the justif icative 
process chosen does fail its substantiation.
In principle this process is very much like the diagnostic one of the physi-
cian or the motor mechanic who proceeds accordingly to – hypothetically 
– the best f it for that specif ic 4-D problem. It is even similar to, indeed 
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identical with the ways our ancestors since the dawn of times read tracks. 
(Liebenberg 1990, especially chapters 6 and 11) Liebenberg argues – convinc-
ingly to my mind – that the reading of spoor might very well be the origin 
of science which he even states in the titles of his books (Liebenberg 1990 
and 2013). Observing and through that learning and knowing, mutually 
discussing and teaching their ofspring the ways of (other) animals has been 
the fundamental basis for survival of our ancestors. Basically, he argues, 
this still is the way of the scientist.
This 4-D web of developing knowledge rests on Homo sapiens’ inborn 
tentatively acceptance of his mere existence and that of his environment. 
Such acceptance implies Self. David Hume: “When I turn my reflection 
on myself, I can never perceive this self without one or more perceptions; 
nor can I ever perceive anything but the perceptions. It is the composition 
of these, therefore, which forms SELF.” One caveat though, ‘composition’ 
should be understood as a process, i.e., within a (continuous changing) 4-D 
context. [Addendum 14-5 (p.174)]

8 Non-sensory sensing and non-
linguistic thinking
8.1 Introduction
In the title of this chapter I have taken together phenomena that may emerge 
in twilight-like transitions between sensory systems, subconsiousness, 
unconsiousness, feelings and emotions. [Box 8-1] Von Helmholtz’s concept 
of unconscious inference and the ideas of other forerunners about the uncon-
cious and subconscious mind should be acknowledged. Their extensive 
study, however, began with Freud and Jung.
Distinct from these phenomena, philosophy embraced other non-
linguistic and non-sensory oriented cognitive faculties using expressions 
derived from sensory systems. These putative faculties may be subdivided 
into introspection, intuition, the mind’s eye, and the pair contemplation and 
meditation. I will discuss these notions in this and the next chapter.
A characteristic feature of philosophy – even almost a prioristic – is its 
linguistic basis. Many philosophers were and many still are convinced 
that thinking is entirely based on language (private talk, often referred to 
as inner speak) although Wittgenstein and his followers took language as 
an interhuman, collective phenomenon denying the existence of private-
language. In the next paragraphs I will occasionaly refer to this topic also.
8.2 Introspection
“A subjects’ awareness of his own mental state is analogous to perception 
of things distinct from himself, being another species of the same genus. 
The terms ‘reflection’, ‘inner sense’, and ‘introspection’ have been used for 
the former, and labels such as ‘sensation’, ‘outer sense’, or ‘perception’ for 
the latter” (Stevenson 1982,73f). The targets of introspection (Latin intro = 
into, speculari = to view) may conveniently be distinguished by their shots:
– Folk psychologists aim at their own conscious thoughts and feelings,
– Faith in all its varieties has the common goal of reflection and mysti-
cism, [Chapter 9]
– Philosophy, according to Schwitzgebel (2010), the comparative and the 
Western variety, reflected on ‘the inner gaze’ from its very beginning,
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– Psychology and psychiatry separated from philosophy in the course 
of the 19th century and subsequently developed into many schools of 
thought all with their own view on introspection, viz. behaviourism, 
Gestaltpsychology, psychoanalysis and its varieties, phenomenology 
and cognition, (Boring 1953)
– “Until the end of the 19th century the chief method for understanding 
the mind,” writes Kandel (2013,371) “was introspection. In fact, this 
scholarly study of the mind was a branch of philosophy. By the middle 
of the 19th century, however, the philosophical approach gave way to 
empirical analysis and eventually to the formation of the independent 
discipline of experimental psychology.”
We need not pay attention to every point of view on introspection of all 
these disciplines. The reader may consult the above cited sources as a more 
extensive introduction. The essence of the old belief is that introspection 
provides ‘privileged access to our mental states (including sensory, bodily, cog-
nitive, emotional et cetera) and thus is unique’. This old position is untenable, 
however, since experimental psychology showed that introspection is often 
mistaken, is unreliable, is auto-suggestive and may be biased. Boring (1953) 
posed the question in the introduction of his scholarly review of introspection 
“what became of introspection?” and concluded “…thus dynamic psychology 
carries on with the basic assumption that one cannot trust the subject’s 
personal belief (introspection) for the true assessment of his motives”.1
1 Danziger (1980) in his discussion of Boring’s paper draws the attention to historical dis-
crepancies between Anglosaxon and German psychological views on introspection which do 
not need to concern us here.
Box 8-1 Emotion and feeling*
Emotions are the set of physiological reponses that occur more or less uncon-
sciously when certain challenging situations are detected. In the brain these 
automatic physiological responses involve changes in arousal levels and in cogni-
tive functions such as attention, memory processing and decision making. In the 
body proper they involve autonomic, musculoskeletal and endocrine responses.
Feelings are the conscious experiences representative of the physiological 
phenomena generated by the emotional state.
* Ledoux JE, Damasio AR. Emotions and feelings. (Kandel et al. 2013,1079)
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Many modern philosophers began with introspection of their own 
mental states. From Descartes onwards, knowledge so acquired was widely 
viewed as providing a unique – putatively incorrigible – foundation for 
philosophical investigation. (Papineau 2009) The discussion centred on the 
status of the beliefs obtained through introspection with questions whether 
‘they were justif ied’ and ‘how likely is it that they are false’. (Noordhof 1995).2 
More recent philosophers have been less sympathetic to incorrectable 
introspective knowledge than Descartes3 and other founding fathers of 
modern philosophy. The scientif ic requirement of corrigibility is at odds 
with the ability of introspection to yield substantial information about 
reality, even about internal mental reality. Papineau (2009) observed that 
in the twentieth century people like Wittgenstein and Sellars argued that 
this tension discredited the entire idea of incorrigible introspection. Even 
philosophers who still support incorrigible self-knowledge for a limited 
range do not see it as playing a central methodological role in philosophy. 
I endorse the naturalistic and scientif ic conclusion4 that introspection is 
not a reliable source of knowledge. Sense data’s concept was so conceived 
and as stated earlier its existence has never been scientif ically proved. 
[§ 6-4 (p.84)]
8.3 Intuition
“Intuition has been described by serious and sober writers as the only way 
to absolute truth, and by others writers, equally serious and sober as an 
illusionary path to absolute nonsense. The term, the concept, the fact of f ic-
tion of intuition all carry emotional overtones, regardless of the persuasion 
of the writer or the context of the writing. These emotional overtones range 
from contemplative delight to livid disgust.” (Westcott 1968)
Intuition (Latin intuere = to see) denotes the hypothetical power of the 
mind to perceive or ‘see’ certain self-evident truths. Intuition or insight is 
a private affair, an experience of sensing or obtaining knowledge without 
the use of rational processes, which is diff icult to observe or communicate. 
Intuition supposedly has a direct relation to visual seeing, between the 
2 Noordhof PJP, In: Honderich 1995,414-5
3 van Leeuwen (1986,4-8 & ch.ii) – starting from the premise that Descartes’ Regulae explain 
the process of his methodical thinking that constitutes his philosophy – argues convincingly 
that introspection in se as used by Descartes is to be taken as a metaphor only to substantiate 
(t)his process of thinking. 
4 Gregory R, 1988,388-9
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mind and something abstract, not accessible to the sensory systems and 
sometimes with mystical overtones. Intuition is thought to be an original 
and independent process of acquiring knowledge. Intuitions have been 
important in logic, metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology. Omitting for the 
moment statements on logic or mathematics as laws, axioms and truisms 
as well as intuition in the domains of metaphysics and ethics, I will focus 
on intuition as it occurs in epistemology and science.5 I will not discuss 
intuitionism or the philosophers who held it in high regard like Spinoza to 
whom it provided a superior way of knowing truth, mystical, without prior 
knowledge and the use of reason, i.e., knowledge of the supernatural, and 
of God. [Chapter 9]
In my discussion of innateness [§ 5-2 (p.66)] I said that intuitions were 
accepted as independent and trustworthy sources of knowledge by rational-
ists but were rejected by empiricists as being unreliable and often wrong.
[§ 4-2 (p.52)] Nevertheless, many people rely on intuition in their daily life 
and often do so successfully. Can such apperently contradicting opinions 
be reconciled?
The intuitive mind thinks synthetically where a deductive mind will 
prefer to reason by analyis and abstraction. In the second place intuition 
uses association and is fast, while the rationalist analysis, takes time and, 
apperantly, more effort. Intuition is fallible but may lead to (lucky) hunches 
and quick insights; it certainly has glamour, and seems related to creativity 
and the momentary flash of insight or expression of eureka which of old 
had connections with the divine (in-spirare).
Cognitive scientists consider intuition as a f irst and fast assessment of 
some situation leading to a provisional hypothesis. It usually takes place in 
stress-like situations and is based on extensive experience and knowledge 
in the given f ield or discipline in which the intuition occurs. Therefore, 
intuition is a domain-specif ic phenomenon, which is based on much train-
ing, skill, talent and perseverance. It seems to be a gift of an effortlessly 
operating master in some art. Being an expert the master is usually right. 
Intuition is praised by people like Hadamard, Poincaré and von Helmholtz. 
Einstein once said, alluding to his E = mc2 ”there is no logical way to the 
discovery of these elemental laws. There is only the way of intuition, which 
5 Here no specif ic attention is given to ‘female intuition’. According to Gregory et al. (1988,389) 
female intuition is probably based on the subtle use of almost subliminal cue’s in social situations 
like gestures, casual remarks, and knowledge of behavioural patterns and motives. It heavily 
relies on capabilities to interpret body language, non-verbal communication and understanding 
feelings.
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is helped by a feeling for the order lying behind the appearance”, and again, 
“The really valuable factor is intuition”. We cannot (entirely) rely on intui-
tions and creative insights: we must treat them as hypotheses in need of 
empirical testing. (Feenstra 2005,13-27)
Gladwell (2005) describes intuition as the power of thinking without 
thinking and claims that this is one of the brain’s strategies to make sense 
of a situation, which he describes as the fast operating, almost immediately 
and entirely below the surface of consciousness working system in which 
our ‘brain’ reaches conclusions without immediately telling us that it is 
reaching them. (Beware of the mereological fallacy)[Box 3-1 (p.47)] He cites 
Gigenrenzer calling this the ‘fast and frugal’, and ‘just feeling something’. 
Gladwell describes this phenomenon as the mind operating most eff iciently 
by delegating much of high-level, sophisticated thinking to the unconscious. 
The adaptive unconscious does an excellent job of sizing up the world, warn-
ing people of danger6, setting goals, and initiating action in a sophisticated 
and eff icient manner. Intuition also is the ability of mind-reading that is 
based on the unconscious to f ind patterns in situations and behaviour. 
Moreover, one immediately knows that something is a tomato [§ 5-5 (p.75)], 
an ornithologist recognizes a bird, and anyone recognizes danger, without 
using logic or consciousness in this way; one ‘knows’ it at a glance. One 
knows but doesn’t know how one knows it. This kind of intuitive grasp 
(and/or subliminal perception) is extensively studied by, among others, 
the group of Dijksterhuis (2006,2007). Dijksterhuis himself argues that 
one’s ‘smart unconsciousness’ rather than conscious reason makes the 
better decision in – for instance – purchasing a new house. He describes 
this smart unconsciousness as a mixture of feelings, emotions and rational 
information acquired earlier.
In summary, intuition exists as a time honoured, independent – partly 
unconsciously or subconsciously operating – source of knowledge that 
is based on earlier acquired experience in the f ield to which the specif ic 
intuition is related. From ‘direct seeing and experiencing ultimate reality’ 
in the past 7 it became ‘the immediate apprehension of justif iable belief’ 
that may show a (new, best) way. Its results should be looked upon as a 
6 „Es ist der Instinkt des Tieres, der in uns erwacht, der uns leitet und beschützt. Er ist nicht 
bewußt, er ist viel schneller, viel sicherer, viel unfehlbarer als das Bewußtsein. Mann kann es 
nicht erklären“. Remarque EM 1929/1993,48) [It is the animal instinct which alerts us, guides 
and protects us. It is not conscious, much faster, safer and more secure than consciousness. It 
can’t be elucidated]
7 Viz. Descartes ‘lumen naturale’ as a universal human attribute (van Leeuwen 1986, ch.ii & 
56-97) 
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hypothesis that must be tested. Intuition then is based on the operation of 
un- or sub-consiousness that digested and processed much accumulated 
knowledge acquired by the information of the sensory systems.
8.4 The mind’s eye
When I was a kid growing up in Far Rockaway, I had a friend named Bernie 
Walker. We both had “labs” at home, and we would do various “experiments.”
One time, we were discussing something – we must have been 11 or 12 at the 
time – and I said, “But thinking is nothing but talking to yourself inside.”
“Oh yeah?” Bernie said. “Do you know the crazy shape of the crankshaft 
in a car?”
“Yeah, what of it?”
“Good. Now tell me: how did you describe it when you were talking to 
yourself?”
So I learned from Bernie that thoughts can be visual as well as verbal.
 Feynman 1988
8.4.1 Introduction
It is hardly possible to outdo Bernie Walker’s quote in proving the existence 
of non-linguistic thoughts. It thus would most likely be smarter to stop at 
this point rather than dwell upon the topic of the ‘mind’s eye’ which is at 
the root of Feynman’s anecdote. The essence of the mind’s eye as described 
by Ferguson (1977) in the introduction of his paper ‘nonverbal thought’ is 
‘thinking with pictures’, an essential strand in the intellectual history of 
technological development. He clarif ies this as:
Many features and qualities of the objects [knives, chairs, lighting fixtures, 
motorcycles etc.] that a technologist thinks about cannot be reduced to 
unambiguous verbal descriptions; they are dealt with in his mind by a 
visual, nonverbal process. His mind’s eye is a well-developed organ that not 
only reviews the contents of his visual memory but also forms such new or 
modif ied images as his thoughts require. As he thinks about a machine, 
reasoning his way through successive steps in a dynamic process, he 
can turn it over in his mind. The designer and the inventor, who brings 
elements together in new combinations are each able to assemble and 
manipulate in their minds devices that as yet do not exist. …..Pyramides, 
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cathedrals, and rockets exist not because of geometry, theory of structures, 
or thermodynamics, but because they were f irst a picture – literally a 
vision – in the minds of those who built them …….. Beginning with the 
Renaissance of the 15th century, a vast body of technical knowledge has 
been recorded and conveyed in the form of drawings and pictures. As 
soon as printed books superseded manuscript codices, large numbers of 
identical illustrations began to be reproduced. (Ferguson, 1977)
Ferguson cites Luis Vives, a philosopher and tutor at the English court, 
who as early as 1531 urged scholars to pay attention to the world around 
them, including the work of artisans, in order that their speculations 
might be grounded in reality rather than in “foolish dreams”. François 
Rabelais also advised teacher and pupil to visit shops of artisans and thus 
complete a liberal education, while Newton advised a young friend to seek 
out and observe “Trades & Arts” on the Continent and also to see what 
the Dutch had achieved in the grinding and polishing of “glasses plane”. 
(ibid.) Graphic inventions in the 15th century and drawings in perspective 
provided a consistent and uniform convention for pictorial representation 
of three-dimensional objects that can relatively easily be interpreted. He 
draws the attention to Leonardo da Vinci’s invention of the “exploded” view.
Ferguson (1992) elaborated his ‘Science’- paper in a highly recommend-
able book with many more examples and thoughtful analyses. His f irm 
conviction is that “an engineering education that ignores its rich heritage of 
nonverbal learning will produce graduates who are dangerously ignorant of 
the myriad subtle ways in which the real world differs from the mathemati-
cal world their professors teach them.” (ibid. xii) “The mind’s eye”, he says, “is 
the locus of our images of remembered reality and imagined contrivance, an 
organ of incredible capacity and subtlety. Collecting and interpreting much 
more than the information that enters through the optical eye, the mind’s 
eye is the organ in which a lifetime of sensory information – visual, tactile, 
muscular, visceral, aural, olfactory, and gustatory – is stored, intercon-
nected, and interrelated.”(ibid.41f)
8.4.2 Other fields
The mind’s eye is also used in other disciplines. Consider the anatomical 
atlasses without which no person can hope to become a physician not to 
mention a surgeon. Consider the hands-on training which is extensively 
used in many laboratories in a variety of trades. No otologist can hope 
to learn his profession without many dissections in the temporal bone 
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laboratory and extensively studying surgical atlasses that contain many 
drawings but few words. New surgical technology is taught and learned 
through hands-on courses, enriched with many movies and demonstra-
tions of life operations. Again, words are used sparingly; instead obtaining 
such skill and technology needs long hours of intense and concentrated 
observations and hands-on practice, which reminds one of Polanyi’s tacit 
knowledge [Box 2-4 (p.37)] and the above mentioned ‘lifetime of sensory 
acquired information’. A good clinical examination and a thorough medical 
history are learned in the same way. A detailed talk with the patient is half 
the diagnosis. This art, as again Ferguson tells us, can not be taught through 
written text. Observation and learning by doing, i.e., practice only can teach 
trainees these activities. There is little difference between the training 
in medicine and surgery on the one hand and that of artisans, engineers, 
sportsmen and artists on the other.
Another example of training the mind’s eye to which Ferguson points is 
the use of ‘models’ which brings the trainee a dimension nearer to reality 
than a drawing and provides ‘nonverbal, sensual visual, tactile, muscular, 
and nowedays even aural information.’
Hamilton (2001) also citing Ferguson argues in ‘Wittgenstein and the 
mind’s eye’ 8 that the visual thinking involved in technical drawings of 
engineering design has crucially influenced the structure of the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus (hereafter Tractatus) and influenced Wittgenstein’s 
conception of the Bild theory of language. “A proposition shows its sense” 
(Tractatus 4.022), “Propositions show the logical form of reality. They display 
it” (Tractatus 4.121). “What can be shown, cannot be said” (Tractatus 4.1212).
Wittgenstein once described his own distinction between ‘saying’ and 
‘showing’ as “the cardinal problem of philosophy”. (Monk 1990,164) And, 
again, a “picture … cannot represent its form or representation; it shows it 
forth”. (Tractatus 2.172)
8.4.3 Sensory systems and the mind’s eye
Like introspection and intuition, the mind’s eye is not an example of some 
special anatomical or physiological sensory system or a special unit. Its 
importance for my theme lies in the similar ways people think and speak 
about the sensory systems and the mind’s eye. Metaphor and reality may be 
confused. Moreover, the process of intense cooperation of many simultane-
ously active sensory systems in acquiring and mastering knowledge and 
8 Hamilton K. Wittgenstein and the mind’s eye. In: Klagge, 2001,53-97
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skill(s) is similar to the process of acquiring a mind’s eye. If this combination 
of knowledge and skill has been attained we tend to refer to that status as 
being experienced in that specif ic skill.
In this context I like to point out a typical Dutch term for the mixture 
of knowledge and (professional) skill which differentiates it from pure, i.e., 
predominantly theoretical knowledge. [Box 8-2] The combination of theo-
retical knowledge and proficiency may be compared with both knowledge 
what and knowledge how. (Ryle 1949,28) Granted that transitions occur and 
that the difference is not always sharp the meaning of both notions (i.e. 
‘kennis’ and ‘kunde’) is not the same.
Much more than in Western philosophy the relation between intensely 
close sensory attention, theoretical knowledge and skill has attracted 
focussed interest in Asian philosophy, especially in the Zen tradition 
and in martial arts. After the second world war these Asian traditions 
became more widely known in the Western world. Book titles such as Eugen 
Herrigel’s ‘Zen and the art of archery’ (1953) and Robert Pirsig’s ‘Zen and 
the art of motorcycle maintenance’ (1974) to name only two, testify to this 
phenomenon. Indeed these two titles now are almost household names. A 
concentrated intellectual study (philosophical and scientif ic) of the mar-
riage of these two varieties of knowledge is still wanting.
8.5 Meditation and contemplation
Intuitive knowledge may also be obtained through meditation and con-
templation. These terms are often used as more or less synonymous but 
they are not.
Box 8-2 Two Dutch terms discriminating theoretical from applied Wissenschaften
The Dutch word ‘kennis’ is used for knowledge, of the more theoretical variety in 
the first place.
The Dutch word ‘kunde’ is used for the mixture of knowledge and (profes-
sional) skill, a word also used in compounds such as ‘verloskunde’ (literally 
deliver-‘kunde’ = obstetrics).
Viz. the German word ‘Kunde‘ is now obsolete but is still used in compounds 
like ‘Heilkunde’ (literally heal-‘kunde’ = surgery); ‘Kenntnisse’ (plural) covers both 
the Dutch ‘kennis’ and ‘kunde’ although the German term, like the Dutch ‘kennis’ 
tends to stress the theoretical side.
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Meditation is focussing one’s thoughts and seriously concentrating on one 
subject. The aim of meditation may be religious or profane. In the Roman 
Catholic tradition it is considered to be a silent prayer concentrated on a 
religious truth.
Contemplation is the activity of viewing and continuously concentrating 
on spiritual phenomena as a form of devotion. In Roman Catholic tradition 
the devotion to transcendental truths by way of contemplation is thought 
to be the third and last preparatory step (after cogitation and meditation) 
before the soul’s vision of God.
Devotees consider meditation and contemplation usefull to intuitively 
acquire knowledge. They are sources of alleged intuitive ways of acquiring 
knowledge of an entirely different variety than that which is the product of 
conscious ways of using sensory systems and of scientif ic enquiry.
Zazen9 training by a zen-teacher brought me into contact with Zazen’s 
putative target, i.e., practical mysticism as way of gaining knowledge which 
I will address in the next chapter.
8.6 Summary
Philosophical tradition attached great value to cognitive faculties like 
introspection and intuition, a little less value to the twins of contemplation 
and meditation, and hardly any value to the relatively unknown mind’s 
eye. Introspection is no longer accepted as a reliable cognitive system. 
Intuition has also met with conflicting opinions, is still valued but its 
cognitive meaning changed from ‘direct seeing and experiencing ultimate 
reality’ to ‘the immediate apprehension of justif iable belief’. The mind’s 
eye entirely relies, like introspection and intuition, on prior input of the 
sensory systems and on time for un- and subconscious processing and 
assimilation. Indeed, thinking, speaking and writing about these cognitive 
phenomena is distinguished by the use of a terminology derived from the 
sensory systems. Occasionally, the dividing line of metaphor and reality 
is – unwittingly – crossed.
9 Zazen is a meditative discipline or technique of just sitting in meditation, suspending all 
judgmental thinking and letting words, ideas, images and thoughts pass by without getting 
involved in them.
9 Mystical experience as an empirical fact
In most circles where it is fashionable to be rational, it is not fashionable to 
be mystical; and in most circles where it is fashionable to be mystical, it is not 
 fashionable to be rational.
JF Staal 1975,12
You can have an (epistemically) objective science of an (ontologically) 
 subjective consciousness.
JR Searle 2011
9.1 Introduction
In the humanities perception may be understood as an intuitive ability to 
understand (Verstehen). Perception thus understood seems to border on 
inner or spiritual vision and contemplation. This chapter deals with the 
‘humanities version’ of perception, which according to Wittgenstein is ‘the 
inexpressible’.1
Meditation, contemplation and mystic insight or enlightenment may 
be understood as variations of perception as Aurelius Augustinus (St. Au-
gustine) knew. It concerns a kind of perception that leads to some special 
experience, one that is signif icant for the perceiver but impossible – or very 
hard – to be vindicated by others.
The literature on mysticism is extensive. A recently released encyclopae-
dia of mysticism written in Dutch took ten years, thirty four collaborators 
and 1149 pages. (Baers et al. 2003) My present review of the matter will of 
course be ‘brief’. Although I will try to present the information systemati-
cally, it should be kept in mind that mysticism usually ignores all rules of 
taxonomy.
9.2 Sources
The obvious way to study mysticism is not merely indirect and from without, 
but also directly and from within, comparable to work on perception. While 
1 Es gibt allerdings Unaussprechliches. Dies z e i g t sich, es ist das Mystische’ (There is indeed 
the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical)(Wittgenstein 1976,6.522)[§ 8-5.2]
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the knowledge of perception is generally taken for granted, for mysticism we 
have no storehouse of knowledge to draw upon personally. Staal (1975,125f) 
continues (t)his statement by comparing it with the way in which a blind 
man would study vision. He says:
that mysticism is not (often) studied directly and from within (1) because 
it is not so simple, (2) because of the general prejudice that mysticism 
by its very nature is mysterious and cannot be studied, (3) because of 
the general mistrust on the part of many contemporary philosophers, 
psychologists, and behavioural scientists generally, of anything that is 
not either an aspect of behaviour or a fact of physiology, (4) because of 
particular beliefs concerning mysticism.
The indirect way relies on accounts of the mystic experience itself which 
may take a variety of forms: a f irst-person report, the mystic’s interpretation 
at a later stage, the interpretation of third persons in the same religious 
tradition, the similar experience in other traditions. (Katz 1978,23) The 
literary genres that mystical writings tend to turn up in, are aphorism, 
biography and hagiography, report on visions, commentary, dialogue, 
various forms of instruction (sermon, private counselling, theoretical and 
practical teaching), prayer, religious poetry and f iction. (Keller 1978,78-9) 
Even more important for handing down the tradition – as all mystical 
traditions acknowledge – is the teacher, in clerical circles called mystagogue 
but now generally known with the originally Sanskrit term guru. Gurus 
derive their position from the state of their own mystical experiences. 
Eastern religions tend to call these individuals enlightened.
9.3 Language
Someone who has had a mystical experience usually automatically voices 
this event in his or her frame of reference, usually the terminology of the 
person’s religious/cultural upbringing. Every mystical text should thus 
always be interpreted in the context of the relevant religious/cultural tradi-
tion – including any specif ic subgroup and the historical time – in which 
it was written, be it atheistic, monotheistic, polytheistic, pantheistic or 
animistic. One should also be aware of the constant change in meaning of 
the terms used over time.
As there is a close relationship between the language and way of thinking 
of the mystic, and the contents of the visions he may have, Christians tend 
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to see Christian symbols and Buddhists Buddhist ones (Keller 1978,86). 
Katz upholds the even more extreme position that the mystic’s experience 
is shaped by the religious tradition he was brought up in. (Katz 1978,26)
Mystical texts have a peculiar quality so that mystical experiences can-
not be couched in plain language.2 Typically therefore, mystical texts make 
use of a number of f igures such as metaphors, images, emblems, symbols, 
over-excited expressions, hyperboles, contrasts and contradictions, deni-
als and paradoxes, seemingly illogical comparisons,3 ‘enrichment’ with 
neologisms et cetera. Grasping (the ‘reality’ of) mystical experiences with 
words remains a chimera. One of the Zen metaphors for this is like point-
ing to the moon; it is never identical with the moon itself. Often mystical 
language seems to have a florid, poetical, in Christianity frequently (homo)
erotic – occasionally rather baroque – quality. (Kripal 2001) The reader must 
f ind his way back to the source of the thoughts of the mystic, his mystical 
intuition. Listening to a speaking mystic with all the nuances of his voice 
(sermo mysticus) may easily lead to real apprehension.
There is still another reason why the mystic’s language often is hardly 
comprehensible: mystics of the three monotheistic religions (Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam) entangled themselves in self-contradictions as they 
twisted their statements in order to make them acceptable to the orthodox 
variety of their religious brand.
9.4 Experience
After reading many historical and contemporary accounts of mystical 
experiences William James (1958,292f) decided that an experience could 
only be called mystical if it complied with (one of) the following four char-
acteristrics: (1) ineffability, i.e., no adequate report of its content can be given 
in words. Its quality must be directly experienced and cannot be imparted 
or transferred to others. Mystical states are more like states of feeling than 
of intelligence, (2) noetical quality, being to those who experience them 
to be also states of knowledge, or insight. The following are less sharply 
demarcated, but are usually found, (3) transiency, i.e., cannot be sustained 
2 The view that some realms of reality where ordinary language is not applicable is not, of 
course, paradoxical, inconsistent or contradictory. Such a situation is common not only in 
philosophy, but also in mathematics or engineering, where for that reason artif icial languages 
are constructed. (Staal 1975,53)
3 The metaphor of ‘the mountain and water’ [Box 0-1 (p.16)] may be taken as an example; the 
logic being in the eye of the beholder. 
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for long; half an hour or at most two hours seem to be the limit, (4) passiv-
ity, the experiences can be facilitated but once the characteristic sort of 
consciousness has set in, the mystic feels as if his own will was in abeyance, 
and indeed sometimes as if he were grasped and held by a superior power.
Bharati (1980,59) describes his mystical experience in a way that agrees 
with James’ criteria:
For a moment, or for an hour – I no longer know which – I was that 
which is proclaimed in the four great axioms of Upanishad wisdom: 
Aham brahmasmi – I am the Absolute; tattvamasi – Thou are that; 
prajnatma brahma – everything that is truly the Brahman. Only now 
had I become a real apostate, because I had fulf illed the original heresy 
in me – that mystical pantheism against which early Christianity 
fought so hard, and with f inal success. I am God – that is supreme 
wisdom; I – not the unimportant, physical bodied I, not the wishing 
I, not the intellectual I – but all one impersonal I which alone exists. I 
experienced all this in that blessed moment for which I had not directly 
striven.
Some claim that they found differences between these experiences and 
those of the monotheistic traditions that hold that the mystic moves through 
stages leading toward its divine presence outside himself, i.e., transcendent. 
When such a person has been granted the intuitive apprehension of reality 
it is considered a divine gift of grace.
Buddhist mysticism teaches that the universal principle (Buddha nature) 
already exists in every person (and everywhere else), i.e., immanent.
Other religions contend that there is a third category, that of the prophetic 
ones. They practice intense, devotional worship that lends a distinctive, 
numinous (implying the sense of having encountered the sacred divinity) 
interpretation to the religious experience. (Austin 1999,15).
9.5 Substance
Mystics believe that they have access to a special form of knowledge 
described as revelation, insight or intuition. They are convinced that this 
knowledge is of a different reality, superior to the daily one that strikes them 
as illusionary. Its ‘reality’ is a happier one and it is continuously at hand. 
They are as sure – sceptics might say cocksure – about their convictions as 
any direct sensory experiences can be; and – as Russell (1918,16) has it – they 
MYSTICAL ExPERIENCE AS AN EMPIRICAL FAC T 111
accept them, as a rule, as more convincing than results established by mere 
logic. They just know!
A second characteristic of the mystical experience is an overwhelming 
feeling of unity, together with a refusal to accept duality in general. Reality is 
one and indivisible (Parmenides). Bharati (1980,38) says in this connection:
The one impersonal God presents Himself in many manifestations and 
many functions. Just as one man plays the role of father to his sons, 
husband to his wife, friend to his friends, and master to his servants, 
so God is father to the one, lord and master to the other, a friend to the 
third, and on (….) Upanishad declares: there is only one truth, but Wise 
Man call it by many names.
Because all is one, the distinction of past and future is an illusion and time 
is not important.
Mystical states tend to be brief and bring happiness in a way that James 
calls ‘cosmic emotion’. In many mystics cosmic emotion inevitably takes 
the form of enthusiasm and freedom (they are animally happy, positively 
refusing to feel unhappiness). (James 1958,77)
The Buddhist variety of prajna or insight-wisdom is described as a leap 
of intuition that takes place in the presence of full awareness, but in the ab-
sence of self and of other dualities or formal analysis; transmitting its special 
knowledge wordlessly. This knowledge is more than the German kennen 
und wissen or the French connaître et savoir. It is more like understanding, 
comprehending, knowing in its broadest sense. It is cognition, thought, affec-
tion, cutting through the usual emotions attached to the psychic self. It is 
a quick grasp of unlimited, universal reality which clarif ies the vast unity 
of all things. The actions directly coming out of prajna are swift, sure, and 
free of error, especially free of self-centred mistakes. (Austin 1999,545-6)
Mystics also tend to consider evil as an illusion and some even regard evil 
and good as illusions. The ethical characteristic of mysticism is absence of 
indignation or protest, acceptance with joy, disbelief in the ultimate truth 
of the division into two hostile camps, the good and the bad. This attitude 
is a direct outcome of the nature of the mystical experience; with its sense 
of unity is associated a feeling of inf inite peace. Indeed it may be suspected 
that the feeling of peace produces, as feelings do in dreams, the whole 
system of associated beliefs which makes up the body of mystic doctrine. 
(Russell 1918,17) On the other hand, Bharati ( 1976,53) emphatically states 
that it is wrong to assume that the mystic should be ethical (…) Indeed he 
states that each is irrelevant for the other.
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9.6 Training
Many techniques have been used and are still in use for preparing the seeker: 
fasting, prayer, drugs, self-mortif ication, fornication, yoga procedures, grace 
et cetera. Eliade described them extensively in two of his books.(Eliade 
1964; Eliade 1969) It seems irrelevant how one achieves a mystic experi-
ence.(Bharati 1976,219) There are methods for which exist independent and 
purely secular justif ication: (1) fasting (which has very def inite effects on 
the body), (2) ‘withdrawal of the senses’ (in the Yogasūtra called pratyāhāra) 
or sensory deprivation, (3) meditation, (4) breathing exercises (= training 
of the body-mind complex) which are similar to incantation and recitation 
(Huxley 1944,143ff), (5) detachment which can be induced by recitation or 
meditation on a mantra) (Staal 1975,136f), (6) sexual practices (tantrism) 
which are rejected when they are held to be conducive to an increase in 
mental tension, but are on the contrary utilized in order to bring about 
greater detachment from the rules of morality. (ibid.139)
Many events can and do initiate or trigger a mystical experience, which 
cannot be reduced to sexuality or a chemical compound or the notes on the 
page. It is also irrelevant to mysticism – though of course not to ideological 
afterthoughts of a theological or anti-theological kind – whether the experi-
ment allocates the zero-splash to ‘nature’, to himself as now integrated, or 
to deity however conceived and theologized. (Bharati 1976,51f)
Methodical cultivation as an element of religious life may lead, stepwise, 
to a higher state of contemplation in which – generally – the intellectual, 
dualistic way of thinking and desire drop off, unity remains, and indiffer-
ence begins. Higher stages reach a region where nothing exists, a next higher 
one where the meditator says: “There exists absolutely nothing; neither ideas 
nor absence of ideas.” Then another region where, “having reached the end 
of both idea and perception, the meditator stops f inally.” This stage seems 
to be as close an approach to Nirvâna as this lie affords. (James 1958,308)
In Christianity the basis of the (mystical training) system is ‘orison’ or 
prayer-meditation, the methodical elevation of the soul to God. (ibid.309f) 
This may bring the person to a condition called raptus or ravishment by 
theologians; breathing and circulation are so depressed that some wonder 
if the soul is temporarily uncoupled from the body. It leads – according to 
Teresa d’ Avila and John of the Cross – to enrichment of, and to bringing 
energy to the soul and to even the attainment of absolute truth, usually 
formulated in negations as it goes above every def inable experience and 
knowledge. Like Hegel in his logic, mystics journey towards the positive 
pole of truth only by the ‘Methode der Absoluten Negativität’.(ibid.316-9)
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To overcome all usual barriers between the individual and the Absolute 
is the great mystic achievement. In mystic states (Hinduism, Neoplatonism, 
Sufism, Christianity, Buddhism) mystics both become one with the Absolute 
and come aware of a feeling of oneness. (ibid.321)
9.7 After-effects
William James writes that the fundamental inner conditions of mystical 
experiences have characteristic practical consequences which he lists as 
(1) ascetism (up to pleasure in sacrif ice), (2) strength of soul (fears and 
anxieties go, and blissful equanimity takes their place), (3) purity (cleansing 
of existence from brutal and sensual elements, contact with such elements 
is avoided), (4) charity (to all kind of men and even to animals; Francis 
d’Assisi and Ignatius De Loyola). (ibid.215-25)
Tenseness, self-responsibility, and worry go, equanimity, receptivity, and 
peace arrive when simple relaxing and throwing off the burden occur. Great 
emphasis is laid on the concentration of consciousness when the moment 
is at hand. (ibid.229) There are three minor branches of self-mortif ication: 
chastity, obedience (in different ways) and poverty. (ibid.244-55)
If it does anything directly to the average man with an average mind, it 
makes him more observant, more detached – it makes him see persons and 
events around him in a healthier, more humorous hierarchy, falling in line, 
below the zero-experience, as less important, less pernicious, and thus less 
serious. (Bharati 1976,225)
Far-reaching were the consequences the mystic experience had on 
persons, like Francis d’Assisi and Ignatius De Loyola. Some mystics paid 
with death. Indeed, each of the three monotheistic religions has victimized 
mystics.
Incidentally, changes in worldview after having had a mystical experi-
ence are comparable although not identical with other upsetting experi-
ences of the self. Overactivity in the right hemisphere at the junction of the 
temporal and parietal cerebral cortex can create ‘out-of-body-experienes’, 
the experience of looking at one’s body from the outside; damage to the right 
hemisphere can cause one to look on a limb as ‘not me’. These abnormal 
experiences can be explained as the result of faulty neural representations 
of the body and its parts in space.4
4 Frith CD. Disorders of consciousness and unconcious mental processes In: Kandel 2013:1373-
88
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9.8 Social status of the mystic
Many mystics are drop-outs; mysticism has an asocial or anti-social point 
of view. Mystics often express their dislike or contempt of society. In Yoga, 
the f irst step on the mystic path is vairāgya, ‘detachment, renunciation’, 
and this is primarily directed towards our social attachments. Jesus said: “If 
any man comes to me and hates not his father, and mother, and wife, and 
children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be 
my disciple” (Luke 14:26) Tao is noted for its anti-establishment, anarchist, 
and laisez faire attitude, (Staal 1975,102) as is Zen (Feenstra 2005,95-101). In 
Hinduism, where the prevailing ideal results from a synthesis or compro-
mise between the requirements of ascetism and of society, the mystical path 
of saņnyāsa is generally advocated only for those who have gone through 
the entire gamut of social responsibilities.
A person, who in his search for mystical experience turns away from 
society, cannot be expected to bring the solution of social problems. But 
it does not follow that mysticism does not have social implications, even 
constructive ones. Later Taoism, for instance, became an expression of pro-
test, not only for ‘escapist intelligentsia’, but also for ‘rebellious peasantry’. 
(Staal 1975,103)
9.9 Points of debate
The fourth edition of the Diagnostical Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders (DSM-IV) for the f irst time contains an item on ‘religious or spiritual 
problems’ under the category V62.89. Earlier, Freud had already judged 
the ‘Oceanic experience’ of mystics as nothing but a regression to infantile 
helplessness and primary narcissism. Others called it borderline psychosis, 
dysfunction of the temporal brain and some even denied the existence of 
mind and soul all together.
In a thoughtful analysis, De Waard (2007,9) criticizes the formal view of 
off icial psychiatry (Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Thomas Szasz, 
Ronald D Laing, Jan Foudraine et cetera) on mysticism as “old fashioned 
mysophobia and shivering on the brink”. It shies away from accepting 
mystical experiences as an empirical fact.
William James (1958,29) vehemently opposes this kind of thinking. He 
called it ‘medical materialism’ which classif ies the apostle Paul’s vision 
on the road to Damascus as a discharging lesion of the occipital cortex, 
he being an epileptic, snuffs out Teresa d’ Avila as a hysteric and Francis 
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d’Assisi as a hereditary degenerate. He says that in the natural sciences 
and industrial arts one’s opinion is never refuted by pointing out the 
author’s or inventor’s neurotic constitution. “In the end it has to come to 
our empiricist criterion: By their fruits ye shall know them, not by their 
roots”. (ibid.34)
A second point of discussion is the one of the recognized similarities or 
dissimilarities between mystical experiences and different religious tradi-
tions. Many are of the opinion that all mystical experiences are – basi-
cally – the same, and transcend cultural or religious diversity. Others hold 
that all mystical experiences are the same but the mystics’ reports about 
their experiences are culturally coloured. Some consider that all mystical 
experience can be grouped into various types which cut across cultural 
boundaries. Although the language is culturally bound, the experiences 
of mystics are not. Katz (1978,23ff) argues that such a thing as Huxley’s 
philosophia perennis5 does not exist.
He holds the view “that there are NO pure (i.e. immediated) experiences”: 
“All experience is processed through, organized by, and makes itself 
available to us in extremely complex epistemological ways. The no-
tion of unmediated experience seems, if not self-contradictory, at best 
empty.” He strongly holds the view that to understand the reports of 
the mystic after the experiential event, not only the experience itself 
but also the form in which it is reported, is formed by concepts which 
the mystic brings to, and which shape, his experience. (ibid.26; italics 
in original)
Monotheistic religions seem to strive for the unio mystica with God and, in 
Christianity, also with Jesus Christ and the Holy Ghost. Bharati (1976,28) 
observes that:
Orthodox Jews, Christians, and Muslims really cannot seek this union 
and be pious at the same time, because losing one’s identity and becoming 
the cosmic ground is a deadly heresy in these teachings.
5 philosophia perennis coined by Augustinus Steuchius (16th century theologian and librarian 
of the Vatican) via Godfried Leibniz (1646-1716) chosen by Huxley (1894-1963) as the title of one 
of his books.(Huxley 1944) It is the philosophy that man cannot learn the one divine (spiritual) 
reality through the intellect but only by direct experience.
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Those mystics are an embarrassment to the established religious order. 
If they cannot be suppressed, they will be ‘neutralized’. They may be 
permitted to withdraw to cloistered retreats, there to remain hidden from 
the eyes of the world, put into jail or even tortured. The more reputed 
of their number may be sainted – saints to be revered but not imitated.” 
(ibid.20)
Mysticism of monotheistic religions differs from those that strive for nega-
tion and vanishing in nirvana. The religious experience of certain forms 
of Buddhism, Taoism and others are more mystical, while the prophetic 
ones (Christianity, Judaism, Islam) are more numinous.(Gimello 1978,171) 
Gimello suggests that a numinous experience is one of an encounter with 
a being wholly other than oneself and altogether different from anything 
else. This sort of encounter is usually said to be gratuitous, in the sense that 
those subject to it are not themselves responsible for its occurrence, and it 
is typically described as both overwhelming and self-authenticating. The 
mystical experience, in contrast, is not so much an encounter with a ‘sacred 
other’ but the interior attainment of a certain supernatural state of mind, 
the result of the subject’s efforts in following a contemplative discipline 
or method. (ibid. 172) Indeed, reading the sermons and treatises of Meister 
Eckhart or the writings of John of the Cross one cannot suppress the feeling 
that they also tend to f ind the Holy in themselves rather than in a divine 
structure. Both of them ran into trouble with the Inquisition. Like Staal 
and Bharati state and many other people have experienced, no (believe in 
a) godhead is needed to have an illuminative experience.
A third point of debate concerns the numerous parallels and similarities 
between drug-induced states and mystical states. The great variety of mysti-
cal states, of preparatory exercises between different systems or within the 
same system, of drugs with different effects make comparison diff icult. 
The same drug may induce different states among different people or in 
the same person at different times. (Staal 1975,148) The religious use of 
drugs is old and widespread.6 Institutionalized religions do not like drugs. 
Religions are not so much concerned with religious or mystical experience 
as with ethics, morality and the continuation of the status quo. One of the 
ways to make ethical actions palatable and even desirable is to show that 
they are meritorious. The mere ingestion of a drug can hardly be considered 
meritorious, so how could it lead to such an exalted state? That would seem 
unfair, to say the least. Hence the moralist’s (Eliade) distinction between 
6 Extensive references on psychedelics in Kripal 2007
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easy and diff icult path’s. (Staal 1975,156) Even if the differences turn out 
to be fundamental after thorough and close study, the known similarities 
between drug-induced states and mystical states are far too profound to 
be brushed aside. (ibid.158)
A fourth debatable issue that preoccupies philosophers in their investiga-
tions of mysticism, i.e., how to distinguish between mystical experience and 
the interpretation by the mystic himself, and between others in the same 
tradition and from another tradition. Whether or not, or to what extent, 
mystical experience can be invoked to justify the truth-claims of certain 
propositions of religious or metaphysical belief; the manifold problem 
of def ining relationships between mystical experience and other areas 
of human concern such as morality, aesthetics, mental health et cetera. 
(Gimello 1978,170-2)
In conclusion, mystical experiences happen from time immemorial and 
occur in every culture. Supposedly, they are specif ic and special states of 
mind commonly achieved through some form of self-cultivation and are 
characterized by the following of these features separately or in combina-
tion: (Gimello 1978,178)
– a feeling of oneness or unity,
– a strong confidence in the ‘reality’ or ‘objectivity’ of the experience, i.e. 
a conviction that it is somehow revelation of ‘the truth’,
– a sense of the (f inal) inapplicability of conventional language to the 
experience,
– a cessation of normal intellectual operations (e.g. deduction, discrimina-
tion, ratiocination, speculation, et cetera) or the substitution of them by 
some ‘higher’ or qualitatively different mode of intellect (e.g. intuition),
– a sense of the coincidence of various kinds of opposites, (paradox),
– an extraordinarily strong affective tone, of various kinds (e.g. joy, seren-
ity, fear, pleasure, often in an unusual combination).
Mysticism and the arts of the spiritually contemplative life have always 
been comparatively marginal activities in the western traditions, being 
usually subordinate to prayer, ritual, the sacramental life, worship, moral 
endeavour, study of the Law. In Eastern religions, Buddhism in the f irst 
place, in contrast, meditation has always been one, if not the central 
form of praxis. One should not be surprised, then, if it were found that 
Buddhism offers a more sophisticated set of analytical instruments with 
which to examine such phenomena as obtained in disciplines of mental 
cultivation. (Gimello 1978,180)
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9.10 Mind and brain in relation to mysticism
In the last paragraph I used the formula specific and special states of mind 
which seem to border on consciousness. It is very diff icult to precisely 
def ine consciousness, especially with respect to the mystical states. The 
best I can do is quoting the metaphor of Austin (2000,308) which he names 
‘global analogy’:
They [geologists] now have remarkable evidence about Earth’s active 
early history. Our planet’s crust sinks, thrusts up, breaks apart, drifts, and 
reassembles in new configurations. Subterranean forces are still causing 
our continents to move. Even viewed in slow motion, these dynamic 
geological changes are a useful metaphor for the active processes that 
create the astonishing mental landscapes and deep, V-shaped ocean 
trenches of our extraordinary alternate states. And it is also true that 
the experiant, like a wide-eyed Marco Polo, will be witness to novel 
continents of experience, worlds that could never have been imagined. 
(italics in original)
In describing consciousness in relation to mystic (zen)-states Austin dis-
cerns many layers that – as he puts it – may be ‘lumped’ or ‘divided’. He 
suggests a middle way by lumping and dividing the layers into ten varieties. 
(ibid.298-305) In the perspective of my essay his varieties of mystical states 
do not include consciousness, moreover; daily consciousness in mystical 
states is either ‘non-existent’ or ‘heightened’ which amounts to the difficulty 
described earlier in def ining such states in every day language. That being 
said, it seems that the conscious experience of an I-me-mine as Austin has 
it, alternatively stated, the Ich or Ego, fades into some – almost Léon Battista 
Alberti-like – vanishing point.
An interesting and rather recent development is the introduction of 
modern medico-biological research tools into meditation/illumination 
like EEG, PET-scan, fMRI. These methods demonstrate different images of 
the meditating brain of a seasoned practitioner (whether Roman Catholic 
nuns and Tibetan monks) or of laymen. (Newberg et al. 2001) Notice that 
these kind of images only demonstrate process(es) occurring in the brain 
of people during meditation. They are no more than bodily correlates of 
the mystic process, or, possibly, independent bodily correlates during the 
mystic process.
Some eliminative materialists – notoriously the Churchlands and Den-
nett – think that is all there is. Some others are inclined to express dualistic 
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explanations in the age old mind-body discussion, nowadays more often 
reformulated in terms of neurophilosophical brain-body discussion. Still 
others tend to believe in an idealistic monism. Underneath there lurks a 
semantic distinction emphasized by Rescher (1996,114): “From the concep-
tual point of view, mind is understood autonomously, from the causal view 
it can be explained.” (italics in original)
9.11 Conclusion
Mysticism is thus understood as a special experience that cannot directly 
be imparted or transferred to others. It is more a state of feeling and 
being. Mysticism presents knowledge, insight, illumination or intuition 
that is felt to be of a different reality, superior to the daily real one, that 
strikes the mystic as illusionary. Its ‘reality’ is a happier one, continuously 
at hand and as certain as any direct sensible experiences can be. A mystic 
just knows! This knowledge, being more than the German kennen and 
wissen or the French connaître and savoir, is more like understanding, or 
comprehending. It is cognition, thought and affection, cutting through 
the usual emotions [Box 8-1 (p.98)] attached to the psyche. It is a brief 
grasp of unlimited, universal reality which illuminates the vast unity of 
all things. The actions, directly coming out of prajna are swift, sure, and 
free from error, especially free from self-centred mistakes.
The bodily experience takes place predominantly in the mind/brain. The 
boundaries with perception, consciousness, memory and cognition seem 
faint and partly semantic.
Conscious states of mystici are outside the normal use of the word 
consciousness. Direct sensory perception in mystical states is near-absent.
Thus mysticism has little to offer to the analysis of sensory systems 
in se although it certainly changes the way the environment and the self 
is perceived by their votaries. Still, introspection, intuition,[chapter 8] 
contemplation and meditation, none of them resting on sensory systems 
directly are, even so, putative ways to specif ic kinds of (by many highly 
esteemed) knowledge.

Part III 
 
From sensing and perception to consciousness. 
Braiding the wattle, constructing the raft

10 From sensory systems to experience
10.1 Introduction
From the smallest subatomic particles to the largest stellar structures every-
thing in the universe is part of processes with greatly different time scales. 
[Box 10-1] Our spatiotemporal, 4-D world, the roughly twenty kilometre thick 
layer of the earth and its atmosphere is called biosphere. From its conception 
onwards every organism is confronted with 4-D conditions increasing in 
size and in number of capabilities and functions. Its development may 
be described as a sequence of parallel, successive and multiple processes 
according to its genetic plan ultimately leading to death and decay.
Life may thus be characterized by its constituent processes that can be 
described in terms, formulae and laws from physiology, (bio)physics, (bio)
chemistry, psychology et cetera. The sensory systems, as suggested before, 
form part of many complicated (sub)-processes.1 Although expressions 
like ‘eye’ or ‘ear’ almost automatically presume these structures to be static 
or stable configurations they are almost continuously active, i.e., occupied 
with selecting, and translating into neuronal codes most of the massive 
bombardment of incoming signals from the environment and the body.
The – coded – information [Box 2-5 (p.40)] provided by sensory systems 
may be integrated in a variety of (behavioural) systems. [Box 5-1 (p.67)] The 
definition and the genesis of behavioural systems are intimately connected 
with experience. The relation between sensory systems and experience is 
the theme of this chapter.
10.2 Levels of sensing and levels of perception: prelude to 
experience
Perception has been provisionally def ined in the f irst chapter of this essay 
[p.25] as that part of the sensory systems’ activity that culminates in aware-
ness of objects and events in the environment. Problems with this definition 
arise if we accept awareness to be the dividing line between sensing and 
1 The eye, for example, contains more than one visual system, accounting for perception of 
form, depth, brightness, motion and colour which lead through processes in the brain to the way 
we perceive our 4-D environment. In order to do so the retina sends millions of measurements 
per second to the brain where they are processed by some billion cortical neurons. 
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perceiving which run from not-sensing or not-yet-sensing to and including 
the highest levels of cognition. [Box 10-2]
The unconscious part of the sensory system’s activity is not perception 
in the narrower meaning according to my earlier def inition. Even if we 
rigorously draw the line here problems will still arise as a few examples 
may show:
(1) The regulation of equilibrium, the activity of the skin receptors and 
interoception [Chapter 5] are generally excluded by philosophers as 
not being perception but ‘mere bodily sensations’. As explained before, 
these always alert sensory systems are the receptor-part of (homeo-
static) mechanisms [§ 5-4 (p.74)] that provide continuous information 
of the environment and the body itself to the control centres of which 
the reactions keep the milieu intérieur constant. Very little homeostatic 
control reaches awareness although we may consciously notice some 
consequences like gooseflesh and shivering as responses to decreased 
temperature.
(2) From the moment we button our shirt or buckle our belt we forget 
them and generally do not pay attention to them until the moment 
of undressing some sixteen hours later. If asked to focus on the shirt’s 
third button from above, consciousness is able to immediately locate 
them.
(3) A new scent is quickly noticed, is no longer noticed a few minutes later 
but may recur by inhaling deeply and paying attention.
(4) The phenomenon of blind sight, originally described by Weiskrantz 
(1991) as a brain lesion causing loss of awareness/consciousness when 
Box 10-1 The environment of the Earth*
When life appeared on Earth the ‘faint young Sun’ only radiated about seventy 
percent of the energy it now generates. The core of the sun is gradually being 
enriched in helium. It is contracting and the temperature of the core where most 
of the thermonuclear reactions occur is increasing. The rate of thermonuclear re-
actions is sensitive to temperature and this will cause the insolation to increase 
about one percent per hundred million years. The sun, inevitably progressing 
along its evolutionary path, before five billion more years will expand beyond 
the present orbit of the Earth and become a red giant. The oceans will boil away 
and the Earth will be cooked into lifelessness like Venus is today. Life has already 
existed on earth for three quarters of its allotted time.
* Yokey 2005,133f
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looking with both perfectly normal eyes caught wide philosophical 
attention.
(5) The sensing by the vomeronasal organ of man never reaches awareness. 
Noë therefore excluded the organ as a sensory system although Keeley 
(2009,226-50) contradicted Noë most convincingly.
(6) The satisfaction of suckling during and shortly after feeding does prob-
ably not involve consciousness.
(7) Withholding early maternal care causes unhappy maternal-infant 
relations with permanent damage to the infant in later life as has been 
shown by Harlow’s [note 12 (p.39)] experiments with infant-monkeys 
even though consciousness at the time of the missed care did not seem 
to be involved.
(8) Tinbergen’s herring gull chick eyeing the red dot on its parental bill 
(the innate releaser) [Chapter 2] is part of an intricate feeding pattern 
that belongs to the intrinsic need of the body to grow. This experience 
is not consciously noted.
(9) The molecular sensing by gastrointestinal epithelial cells [note 16 (p.77)] 
may be viewed as a sensory system although no one would accept this 
as ‘perceiving’.
 These examples are manifestations of bodily effects following specif ic 
stimuli that usually do not but occasionally may reach awareness.
Box 10-2 From sensing via perceiving to cognition*, **
un-conscious viz. molecular sensing, blind sight, vomeronasal organ’s action 
etc.
sub-conscious viz. ‘automatic pilot’, Proust’s story about petites madeleines
hear passive; one may hear a sound or an utterance but not correctly 
catch the sounds, viz. E.A.Poe’s story of The murders in the Rue 
Morgue
listen 1 active listening but unable to catch an utterance correctly for 
example due to an inadequate stimulus to noise ratio
listen 2 active listening correctly catching an utterance but not 
understanding it as for instance hearing a word in an unfamiliar 
language
understand understanding an utterance but not its meaning
comprehend, grasp correctly understanding the utterance 
* Molecular sensing in the gastrointestinal tract [note 16 (p.77)], blind ‘perception’ [p. 38f], 
Proust [p.38], 
** E.A.Poe’s The Murders in the Rue Morgue (Graham Magazine, 1841) is an early detective story. 
Two ladies were killed. Many listeners had noticed someone shouting but no one could tell what 
language had been used. The suspected ‘person’ turned out to be an escaped orang-utan.
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(10) Some people consider the ‘sensing’ of the endocrine system and the 
immune system also as sensory systems. [§ 5-5 (p.75)]
When infected with the mumps virus, we may fall ill; on the other hand, the 
infection may pass unnoticed. Nevertheless, after our f irst encounter with 
the mumps virus our body has developed resistance to this virus; the body 
‘experienced’ the virus and ‘recognizes’ it whenever new contacts occur. 
For the other examples similar arguments can be presented.
Between the unconscious and the conscious level of the sensory systems’ 
effects a grey zone exists that is usually described with some metaphor 
like ‘automatic pilot’. We may be in deep thought about problems during 
work while driving home. The automatic pilot safely takes us there while we 
not consciously notice anything of the drive. If need arises later, however, 
we can usually recall the drive and bring back into consciousness much 
which we only noticed subconsciously. Sometimes the delay between the 
unconsciously noticed phenomenon and the recollections may take years 
as Proust’s reflections on the smell of his ‘petite madelaine’ demonstrates. 
[p.38] Subconscious sensations or ‘perceptions’ have effects and thus they 
must be accepted as experiences. The difference between sensing and (my 
original definition of) perception seems marginal since other examples of 
subconscious ‘perception’ never reach consciousness. Like the unconscious 
level of perceiving, also the subconscious level should be represented in a 
general definition of perception. If not, the logical consequence is that young 
children, animals and plants do not perceive, which clearly is not the case. All 
other levels of perception [Box 10-2] belong to the generally (philosophical) 
accepted definition of perception since consciousness is clearly involved 
albeit with variable intensities. Definitions of perceptual experience that do 
not pay attention to the borderline phenomena are incomplete.
10.3 Defining experience
Many discussions about perception simply accept experience (veridical 
or illusory as a given and tend to formulate it in the context of belief or 
knowledge acquisition. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) gives three 
meanings of experience: (1a) direct participation or observation, (1b) the 
knowledge, skill, or practice derived from such experience, especially over 
a period of time, (2) something personally encountered or undergone, (3) 
the sum total of conscious events that make up an individual life or the 
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collective past of a community, nation, et cetera. In the philosophical 
literature, experience is generally tightly coupled to Aristotle’s f ive senses, 
predominantly vision, to empiricism, to consciousness and to knowledge.
The OED’s definition of experience (2): ”something personally encountered 
or undergone” corresponds best with the way in which I use the term. That 
def inition omits consciousness and subjectivity. The def inition encloses 
perception, sensations, homeostasis, the immune system and the endocrine 
system. It includes infants, animals and plants. It includes time and thus 
experience is a process and not a thing. [§14-5 (p.174) A variety of adjectives 
and elucidations may be attached to the term experience in order to specify 
the nature of the ‘something’ in the def inition, such as: mental-, spiritual-, 
mystical-, bodily-, life-, technical-, professional-, animal-experience et 
cetera.
10.4 The something personally encountered and undergone
10.4.1 Introduction
Essentially the OED def inition of experience uses the verb encounter or 
undergo signifying what makes an experience an experience. Without 
encounter, no experience; experiencing is undergoing something.
The ‘something’ that is personally encountered or undergone may not 
be consciously noticed as in the light variety of mumps. If noticed, the 
experience is usually described by philosophers as “having some phenom-
enal character (some phenomenology) or what it is like for the subject to 
have them” (Siegel 2011). In the case of a bat this would mean “that there 
is something that is like to be a bat” (Nagel 1974). The subjective character 
of experience is underscored by Nagel. Experience, he writes, includes 
enormous variation and complexity, and while we do not possess the 
vocabulary to adequately describe either of them, its subjective character 
is highly specific. The gap between the sensory systems’ of oneself and those 
of another sentient being, Nagel says, can fall anywhere on a continuum. 
Even for other persons the understanding of what it is like to be them is 
only partial. When one turns to different species understanding of them 
will even be less. The psychiatrist R.D.Laing (1967,16) put it even more 
explicitly: “I cannot experience your experience. You cannot experience 
my experience. We are both invisible men” and “I see you, and you see me. 
I experience you, and you experience me. I see your behaviour. You see my 
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behaviour. But I do not and never have and never will see your experience 
of me.” (ibid.15. Italics in original).
The doctrine that physical objects are reducible to (the) sensory experi-
ences of an organism or that physical object-statements can be analysed 
in terms of phenomenal statements describing sensory experiences has 
been called phenomenalism. Instead of stressing the phenomenal side of 
experiencing I opt for the pragmatic acceptance of the phenomenal aspects 
of experience as a biological fact. Studying experience from an individual’s 
subjective side easily leads to unproductive solipsism or to unscientif ic 
reasoning.
10.4.2 Phenomena
The process of encountering or undergoing that makes something into an 
experience has, as it where, two ends: (1) the factual of physical objects and 
events in (a) the organism and (b) in its environment, (2) the experiencing 
body, subjective or phenomenal.
Phenomena2 are observable facts or events, i.e., objects of sensory 
perception. In chapter 6 we met philosophers who take (private) percep-
tion rather than facts or events as their starting point of philosophizing. 
These philosophers try to show how the contents of facts and events involve 
little more than sense data or activity of sensory systems. As said in the 
introduction of this paragraph [§ 10.4.1] I consider this approach as less 
prof itable than following Sellars’ (1963,173) dictum that “natural science is 
the measure of all things, of what is that is, and of what is not that it is not”. 
This point of view denies the anthropocentric subjectivity of sense data 
and (other) philosophical idealism. It accepts that there is a real world in 
which – among other organisms – Homo sapiens lives.
10.4.3 The consciousness side of perceiving
With respect to experience, philosophers usually have in view the conscious 
part of the phenomenon. For example Stevenson (1982) in his The metaphys-
ics of experience,defines experience as:
the common use in English [as] to mean knowledge, skill, or wisdom 
acquired from life and practice over a substantial period of time. (Ste-
venson 1982,1)
2 Left out in this essay are noumena (Plato’s Ideas and Forms) and Kant’s discussions thereof.
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He continues with:
that which has featured so centrally in modern epistemology, namely to 
refer to the momentary states of consciousness of an individual perceiver 
and thinker. In this philosophical usage, which is also in common speech, 
the term has a plural, as in I’ve had several peculiar experiences today. 
All that we assume about experience is that it involves both perception 
and thought. That is any subject of experience has, in our definition, both 
sensibility (the capacity for sensory awareness) and understanding (the 
ability to make judgments about what he is aware of ). (ibid. italics added)
In this definition Stevenson refers to (an English translation of) Kant’s Kritik 
der reinen Vernunft – [critique of pure reason] (A15/B29, A19/B33, A50/B74) 
which is in agreement with the statement in his own preface where he says 
that his own book is to be understood as “inspired by this [Kant’s] work”. 
Stevenson confirms his views on experience with:
The conditions we are concerned with are those logically or conceptually 
necessary for experience. If it is physically necessary for such experience 
that there be so many million neurones (or equivalent functional units) 
with certain complicated patterns of interconnection, supplied with 
blood (or other energy input), that is no business of ours. The subject-
matter here is not the physics but the metaphysics of experience. (ibid. 5)
In fairness to Stevenson, he also says:
It may well be claimed that a f ish can perceive a fly, and see that it is mov-
ing downstream, without thinking of the fly or judging that anything is 
the case. We do not deny that in one sense of ‘experience’ many creatures 
incapable of assertion, judgment, or thought can have, enjoy, or suffer 
various kinds of experience including sensations and perceptions. We just 
point out that our subject-matter here is the experience of rational beings, 
who can apply concepts to their intuitions and thus make judgements 
about what they are aware of. Exactly what is implied in these notions of 
“rationality”, “concept”, and “judgment” will be examined in more detail 
later. (ibid. 3-4, underlining in original)
Ignoring the inconsistency within his def inition of perception and the 
difference between experience (with -) and experience (without -) judgment 
or thought in the last quote, Stevenson excludes the ‘animal side’ of human 
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experience as the target of his inquiry. He underscores this line of reasoning 
again when defining ‘sensibility’ [...] the capacity for awareness of particular 
items”.(ibid.11, italics added)
I will return to consciousness later but wish to stress here that Stevenson’s 
type of experience, goes hand in glove with, as he formulated it in the f irst 
quote, knowledge, skill, or wisdom to which I like to add “perception and 
information”.
We may thus postulate characteristics of experience as follows:
(1) sensing and perception are the beginning of experience,
(2) it is/they are/ (a) process(es) situated in time and taking (any length of) 
time,
(3) relations exist between the goings on at the milieu extérieur and the 
milieu intérieur,
(4) all sensory systems contribute to experiences of an organism and all 
sensory systems are continuously active when awake,
(5) some (isolated, or cut off) period or part of time and combination of 
sensing/perception may be referred to as a (specif ic) experience,
(6) awareness may be involved but it is not a necessity,
(7) someone’s experience at any moment t, the thing that Siegel coined 
overall experience (although she seemingly excludes some of it) is the 
person’s total experience (the accumulated exposures to objects and 
events) at t. This of course includes cognition and emotion although so 
far I have not mentioned anything explicit about either.
To define experience at time t as the sum of everything that entered an organ-
ism’s body (including its brain) through all sensory systems, unconsciously 
or consciously up to t, is certainly not the general view in philosophy.
In the next chapter I will pay attention to the informational aspect of 
sensory systems and perceiving.
11 Information
11.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter ‘experience’ of an organism at some time t was 
defined as the sum of the effects of all stimuli that entered the organism via 
the sensory systems (in the widest meaning) up to t. ‘Experience’ that has 
been accumulated in the course of evolution by cells, tissues, organs and 
organisms and that has been ‘stored’ in their genes has been deliberately 
omitted so far but I will return to it in the course of this chapter.
Previously I have def ined a stimulus1 (or signal) as an environmental 
change or more specific, the characteristic physical or chemical energy gener-
ated – directly or indirectly – by an ‘observed’ object or event. This definition 
is valid for any living cell, tissue, organ and organism; stimuli thus convey 
environmental features which is usually called information. Sensory systems 
are thought to be the machinery with which an organism seeks and receives 
‘information’, [Box 2-5 (p.40)] a subject that deserves now my attention.
Information can be defined in many different ways.2, 3, 4 For this essay I dif-
fidently add may own definition: ‘all specific features of their environments’ 
conveyed to a cell, to a tissue, to an organ and to an organism. I will f irst pay 
attention to ‘information’ itself and then extend the discussion to biosemiotics, 
an interdisciplinary scientific study of signs and codes in living systems.
11.2 Information as features of the environment
In order to introduce the subject I return to the herring gull chick and the 
new born human, [Chapter 2-2 (p.28)] which showed specif ic behaviour in 
1 Previous examples of such ‘specif ic stimuli’ were the temperature gradient in the watery 
environment of some micro-organisms, the red spot on the beak of mother herring gull for her 
chick and the smell of the mother’s breast for the new human baby.
2 Information is notoriously a polymorphic phenomenon and a polysemantic concept so, 
as an explicandum, it can be associated with several explanations, depending on the level of 
abstraction adopted and the cluster of requirements and desiderata orientating a theory. (Floridi 
2009,13) 
3 According to Francis Crick’s ‘central dogma’ of genetic inheritance, information is syn-
onymous with the sequence of amino acid residues per se without any regard to cognitive or 
semantic considerations.
4 According to Claude Shannon at al (1949,8), information is the diminution of uncertainty 
in a system. 
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response to an environmental change immediately after they were born. 
For the herring gull chick this change (= stimulus) was the appearance into 
its proximity of a yellow object with a red spot, representing the beak of its 
mother. In response the chick started pecking at the red spot. The mother 
responding to the opened bill placed regurgitated food into the chick’s beak. 
These environmental changes (stimuli, signals) function as information, 
i.e., they are specif ic features of the environment, very important to the 
chick and the mother. If we wave a yellow red-striped stick near the chick’s 
head it opens its bill too and the response may be even greedier than the 
natural one, i.e., its mother’s beak. This phenomenon, called superstimula-
tion (superreaction might be a more accurate term) obviously is mis- or false 
information since the chick is offered no food at all.
The human baby opens its mouth when its lips are gently touched with 
the mother’s nipple or f inger, and puts its lips around them (the f inger is 
thus falsely taken to be a nipple: misinformation) and starts the coordinated 
muscle activity called sucking. Shortly before the lips touch the nipple 
the baby turns it’s head towards it, the smell being the stimulus. For the 
human baby the smell and the lip-touch are the environmental changes 
that – normally – lead to food/drink if it starts to suck. (I omit here the 
interoceptive sensation of hunger).
These actions are basic examples of the informational process which 
starts with a looked for or contingent environmental change relative to an 
organism. This change (= stimulus) may lead to one or more reactions of 
the receiver. In the given two examples of the processes we have:
(a) a looked or not looked for situation or environmental (physical, chemi-
cal) change (or distinction) – relative to one or more sensory systems 
of the organism – that,
(b) may be sensed by an organism’s sensory systems because of the strength 
of the change and the properties of its sensory systems, (if sensed, the 
environmental change is called stimulus or sign retrospectively),
(c) may not be noticed (= unconsciously) or noticed (sub)consciously by the 
organism (as some of its bodily reactions and reflexes may indicate),
(d) may be deliberatedly ignored or not. This phase implies a choice 
as the human baby may stop sucking because it is tired or satiated. 
Probably the baby continues to receive stimuli and may take note of 
them. Ignored here is the question if a baby may be credited or not with 
consciousness.
Interestingly, none of these steps seems to have a generally accepted name 
in the information literature. Luciano Floridi (2010,23) speaks about (a) up 
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to and including (d) as ‘data in the wild’ or dedomena (‘data’ in Greek) with 
the comment that the term ‘data’ originates with the Latin translation of 
a work by Euclid entitled Dedomena). He describes dedomena as ‘fractures 
in the continuum’ or ‘lacks of uniformity in the fabric of reality’, ‘pure data 
prior to interpretation or cognitive processing’. This description amounts to 
‘sensing’, the reaction of a sensory system to a change in the environment. 
Floridi def ines environmental information as the possibility that data may 
be meaningful independently of an intelligent producer/informer. The often 
cited example, also put forward by Floridi, is the cut tree trunk with the 
tree’s yearly formed concentric rings to estimate its age. Environmental 
information, he says, does not need to be ‘natural’; a f lashing red light 
indicating that the battery is f lat may also be taken as an example of (non-
natural) environmental information. (ibid.32f)
An observer may decide to attach meaning to some feature like the red 
spot on the bill of mother herring gull or the smell of the mother’s breast 
and the touch on the lips of the baby. The organism’s or observer’s (reflex 
or conscious) decision to attach meaning to observed phenomena in the 
environment is an interpretation in itself, an inferential biological decision 
or reaction upon some observed ’fracture in the continuum’. Meaning is thus 
based on observed correlations, indicating the (repeatedly) observed relation 
of some specif ic environmental change or ‘fracture in the continuum’ on 
the one hand and another (co-existing) phenomenon, i.e., in my examples 
the perceived effects (the specif ic behaviour of our chick and baby). Envi-
ronmental change may also consist of a network of patterns or correlations. 
Observed correlations may be due to physical, chemical or biological laws 
that are after all regular relationships observed by human observers. These 
relationships became generally accepted as physical, chemical or biological 
laws.
In the literature on information the phase of (‘f irst’) noticing and as-
sessing a correlation is often overlooked or taken for granted (‘data in the 
wild’) as for example the concentric rings in the wood of a cut tree (Floridi, 
vide supra). Someone must have noticed this pattern in all felled trees of 
all ages which led him to the conclusion that the patterns were related to 
the age of the tree. Only after such observation, interpretation and establish-
ment we accept a relation as a fact (datum) and may start to f ind (causal) 
explanations for the phenomenon. A datum, thus, is a conclusion based on 
observed correlations. Only after a f irst establishment of a relation, already 
a conclusion, we can speak (tentatively) of a datum.
From this point onwards we enter the domain of cognition and mind of 
the owner of the sensory systems, i.e. the chick and the baby. The change 
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between (c) and (d) in the list above is gradual although the extremes are 
clearly different.
The retrospective establishment of an observed correlation between an 
environmental change and a consequent effect (or behaviour in case of an 
organism) such as mentioned under (c) and (d) I called meaning. Others call 
only this part of information a ‘datum’ and start discussions about meaning 
of from there. Milllikan (1984,85) following Peirce states:
Natural signs, animal’s signs, people’s signs, indexes, signals, indicators, 
symbols, representations, sentences, maps, charts, pictures – there is no 
generic term in English that naturally covers all of these. Yet it has been 
felt by many philosophers that these are all related, and it is the term “sign” 
that has most often been used to cover them all, or all that were felt to 
be related. [Moreover she says] Most signs mean. But “mean” has various 
senses. Storm clouds mean rain; John means well; Hund means dog.
Interpreting a physical or chemical change in the environment as ‘meaning’ 
Millikan called intentionality or teleosemantics. The notion of intentional-
ity, she proceeds, was reintroduced into modern philosophical vocabulary 
by Brentano to be able to make a clear cut between the mental and the physi-
cal. The term intentionality is related with what Millikan calls ‘mapping’ 
relations, it is not unified by a definition but by a paradigm.(ibid.86) She says 
that basic intentionality is something that only mental things have.(ibid.89, 
emphasis added) I do not agree with Millikan on this point. All organisms 
are born with abilities to react upon physical and/or chemical changes in 
their environment. All organisms therefore demonstrate intentionality if 
the term ‘mentality’ is re-interpreted to mean the ability to (re)action to an 
environmental stimulus. They act or react, genetically programmed, to a 
stimulus, thus demonstrating a potential of discrimination between at least 
two alternatives and thus of a capacity of interpretation. Millikan admits 
that “there are no signs without potential interpreters” and “the interpreter 
of a natural sign may have learned to interpret the sign”.(ibid.118f) I agree 
with her “with respect to the continuity of selection processes and semantic 
representation”. That, of course, suggests the possibility of non-mental 
(mental taken here in the more classical sense) intentionality which to 
me is identical to the classic physiological term ‘excitability’ the word for 
(potential) reactivity upon a stimulus.
Millikan (2004) further argues that the correlations organisms rely on 
often only exist for limited 4-D situations and often are imperfect. Nev-
ertheless, under many circumstances it pays to quickly act disregarding 
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perfection. Accidental relations are of little use in (scientif ic) explanations. 
Only relations existing for a reason are interesting and require (causal) 
explanations and/or interpretations. Millikan def ines the domain of a 
natural sign as that in which the reason for correlation subsists. She calls 
these correlations ‘local natural information’.
Not yet discussed is the domain of cellular communication, i.e., processes 
concerning molecular biology, DNA, cell interactions, hormones, enzymes 
et cetera. That subject is part of the domain of biosemiotics to which I will 
return shortly.
11.3 Interlude
Primitive organisms have few receptors, sense few changes in their environ-
ment and have few potential reaction mechanisms. Less primitive ones have 
conglomerates of specialised tissue, mainly products of the ectoderm5. 
Ectoderm develops into skin, sense organs, and neuronal tissue (ganglion) in 
each segment of the organism’s body-to-come. Higher organisms retain rem-
nants of the original fetal segmental construction like vertebrae, neuronal 
segmental distribution of skin sensitivity, basic reflexes et cetera; ontogeny 
tells us that evolution rarely if ever completely discards anything that was. 
Primates, among them Homo sapiens, in the course of evolution obtained 
more neuronal tissue in the cranial (front) part of the body. This process 
was accompanied with the parallel introduction and development of new 
sensory systems and reaction mechanisms. Understanding the biomedical 
side of man is simplif ied by comparative studies of many other organisms. 
It is important to realize that brain tissue needs more energy than other 
tissues6, that a large animal needs more neuronal tissue than a small one 
because of the greater number of muscle cells, and that large brains would 
be a handicap for a bird’s f lying capabilities.
From time to time we need to revert to comparative anatomy, com-
parative functions et cetera to understand. Most human functions are 
approximately equivalent to those of other species. I thus wholeheartedly 
endorse Millikan’s (1984,7) statement in this context that
5 Shortly after fertilization the embryo develops three so called germ layers: ectoderm, 
mesoderm and entoderm which – by and large – generate covering tissues and organs, the 
locomotory system and the intestines respectively.
6 The human brain consumes about 20% of the energy intake of the whole body while only 
constituting about 2% of the body weight and is thus an energetic-expensive structure.
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‘Man is a natural creature and a product of evolution. Man’s capacities 
(as a knower) are also a product of evolution. The capacties to believe 
and know are therefore natural evolutionary products. Knowing instead 
of not-knowing must be advantageous and must have adaptive worth. 
Knowing must be some kind of natural relation that he often bears to 
his world.
As soon as sensory receptors present their stream of ‘information’ through 
nerve cells to the brain, the information gets organized. This ultimately 
leads to patterns of behaviour, to memory (future reference) and for a small 
part in a few species including Homo sapiens, to conscious knowledge. I will 
return to this in the next chapter. In the context of information, however, 
I will f irst discuss biosemiotics.
11.4 Biosemiotics7
We can see then that whenever biology uses semiotic terms such as 
information, adaptation, signal, messenger, f idelity, cross-talk, cue etc. 
it tacitly presupposes some homunculus-like principle to substitute for 
Darwin’s “striving”. (Hoffmeyer 2009)
One philosopher muttered “He probably heard bacteria talking to one 
another.” In the meantime, the course of development has proven this 
thesis correct on all counts. “Using advanced linguistic capabilities, 
bacteria can lead rich social lives for the group benefit. They can develop 
collective memory, use and generate common knowledge, develop group 
identity, recognize the identity of other colonies, learn from experience to 
improve themselves, and engage in group decision-making, an additional 
surprising social conduct that amounts to what should most appropriately 
be dubbed as social intelligence.” (Witzany 2010 citing Jacob et al 2004)
11.4.1 Prelude
Biosemiotics – a relative new speciality in biology8 – is an interdisciplinary 
scientif ic study of signs and codes in living systems. The linguistic part was 
7 Barbieri (2008), Hoffmeyer (2008), Favareau (2010), Witzany (2010), Emmeche and Kull (2011)
8 For a comprehensive historical overview see the introduction of Favareau’s (2010,1-77) 
anthology.
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modelled after Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) and Charles W. Morris (1903-79) 
but Jakob von Uexküll (1864-1944) was the early pioneer. The founding 
fathers of biosemiotics were Thomas Sebeok (1920-2001) and Thure von 
Uexküll (1908-2004, Jakob’s son). The term ‘biosemiotics’ was used for the 
f irst time by Frederich Solomon Rothschild9 but probably already emerged 
in Russia in the 1970s, where it was used to refer to the study of natural signs 
– including the study of communication systems in organisms – particularly 
with reference to Jakob von Uexküll’s work.
11.4.2 Basics
The history of semiotics has been influenced by structuralism in linguistics, 
and semiology is related to a similar structuralist movement in theoretical 
biology. Semiotic biology sees living creatures not just as passively subjected 
to universal laws of nature, but also as active systems of sign production, 
sign mediation and sign interpretation, that makes use of physical laws in 
order to live and sometimes to make a more complex living.
Biosemioticians claim that life is fundamentally grounded in semiotic 
processes. They approach (1) the cell as a real semiotic system, (2) the genetic 
code as a real code, (3) the evolution as a process of natural selection and 
natural conventions, and (4) natural conventions, i.e., organic codes, as 
origin to the great novelties of macroevolution.
According to the analysis of information [§ 11-2] a sign is ‘accepted’ as a 
sign only after it has been associated with a meaning. Organisms (‘agents’) 
have a built-in drive to ‘make sense’ of their environment. When an or-
ganism reacts to a stimulus from the environment in a certain pattern or 
lawlike behaviour, the reaction implies meaning. Correlation of sign and 
meaning implies a relationship between receptor and stimulus. Thus, sign 
and meaning are the two sides of the coin. A sign stands for something that 
is other than itself, implying at least some degree of independence; there is 
no deterministic relationship, no necessary connection between sign and 
meaning, between names and objects. A semiotic system, therefore, is a 
combination of two or more worlds between which there is no necessary 
link. This implies that a bridge between the worlds can be established only 
9 We speak of biophysics and biochemistry whenever methods used in the physics and 
chemistry of lifeless matter are applied to material structures and processes created by life. 
In analogy we use the term biosemiotic. It means a theory and its methods which follows the 
model of the semiotic of language. It investigates the communication processes of life that 
convey meaning in analogy to language. (Rothschild 1962)
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by conventional rules, i.e., by the coding. This is what qualif ies the semiotic 
system: a system consisting of independent worlds that are connected by 
the conventional rules of a code.
A semiotic system, in conclusion, is necessarily made of at least three 
distinct entities: signs, meanings, and code. This definition explicitly states 
that a code is an essential component of a semiotic system. The coding 
creates a correspondence between signs and meanings.
Biosemiotics and biocommunication investigate communication pro-
cesses in and among cells, tissues, organs and organisms as sign-mediated 
interactions, i.e. language-like text, which follows three kinds of rules: 
combinatorial (syntactic), context-sensitive (pragmatic), and content-
specif ic (semantic).
We need to keep in mind that signs and meanings are mental entities 
when the codemaker is the mind, but they are organic entities when the 
codemaker is an organic system without mind.
11.5 Biosemiotics and perception
In biology, quorum sensing has become the designation for a kind of 
communicative activity in bacteria where the density of bacteria present 
is a causal factor. In short, quorum sensing is due to a process where each 
single bacterium excretes a certain chemical compound such that the 
concentration of this compound in the medium will reflect the number 
of bacteria per unit of volume. Quorum sensing occurs if the compound, 
after having reached a threshold concentration, binds to a regulatory 
protein in the cell and thereby intitiates the transcription of specif ic 
genes. (Hoffmeyer, 2008,91)
As early as 1928 Jackob von Uexküll introduced the term Umwelt which he 
defined as the perceptual world of organisms, the subjective or phenomenal 
world of the animal. He argued that animals spend their lives ‘locked up‘ 
inside their subjective worlds, in their subjective Umwelt. While modern 
biology employs the term ecological niche, the set of conditions of their 
environment, the Umwelt is the ecological niche, so to speak, the organism 
itself perceives. [§ 3-2 (p. 43)]
One of von Uexküll’s prime examples was the tick, known to crawl up 
branches to quietly wait for a warm-blooded animal to pass by below. Only 
then the tick let go and lands itself upon the animal or human, where it 
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burrows itself into a f ixed position. The signal that awakens the tick is 
butyric acid, a compound secreted by the skin of all mammals, and thus 
the Umwelt of the tick is characterised by the presence or absence of butyric 
acid. (ibid.171)
Another example of von Uexküll (1982,(1940),45), cited by Hoffmeyer are 
the different imprints of a girl, an ant, a larva of the spittlebug and a cow on 
the meadow flower: the girl picks the flower as a decorative object in her 
Umwelt, the ant uses the flower’s petals as a natural ladder in its Umwelt, the 
larva of the spittlebug bores its way into the stalk to obtain the material for 
constructing its ‘frothy home’ using the flower as construction material in 
the larva’s Umwelt and the cow eats the flower as fodder in the cow’s Umwelt.
Dretske (1985,181) gives an almost identical example when he notices a 
daisy while taking his two year old daughter and his dog for a walk. The 
daughter “has experience of the world as rich and as variegated as that of 
any knowledgable adult but differs from an adult in the capacity to exploit 
these experiences in the generation of reliable beliefs (knowledge)” about 
what she sees. All three are able to observe the daisy. Dretske sees the 
flower as a daisy, his daughter sees it simply as a flower, and “who knows 
about the dog?”
In the examples of von Uexküll and Dretske all involved inhabit his/
her/its own Umwelt that guides each one’s activity in his/her/its semiotic 
niche, i.e., the world around the agent which he must wisely interpret 
in order to keep life. This implies [§ 3-2 (p.43)] that every one of them is 
constructing its own area of experience, his own virtual reality (RA). A 
corollary is that perception is to be understood as giving meaning about 
something. As Jakob von Uexküll (1982 (1940),31) said: “Every action [..] that 
consists of perception and operation imprints its meaning on the meaning-
less object and thereby makes it into a subject-related meaning-carrier in 
the respective Umwelt.” We thus construct an immediate experience of 
an external world that is continuously presented to us in a 4-D fashion 
by our sensory systems.
I do not see reason to dismiss such experiences as ‘Folk psychological 
constructions’. They are teleonomic10 evolutionary facts that function as 
appropriate experience-based selection models or information for actions.
10 Teleonomy is the quality of apparent purposefulness and of goal-directedness of structures 
and functions in living organisms derived from their evolutionary history. Teleology is a doctrine 
explaining phenomena by reference to planned goals or purposes.
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11.6 Summary in a larger context
This chapter is devoted to the concept of information and sign, both 
conceived as circumstances in the environment in relation to sensory 
systems, and leading to experience(s) in the cell, the tissue, the organ and 
the organism.
Information, as the term is used in the neuroscientif ic sense, is def ined 
by the four elementary features of a stimulus leading to activation of a 
receptor: modality, location, intensity and timing. In the next chapter I will 
follow the path that this stimulus, this type of information, takes from the 
receptor to the cerebral cortex.
12 The construction of some foothold in 
the swamp1
You cannot theorize about the world without making decisions and choices 
about how to theorize.
BC van Fraassen 2002,224
12.1 Introduction
In bygone ages the Netherlands contained large areas of swamps and 
marshes. Three ways were and are still used to construct buildings which, 
nevertheless, keep our feet dry:
(1) driving piles into the swamp until they hit a solid layer (usually clay, 
loam, rock or sand); on the tops of these piles one constructs the true 
foundation for a building,
(2) sinking into the moor a mattress that provides the solid layer; various 
materials have been used for such matresses. Amsterdam is partly built 
on cow-hides and Dutch dykes on sunken fascine mattresses,2
(3) constructing a caisson that ‘f loats’ in the soggy bog.
In the last decennia a new method came into use: temporarily freezing the 
part of a swamp needed for some activity such as a timber-yard. Finally, 
baron von Münchhausen [Box 12-1] brings back to memory the fascinating 
– admittedly f ictive – method of ‘bootstrapping’!
Some of these methods may be used as metaphors for a number of 
philosophical concepts: the pile driving method may be compared to 
foundationalism, the willow-twig mattresses to coherentism3 and the 
floating construct to Neurath’s ship, the other two methods – may be – as 
1 Feenstra is a Frisian family name. ‘Feen’ stands for ‘peat-bog’, and ‘–stra’ stands for ’native 
of’.
2 A fascine mattress consists of a f lexible layer of brushwood often several hundred feet 
long, weighted down with stones and sunk into a river or sea bed to prevent scour. The 
brushwood is harvested from coppices, in Dutch ‘grienden’. This particular kind of copse 
generally grows in wet or boggy areas, in earlier days in tidal areas where access is generally 
only possible on foot or by water. The vegetation mainly consists of very short willow or ash 
stumps from which osiers grow. One most famous ‘griend’ in The Netherlands is the National 
Park ‘De Biesbosch’.
3 Sellars (1997,147) famously compared foundationalism to the tortoise – the mythical beast 
of burden carrying the universe – and coherentism to the ouroboros (the earliest alchemical 
symbol) or ‘great Hegelian tail-biting serpent’. 
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thought experiments. Finally, the marsh can be compared to all uncertain 
ground we may so stumble on. Foundationalism, the golden standard lost its 
solidity in the second half of the twentieth century partly due to quantum 
mechanics, but it still has its supporters.
Keeping in mind van Fraassen’s statement at the top of the last page, I 
will present my starting point under the heading of ‘Chisholm’s philosophic 
compass’. I will then briefly present my selection of (the extensive) philoso-
phy of science and braid my ‘fascine matress’ about sensory systems and 
perception devoting a few paragraphs to ‘consciousness’.
Box 12-1 How I once rescued myself from a moor*
If you run the risk to sink into a moor you should remember this history as once 
truly happened to me. During an excursion my horse and I entered a moor. We 
had to cross it as there was no alternative route to our destination. Since we 
couldn’t pass through it we had to jump.
The first try was too short. During the jump therefore, we had to turn and we 
landed in exactly the same place as where we took off.
At the second jump we were not able to turn and we crashed onto the subsoil of 
the moor.
My horse and I would have sunk without any hope if I wouldn’t have been able 
to draw myself out of the moor by my own hairlock. Of course I also rescued my 
trusty horse.
Indeed there is great advantage in having a well trained body.
Hieronymus Carolus Friedricus Freiherr von Münchhausen known as the Baron 
von Münchhausen (1720-1797) or Lügenbaron [the lying baron] wrote immortal 
and fantastic stories about his experiences and impressions during his military 
career. Anonymously he published his Wunderbare Reisen zu Wasser, zu Lande, 
Feldzüge und lustige Abentheuer des Freyherrn von Münchhausen. [Marvellous 
expeditions by sea and land, campaigns and amusing adventures of Baron von 
Münchhausen, 1786]
* Bürger,1786, Kapitel 4: Abenteuer im Kriege gegen die Türken. 
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12.2 Chisholm’s philosophical compass
Quoting Montaigne4 and Mercier, Chisholm (1982,61-75) wrote a beautiful 
paper with the signif icant title ‘The problem of the criterion’. No one, says 
Chisholm, has begun to philosophize until he has faced the following two 
questions and recognized how unappealing in the end, each of the possible 
answers is:
(A) “What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge?”
(B) “How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of 
knowledge?”
Chisholm compares three positions: (c) the one of the sceptic who says that 
you cannot answer either question without presupposing an answer to the 
other, so neither can be answered, (b) the one of the dogmatist or ‘methodist’ 
who thinks he has an answer to (B) and then works out his answer to (A) 
and f inely (a) the one of the ‘particularist’ who starts to answer (A) and 
then tries to give an answer to (B).
Approvingly citing Spinoza’s “in order to know there is no need to 
know that we know, much less to know that we know that we know”, and 
St.Augustine’s “It is more reasonable to trust the senses than to distrust 
them”, Chisholm f inely settles for (his) three f irm starting-points. The f irst, 
a moral one, is having the courage to recognize that we can deal with the 
problem only by circular reasoning. The second, also a moral one, is to be 
true to this recognition and not try to pretend that it is not so. The third one 
is to follow Mercier’s concept of objectively making a reasonable preferential 
choice based on the context and circumstances. In order to make such a 
choice, his advice is to recognize and make use of Leibniz’s ‘truths of reason’ 
and ‘truths of fact’ to make propositions that are certain for man. Adding to 
Chisholm’s set of rules the – probably superfluous – remark ‘at a given time’ 
4 Pour juger des apparences que nous reçevons des subjects, il nous faudroit un instrument 
judicatoire; pour verif ier cet instrument, il nous y faut de la demonstration; pour verif ier la 
demonstration, un instrument; nous voylà au rouet. Puisque les sens ne peuvent arrester notre 
dispute, éstans pleins eux-mesmes d’incertitude, il faut que se soit la raison; aucune raison 
s’establira sans une autre raison: nous voylà à reculons jusques à l’inf iny. (Montaigne) The 
passage appears in Book 2, Ch 12 (An Apologie of Raymond Sebond). It may be found on p.544 of 
the Modern Library edition of The Essays of Montaigne. (Chisholm 1982,61-75,note 3) [To judge the 
appearances that we receive of things we need a decision instrument; to verify this instrument 
we need proof; to verify this proof an instrument; there we have the circle. Because the senses 
cannot determine our dispute being full of uncertainty themselves, it must be done by reason; 
but no reason stands f irm without another reason; and so we turn round without end].
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takes it into the concept of process, which I venture to name ‘Chisholm’s 
philosophic compass’, that I wish to sail by.
12.3 The circle of knowledge and perception
To be able to speak about knowledge we need information from the sensory 
systems. In order to understand the sensory systems we need knowledge. 
Much like Montaigne and Chisholm we cannot possibly escape this circle so 
that the only way left is Baron von Münchhausen’s variety of ‘bootstrapping’. 
I will thus discuss perception based on knowledge and knowledge based on 
perception together.
Philosophers5 speaking about knowledge6 readily tend to focus on 
propositions, something offered for consideration or acceptance, or, more 
colloquially, taken to be true or false. The notation is ‘S knows that p’, where 
‘S’ stands for the subject who (thinks he) has knowledge and ‘p’ for the 
proposition that is known. The definition of knowledge then is generally 
taken to be a justif ied true belief and a Gettier condition. [§ 7-4 (p.89)] 
The discussion then moves away to the relation between proposition and 
(factual) evidence, meaning – in the end the basics of – empiricism [Box 
12-2] or the reliability of our (instrumentally assisted) sensory systems. 
With ‘instrumental’ in this context I have in mind each and every means 
and expedients including formulae and language(s).
Kvanvig (2005,290f) argues that the goal of knowledge should not be the 
meta-epistemological question ‘if truth is the primary (teleological) goal 
of epistemology’.
Van Fraassen’s (1998,213) choice for a ‘scientific agnostic’ 7 approach aims 
to f ind the empirically most adequate answer to some specif ic spacetime 
problem not worrying about ‘Truth’ or falseness. Ten years later van Fraassen 
(2008,1-3) repeats (t)his view:
To understand science we need to approach it from many directions. (2008,1)
I try to be an empiricist, and as I understand that tradition (what it is, and 
what it could be in days to come). It involves a common sense realism in 
5 Steup (2012) starts his paper on epistemology by saying that he leaves all other forms of 
knowledge out of consideration in his paper on epistemology.
6 King (2011), Steup (2012)
7 The contrasting view is the ‘scientific gnostic’ one, someone who believes the science he 
accepts to be true.
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which reference to observable phenomena is unproblematic: rocks, seas, 
stars, persons, bicycles… Empiricism also involves certain philosophical 
attitudes: to take the empirical sciences as a paradigm of rational inquiry, 
and to resist the demands for further explanation that lead to meta-
physical extensions of the sciences. There is within these constraints 
a good deal of leeway for different sorts of empiricist positions. For my 
part, specif ically, I add a certain view of science, that is the basic aim – 
equivalently, the base-line criterion of success – is empirical adequacy 
rather than overall truth, and that acceptance of a scientif ic theory has a 
pragmatic dimension (to guide action and research) but need involve no 
more belief than that the theory is empirically adequate.(2008,3)
This describes unqualif ied acceptance; in practice, acceptance will come 
with restrictions and qualif ications, and belief will come in degrees 
(2008,345,note 3)
This presumed best answer to some four dimensional (4-D) problem is also 
known as inference to the best explanation. An empirically adequate or a 
pragmatic, tentative answer8 to some specif ic 4-D problem is to be found 
in the notion of evidence which is based on experience(s), prediction (might 
be called ‘reasoned ‘belief’), and reliable external conditions and processes. 
Since I do not believe in a priori concepts and I cannot accept such armchair 
8 An alternative for ‘answer’ in this context might be ‘successful cognition’.(Kvanvig 2005,286) 
Box 12-2 Roots of empiricism*
Latin empiricus is derived from the Greek peira (trial, experiment), empeiros 
(skilled), empeiria (experience).
The earliest use refers to a school of physicians, empirici as opposed to 
dogmatici or methodici. The empirici professed to base their practice entirely on 
experience (understood as that of the medical profession of those days) and not 
on theories drawn from more general philosophies or cosmologies.
Francis Bacon’s classification: ”Those who have practised the sciences have 
been either empiricists or dogmatists. The empiricists, like the ants, merely col-
lect and use; the rationalists, like spiders, spin webs out of themselves. But the 
way of the bees lies in between: they gather materials from flowers of the gar-
den and the field and then by their own powers transforms and digests them. 
The real work of philosophy is similar.”
* van Fraassen (2002,201-5)
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philosophy my method of choice would be empiricism and naturalism9 with 
Francis Bacon’s bee-like inclinations. [Box 12-2]
Quine (1969,69) states that the foundations of science are conceptual and 
doctrinal. Conceptual foundations are concerned with meaning, clarify 
concepts by def ining them, if need be occasionally in terms of other ones. 
Doctrinal foundations concern truth, establish laws by proving them, 
sometimes on the basis of other laws. Ideally, the obscurer concepts would 
be def ined in terms of the clearer ones in an attempt to maximize clarity, 
and the less obvious laws would be proved from the more obvious ones to 
maximize certainty. Ideally, the definitions would generate all the concepts 
from clear and distinct ideas, and the proofs would generate all the theorems 
from self-evident truths. (Quine 1969,70)
Ultimately, justif ication may be thought to be internal, i.e., based on 
mental states and/or on reflection which is not empirical. On the other 
hand justif ication may be thought to be external if it is based on reliable 
external conditions and processes. Empiricism and naturalism rest on 
sensory experience10 and has to be justif ied in sensory terms. Theories are 
constructed through contextual def initions in sentences as the primary 
vehicles of meaning. Quine is, like Chisholm, not in the least impressed by 
the inherent circularity of his reasoning.
On the basis of the foregoing I opt for an eliminative physicalist approach 
[Addendum 14-4 (p.172)] to develop my point of view that consciousness and 
perception are biological activities of the sensory systems and the brain of 
Homo sapiens. They arose in the course of Darwinian evolution gradually 
coming into being in the course of infancy and with precursors in animals. 
The term consciousness is either a misnomer or too vague. (vide infra) Searle 
(1997) concluded that consciousness is a ‘state’, but it is not, it is a continuing 
process. We should pay more attention to Herakleitus’ Panta Rhei, to the 
fourth dimension.
9 Philosophical naturalism f irmly believes that reality contains nothing supernatural: no 
souls, no spirits divine or human, no entelechies, no vital forces, no mental substances, no 
spooks, no demons and no universals. Methodologically philosophical naturalism also f irmly 
believes that scientif ic method(s) should be used to investigate all areas of reality including 
epistemological issues. [Box 14-1 (p. 173)]
10 Foundation of knowledge begins with experience but does not provide the foundation, and 
foundations are conceived as a metaphysical thesis of the sort against which empiricism stages 
its recurrent rebellion (van Fraassen 2002,38)
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12.4 Classification of sensory systems
12.4.1 Introduction
When scientists discuss the sensory systems they usually do this in terms 
of the signal and the sensitive receptor def ined in (bio)chemical and (bio)-
physical terms. [Chapters 2,3,5] In this essay I sofar paid little attention 
to the philosophers’ criteria for classifying the senses. Many but not all of 
them preferably concentrated on the aspects of the perceiver’s intuition, 
introspection, analyzing terms, and one sensory system in particular, usu-
ally vision. (see the anthology of Macpherson 2004).
I do not accept intuition and introspection as reliable ways for studying 
the sensory systems. [§ 8-2 (p.97); § 8-3 (p.99)] Aristotle, son of a physi-
cian, used both in his De Anima. His f irst criterion, which he considered 
ontologically prior, concerns the special properties that each sense directly 
reveals. His second criterion is the medium through which information is 
transmitted, for each of his f ive senses another one. For example vision 
through a transparent medium, and hearing through trapped air. For an 
extensive discussion of Aristotle’s theory of number and nature of the senses 
see Keeley (2009).
12.4.2 Criteria for classifying
Many criteria have been suggested to classify the sensory systems. Some 
authors chose even combinations of such criteria, be it a priori or a posteriori. 
Most if not all proposed criteria have been readily attacked by always available 
antagonists. Agreement is the exception rather than the rule although scientists 
do agree on a few basics.11 To begin with, I present a small potpourri of criteria 
(pro or contra) and discussions (pro or contra) about senses that are (explicitly) 
included or (explicitly) excluded in classifications of sensory systems:
(1) the observer’s criteria: the properties of sensory experience, qualia, the 
special introspection,12
(2) feelings, proprioception, pain, temperature, hunger, thirst, sexual 
arousal, vomeronasal’s effects, number sense, time sense, language, 
11 The empiricist view from the mid 19th century onwards founded by the mainly German 
fathers of physiology and experimental psychology still holds (JP.Müller, G.Fechner, E.Weber, 
H.von Helmholtz, E.duBois-Raymond, T.Schwann, FGJ.Henle, C.Ludwig, E.Haeckel, MRF.von 
Frey, W.Wundt and others). 
12 Grice HP. Some remarks about the senses. In: Macpherson (2011,83-100)
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homeostatic control mechanisms, the immune system [§ 5-4 (p.74)] 
and somatosensory systems in general [Box 5-3 (p.69)],
(3) folk psychological arguments such as custom and convention,13
(4) extensionally versus intensionally premises,
(5) uni-sensorial or multi-sensorial; this applies with respect to one of 
two possible directions: (a) one sensory system that incorporates 
more capabilities, e.g., vision (colour, shape, movement, brightness, 
circadian rhythms) and vestibular system (angular acceleration, linear 
acceleration) [§ 5-3 (p.70)] and (b) two sensory systems cooperating for 
one ‘sensory quality’ as vision and touch to determine ‘shape’, or vision 
and audition in understanding speech as demonstrated by McGurk14, 
or ‘taste’ as the combined sensory acitivities of tasting, olfactory taste 
(smelling) and the tongue’s touch;
(6) consciousness considered mandatory versus consciousness not (always) 
necessary;
(7) active (exploration) versus passive (‘mere’ experience), for example 
looking versus seeing, touching versus feeling, sniff ing versus smelling 
(Grice 1962).
Sensory systems could even be considered a ‘cluster concept’ such that sev-
eral criteria are relevant to it, but none necessary. In different contexts, dif-
ferent criteria may also be weighted differently.15 Macpherson (2011,36)16 in 
the extensive introduction of the book she edited, summarizes the diversity 
of criteria as “the proximal stimulus, the representation, the phenomenal 
character and the sense organ criterion”, adding, “So, we should stop trying 
to artif icially determine or stipulate which Aristotelian sense any sense 
is – or to shoehorn each sense into one of a small number of discrete kinds.” 
In the same vein Heil (2011,154)17 writes “An exhaustive taxonomy of the 
senses is, after all, an empirical task”, a view I certainly endorse.
Rather than discussing each and any point of view or each and any 
argument pro and con I prefer a more pragmatic approach starting from 
three premises:
13 Nudds M. The senses as psychological kinds. In: Macpherson (2011,311-40)
14 The McGurk effect: normal people will better understand speech if the simultaneously 
viewed lip movements on a screen are the same as the words spoken than if they are different. 
(McGurk, 1976)
15 O’Dea J. A proprioceptive account of the sense modalities. In: Macpherson (2001,297-310)
16 Macpherson F. Individuating the senses. In: Macpherson (2011,3-43)
17 Heil J. The senses, excerpt from perception and cognition. In: Macpherson (2011,136-55) 
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(1) I accept the daily use of terms and criteria of the common man, or, in the 
wording of Heil (1983,3)18 “Perceiving is a general term, a technical – or, 
at any rate, quasi-technical – expression covering what one does with 
one’s senses”.
(2) Evolutionary theory applies to all properties and principles of life on 
earth. Any organism in the biosphere is subjected to the laws of (bio)
physics, (bio)chemistry and biology.
(3) Anyone who wants to academically discuss sensory systems should 
be aware of the accumulated empirical knowledge in the f ield, an 
opinion I share with Keeley (2009,226)19, Heil (2011,284)20 and many 
other philosophers and scientists thinking about ‘perception’.
Consequently, speculation about organisms and their sensory systems 
without these restrictions in mind is pointless. These considerations, then, 
considerably reduce the number of critera to classify sensory systems.
12.4.3 An attempt at a classification
The previous chapters suggest that a structure can only be called a sensory 
system if it complies with three conditions, P1 – P3:
P1 Sensory systems of an organism have receptors, cells responsive to a 
particular type of physical or chemical form of energy, the stimulus.
The term ‘stimulus’ may only be used after it is proven to be effective and 
then is synonymous (in the context of neurophysiology) with information 
and with energy. There may be a hidden tautology (for instance, eye ↔ light) 
in the f irst part of the statement ‘P1‘ avoidable by inclusion of the second 
part.[§ 1-2 (p.24)]
P2 The receptor cell transduces the stimulus energy into a – usually electric 
– output signal which can be considered the receptor cell’s stimulus to its 
(cellular) environment, or to more centrally located structures.
18 Heil (1983,5) obviously is not interested in discussing each and every point of view either 
(quote: “I shall not here attempt to elucidate the view that emerges in Grice’s [1962] discussion”).
19 “It is my thesis that neurobiological facts are necessary for the attribution of an important 
understanding of modality”(Keeley BL. The role of neurobiology in differentiating the senses. 
In: Bickle 2009,226- 50) 
20 Heil J. The senses In: Macpherson (2011,284-96)
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P3. Sensory systems do not function in isolation but are connected to other 
systems that may (re)act; they are part of biological loop-like processes.
A good example to explain the relation of a stimulus and the body’s reac-
tion is the knee jerk reflex: sudden light stretch of the hamstring muscle 
tendon slightly below the kneecap is followed by movement of the lower leg 
forwards. The reflex action, part of the function of the leg while a person 
is standing or walking, remains unnoticed. Only when a physician taps 
the tendon of the hamstring muscle, the ref lex is consciously noticed: 
movement is seen and felt. Reflexes help to maintain body function, i.e., 
regulatory circuits used to maintain a constant state of the basic conditions 
such as temperature, water content, or position.[§ 5-4 (p.74)]
We may thus def ine a sensory system as the assembly of a sensor (recep-
tor, some specialized cell(s) that transduce(s) incoming energy into an action 
potential) which is conducted to a control centre from where usually other 
signals are transmitted to parts of the body in need of control.
In this context the discussions among authors (scientists as well as 
philosophers) writing about the def inition of ‘vision’ demonstrate views 
which I f ind very diff icult to accept. I will describe a few of them here.
Some authors are convinced that only one-lens-eyes should be included 
which omits the facet eye of insects and the tiny pinhole eyes of simple 
invertebrates. If the stimulus of sensory systems is taken into consideration 
as life sciences do this criterion makes no sense anyway.
Others accept the human eye as the sensory system of vision but exclude 
all non-conscious perception. The pupil reflex, however, the unconscious 
narrowing of the pupil if environmental light is intensif ied, does belong 
to the human eye. Does the pupil reflex then not belong to ‘vision’? To me 
that does not make sense.
Still others argue that the evolutionary path of ‘the eye’ is the most 
important criterion. Some ‘eye-like structures’, however, have appeared 
and disappeared in the course of evolution more than once. Some of these 
structures might have complied with the def inition while others did not. 
The evolutionary beginnings of the vertebrate’s eye are the only ones that 
seem always to have been accepted as real ‘vision’ by the advocates of this 
concept of ‘vision’.
In conclusion, Macpherson rightly stated that we should stop trying to 
artif icially determine or stipulate senses into a classif ication since that will 
always be arbitrary. To illustrate her point I present the very cumbersome 
and unwieldy def inition of Gardner and Johnson (2013):
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[s]ensory information is neural activity originating from stimulation 
of receptor cells in specif ic parts of the body. These senses include the 
classic f ive senses [audition, smell, taste, touch, vision] plus a variety of 
modalities not recognized by the ancients [italics added] but essential 
to bodily function: the somatic sensations of proprioception (posture 
and movement of our body), pain, itch, and temperature; visceral sensa-
tions of proprioception (both conscious and unconscious) necessary for 
homeostasis; and the vestibular senses of balance (the position of the 
body in the gravitational f ield) and head movement.” 21
This anthropocentric def inition omits the sensory systems of many lower 
animals and plants.[§ 1-2 (p.24); Box 2-2 (p.33)] Such organisms have sensory 
systems albeit not (always) accompanied by neural tissue; they use other 
ways of transmission or ‘communication’, usually volatile or humoral. We 
call such ‘reflexes’ or reactions after stimulation of the receptor a very basic 
biological decisionary process or, perhaps, an inferential reaction.
In order to grasp the whole f ield of perception, I need now to discuss the 
central nervous system, consciousness, cognition and the mind.
12.5 Receptor signals in the CNS
12.5.1 Introduction
Until the middle of the nineteenth century all efforts to understand the 
signif icance of sensory systems, perception and the mind belonged to 
the realm of philosophy. From the middle of the nineteenth century the 
philosophical approach gave way to the more empirical analysis approach 
of physiology and the young experimental psychology. Later, in the second 
half of the twentieth century cognitive neural science emerged, a sort of 
cooperation of cognitive psychology proper and neural science, itself a 
sort of amalgamation of molecular biology, cell biology, electrophysiology, 
neuroanatomy and other (sub)- specialities.
In the early 1980s Patricia Churchland coined the term neurophiloso-
phy. Neurophilosophy and philosophy of mind share interests but are not 
identical. Neurophilosophers such as the Churchlands and Dennett, like 
neuroscienists in general, support eliminative materialism [Addendum 
21 Gardner EP, Johnson KO. Sensory coding. In: Kandel (2013,449)
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14-4 (p.172)] while many other philosophers of mind, on the other hand, do 
not favour that doctrine.
I will use the all-embracing expression neuroscience to indicate the f ield 
of cognitive neural science and neurophilosophy, which includes the theory 
of evolution [Chapter 4] and belongs to the philosophical view of naturalism. 
[p. 146; Box 14-1 (p. 173)]
12.5.2 The brain
Neuroscientists consider the brain as an information processing organ. 
Cognition is understood as the summation of processes by which sensory 
input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered and used. A 
great deal of cognitve processing proceeds unconsciously.22 Five subjects 
are studied by neuroscience: perception, action, emotion, language and 
memory. Since perception is the dominant subject of my essay I will here 
concentrate on that theme with occasional trips into related f ields.
Different modalities of perception – an object seen, a velvet cushion 
touched, coffee smelled, a concert heard – begin with stimulation of the 
receptors of the different sensory systems. The receptors convey the infor-
mation to specific (unimodal) regions of the cerebral cortex along individual 
axons (projecting part of a neuron conducting centripetally). In this way 
the peripheral nervous system supplies the central nervous system with 
a continuous stream of information about the external and the internal 
environment of the body.
The human nervous system contains approximately 109 neurons, each of 
which has and makes thousands of connections. The neurons in the brain 
and spinal cord are clustered in discrete functional groups (nuclei) which 
are connected with others to create functional systems.
In the brain the information is processed in a hierarchical fashion, i.e., the 
action potential is passed through a succession of subcortical and cortical 
regions. At each level of processing the information becomes more and 
more complex. [§ 5-3 (p.70)] Moreover, different types of information are 
processed in several anatomically discrete nuclei; a light touch and a painful 
22 In the middle of the 19th century von Helmholtz already concluded – based on conduction 
velocity measurement of nerve impulses – that information needs time for unciousious inference 
in order to reach conscious perception. In the beginning of the 20th century Freud concluded that 
much of mental activity is unconscious. In the preceding chapters I made clear that unconscious 
activity of the CNS is far more extensive than the conscious one, including ‘perception’.
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pinprick in the same area of skin are mediated by different pathways in 
the brain.
The different unimodal regions represent different sensory modalities 
that communicate with multimodal association areas through specif ic 
subcortical pathways. In this network signals are selected and combined 
into an apparently unif ied perception.
The brain produces integrated perception by nerve cells that are wired 
together according to a general plan that does not vary greatly among 
normal individuals. Nevertheless, the connections are not exactly the same 
in all individuals because the connections between cells can be altered by 
activity and by learning. Indeed, details of these maps vary considerably 
from one individual to another. Disuse, for instance due to injury, can 
cause dramatic loss in afferent connections, a phenomenon well-known as 
phantom limb syndrome and tinnitus (ear ringing).23 We remember specific 
events because the structure and function of the connections between 
nerve cells are modif ied by those events.
Although the networks depend on the qualities of its individual neurons, 
they are not identical or even similar to these qualities but an emergent 
quality of the way those different cells are interconnected.24 This raises 
empirical questions about the relation between observed neurophysiologi-
cal and mental processes.
12.5.3 Mind and consciousness
What we call mind is not a separate structure but a set of operations carried 
out by the brain. Because consciousness is a property of the mind, it too 
must be a function of the (physical properties of the) brain. We should be 
able to identify the neural circuits that contribute to it. Before theories of 
consciousness can be developed it must f irst be def ined in operational 
terms. (Kandel 2013,370-91) The concepts neuroscientists used to describe 
mental processes – such as learning, memory or consciousness – were 
developed by philosophers before it became known how mental processes 
are mediated by the brain, or in other words before the birth of (cognitive) 
neuroscience. (ibid.)
Consciousness, a (usually wrongly called state-like) process of self-
awareness, is characterised by subjectivity, unity and intentionality. The 
subjectivity of self-awareness is central in (personal) experience [§ 10-4 
23 Roberts et al.2010
24 Use of the term ‘emergent’ does not necessarily support the concept of emergentism.
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(p.127)] due to nature and nurture. [§ 5-2 (p.66)] The story of the aroma of 
Proust’s ‘petites madeleines’ [p.38] is not only an olfactory process from re-
ceptor to olfactory cerebral cortex including the genes that gave rise to them, 
but it is also determined by his personal history – the experience recalled 
from memory – and since experiential history is highly individualized, 
aroma’s may not produce the same subjective sensations in every person.
Conscious experience is fundamentally subjective. The unity25 of self-
awareness refers to the fact that experience of the world at any given mo-
ment is based on the continuous combined activity of all sensory systems, 
[§ 3-3 (p.45)], i.e., the various sensory modalities of which are blended into 
one (seemingly) single experience.
Self-awareness has intentionality, the state of mind that is ‘about’ things 
or represents them (beliefs, wishes, desires, hopes are often called ‘inten-
tional states’ or ‘aboutness’).
Important in the discussion of subjectivity, be it perception or conscious-
ness, is the so called explanatory gap (Levine 1983), also called the hard 
problem (Chalmers 1996).26 The explanatory gap concerns the doubt if a 
complete explanation of consciousnes is feasible. In other words, is it pos-
sible to abridge the gap between the (objective) neuroscientif ic knowledge 
on the one hand and the qualitative (subjective) properties on the other 
hand. There are three different philosophical convictions:
(a) some philosophers are convinced that the gap remains unbridgeable,
(b) some philosophers are convinced that the bridge might be ‘bridgeable’ 
by explaining it away with a specif ic concept such as enactivism27 and 
sensorimotor theories,28
(c) some philosophers deny existence of a gap believing that consiousness 
is nothing but the the ‘computational’ activity of certain areas of the 
brain.
25 William James def ined consciousness as “the continuous stream that is only accessible to 
the subject experiencing it” an entirely subjective affair. 
26 Chalmers (1996,ix,cii) def ines as easy problems the ones like “how does the brain process 
environmental stimulation, how does it integrate information and how do we produce reports 
on internal states. The hard problem is why is this processing accompanied by an experienced 
inner life?”
27 Wallis and Wright. In: Bickle (2009,255)
28 Degenaar 2012 
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12.5.4 Conscious(ness) or not, gap or not: the question
Look at the bright yellow flower and the bright green stem of a daffodil in 
early spring (feel the pleasant temperature, perceive the beautifull colours 
and the shape, be aware of your inner speak and snif to smell …..). I always 
immediately respond to that sight and its smells. I love that flower ( feeling) 
decorating my mother’s breakfast table on an Eastermorning (memory). At 
such moments my ‘experiencing’ the daffodil starts the combined subjective 
and objective process, making an extensive list of the peculiarities of a 
daffodil (Narcissus pseudo-narcissus)[Addendum 14-3 (p.170)], its yellow 
colour, form, 4-D analysis, the garden where my grandfather taught me its 
name, the f irst Easter breakfast with my grandparents, parents and brother 
in the Netherlands and much, much more, associating in ever wider circles…
(knowledge). I am very much aware that I live, think, feel, love the world, 
love the universe: I feel great!
Other philosophers might be inclined to extend such musings. They may 
reflect about the metaphysical discussion concerning the relation of objects 
and properties, i.e., are objects conglomerates of properties or are properties 
universals residing in substances. I do not accept universals. That places me 
in the camp of nominalism or, more precisely tropes. (Garrett 2006,65ff,75; 
Rodriguez-Pereyra 2008) Trope theory predicts that properties and realties 
are themselves particulars; abstract but not in the sense of being outside 
space and time, but because they are subtle, diffuse and partial. One’s 
length, colour of the eyes, but also bikes and trees are examples of concrete 
particulars, composed of abstract tropes. Likewise events and facts are held 
to be constructed of tropes.
Heidegger (1962) devotes an essay on the topic of thing (das Ding) and 
Rescher (2000,25) – more succinctly – presents an example that beautifully 
displays the point:
Consider its [a stone] physical features: its shape, its surface texture, its 
chemistry, etc. And then consider its causal background: its subsequent 
genesis and history. Then consider its functional aspects as relevant to 
its uses by the stonemason, or the architect, or the landscape decorator, 
etc. There is in principle, no theoretical limit to the different lines of 
consideration available to yield descriptive truths about a thing, so that 
the totality of potentially available facts about a thing – about anything 
real whatever – is in principle inexhaustible.
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I do not want to enter the discussion of the relation of objects and properties 
to explain sensory systems. Its answer can be found in the quote of Rescher. 
Paraphrasing this into ‘There is in principle no theoretical limit to the 
different ways sensory systems may perceive something, so that the total 
sum of potentially available (perceivable) facts about something, anything 
real what-ever, is in principle inexhaustible’. I might even return to and f ix 
my attention upon sensory systems again terminating my musings that 
started with the yellow Narcissus pseudo-narcissus (daffodil).
Our sensory systems thus are continuously processing in varying rela-
tions to each other and in varying environmental circumstances and the 
results are continuously compared with earlier experiences. [§ 10-4.3 (p.128); 
§ 11-3 (p.135)] The focus of a philosopher’s attention should be less on the 
putative static character of an object29 and more on the processes of the 
human sensory systems in relation to their environments. The combined 
actions of our sensory systems and the coordinating brain def ines reality, 
earlier called RH [§ 3-2 (p.43)], our human construct of the world.
In perceiving (the daffodil or the tomato, Heidegger’s das Ding or Rescher’s 
stone) our brain combines the incoming stimuli of all sensory systems, 
compares them with memories ‘intellectual’ and ‘emotional’ (the animal 
side) and ‘feelings’ (the coginitive side of the same). We can then say ‘daf-
fodil’, a word, a flatus vocis, a term, a name, a symbol of sorts and we may 
say ‘look at this daffodil, das Ding, that stone’. We will feel connected with 
the whole world or the Universe, widening our perception and experience: 
a mystical moment. (viz. Bharati [§ 9-4 (p.109)]) On the other hand, we may 
regress to a habituation of our earlier school days and kick the stone away, 
deep in thought. Anyway we are – in principle – there, our mind being 
focused on the daffodil, (das Ding, Rescher’s stone). Whatever we think or 
do, we always use all our sensory systems and our locomotor apparatus, 
while our urine still seeps into the bladder, the heart and lungs work, we 
still have an upright position et cetera, et cetera. We started life in this way, 
sucking with our whole body.
Tradition and folk psychology call sensations and their awareness 
‘consciousness’. This is also a short hand for one momentary state of being 
within Herakleitos’ or James’ continuous stream that may be – reductionisti-
cally – explained as activities of neurons in their circuits, comparable to my 
impression of the yellow daffodil. Consciousness is the subjective aspect of 
a series of moments rooted in our experiences. James’ continuous stream 
is only accessible to the subject experiencing it, or, as Patricia Churchland 
29 See Feyerabend 1999 (Terpstra ed) about Parmenides vs. Herakleitos
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says it is comparable to ‘an electrical current in a wire [that] is not caused 
by moving electrons, it is moving electrons’.
We should not ask the why- but the how-question. Why the sun shines is 
not interesting and leads to speculation and metaphysics. It is the question 
how it does, which leads to understanding.
Stimulation of receptors may lead to actions, to phenomena; no mystery. 
Some effects are muscular, secretions of glands, some give rise to experi-
ences like recognition of a familiar face, the exclamation “hello Gerald”; 
again: no mystery in these phenomena. Each effect has a usually arbitrarily 
chosen name. Consciousness is a ‘term’, not a thing, not an object, little more 
than moving electrons (trains of action potentials in nerves) in wires. The 
subjective nature of perception does not prevent one person from objectively 
studying what another person perceives, the approach of psycho-physics, 
well known in laboratories.
Perceptions typically consist of multiple sensations by our processing 
central nervous system, not of just one. A multimodal percept arises from 
activity in numerous brain regions but we sense the conscious experience 
as one seamless unity. The link between discrete functional systems in the 
brain that gives rise to the experience of consiousness is called the binding 
problem. According to one scientific view conscious experience occurs when 
neural activity in disparate regions of the brain is time locked: the activity in 
these areas is temporarily synchronized. (Small and Heeger, 2013,437)30 We 
should not forget, however, that – even this account – cannot be the whole 
story. All sensory systems leading to perception are intimately cooperating 
with other body systems as already pointed out in the examples of the 
herring gull and suckling.
12.5.5 Consciousness31
In the course of evolution, precursors of consciousness have been found 
in other species as the work of animal behaviourists like Frans de Waal 
showed. We can also notice the gradual genesis of consciousness in our 
growing children. We notice the variations of consciousness in ourselves and 
between different people in variable circumstances. We have a reasonable 
knowledge about consciousness, most of it due to a mixture of case histories 
30 Small SA, Heeger DJ. Functional imaging of cognition. In: Kandel 2013,426-42
31 (a) The state of sentience and awareness between two episodes of sleep, if not ‘unconscious’, 
in coma or dead. (b) An inner, f irst-person, qualitative phenomenal process with variable levels 
of alertness (from drowsiness to full awareness).
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of patients and neurologists’ observations. They concern patients with brain 
lesions due to neurosurgical and other trauma’s, tumours, haemorrhages, 
infarcts, a variety of debillitating diseases et cetera, coupled to post mortem 
studies of the brain. The last century registration and imaging technology 
of the central nervous system became more sophisticated.
Fascinating are the bizarre behaviours of patients usually described with 
much empathy and understanding by their attending physicians. Well-
known examples even to the layman are the accounts of the neurologists-
writers Israel Rosenfield (1992) and Oliver Sacks. Sacks (1984), moreover, 
communicated his experiences as a patient with a paralysis of a leg due 
to a traumatic meeting with a charging bull in Norway. This story was 
extensively commented upon by Rosenfield.
Consciousness gradually emerged during Darwinian evolution. The fully 
developed human central nervous system is the most developed brain at 
this point of evolution.
Consciousness on the personal level32 grows out of the coordination of 
all incoming sensory information, begun in the pre-conscious period of 
our lives. The incoming signals from the sensory systems gradually form 
neuronal networks (‘maps’) that become connected with other networks 
into behavioural systems.[§ 5-2(p.66); Box 5-1(p.67)] Human consciousness is 
then best understood as a brain-process generated through the constant flow 
of new stimuli integrating with memories of older ones, similar to Bergson’s 
(1908) le souvenir du présent and Edelman’s (1989) the remembered present.33
Some take consciousness as an illusion, others as a pseudoproblem or as 
a state of the brain (Papineau 2002). Again, some suspend their opinion as 
advised by the Flemish-Dutch Simon Stevin (1548-1620): ”Wonder en is gheen 
wonder” (miracle is no-miracle) meaning that what we don’t understand 
today will (probably) be explained in the future.34,35 In the meantime, 
biology f irmly points in the direction of an ‘emerging’ phenomenon of the 
central nervous system, emerging not to be understood as an explanation 
32 Def ined by Searle (2001) as the qualitative, subjective states of feeling or sentience or 
awareness, and by Searle (1997,161) brain processes cause consciousness but consciousness is a 
feature of the brain.
33 The comparison is borrowed from Rosenf ield and Ziff (2008) 
34 Devreese and Vanden Berghe 2003
35 In the wording of Dennett (2005,ch.1)“indeed a wonderful thing, but not that wonderful – not 
too wonderful to be explained using the same concepts and perspectives that have worked 
elsewhere in biology”.(italics in the original)
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but as a description of physiological processes.36 We may still be used to ‘folk 
psychology’: subjective experiences in daily language originated in times 
long ago. The (neuro)physiological37,38 data point to a continuous process, 
experience, based on continuous sensory information that is being added to 
former experiences and ‘framed’ in our neuronal networks within the limits 
of our genetic ‘plan’ as a spandrel-like phenomenon. (Gould and Lewontin 
1979)[Addendum 14-1 (p.167)]
The experiential side of consciousness, what it is to have and what it 
means to loose one or more function(s) has exceptionally well been de-
scribed by Rosenfield (1992). He emphasizes the relation of consciousness 
to memory. Memory without consciousness is impossible and vice versa.39 
Indeed consciousness arises from the “dynamic interrelations from the past, 
the present, and the whole body image.” (ibid.84)
[A] sense of consciousness originates in the f low of perceptions, the 
relations among them (both spatial and temporal), the dynamic but 
constant relation to them as governed by one unique personal perspective 
sustained throughout a conscious life. This dynamic sense of conscious-
ness eludes the neuroscienctists’ analyses. (ibid.6)
The essential ingredient of consciousness is self-awareness:
My memory emerges from the relation between my body (more spe-
cif ically my bodily sensations at any given moment), and my brain’s 
“image” of my body (an unconscious activity in which the brain creates a 
constantly changing generalized idea of the body by relating the changes 
in bodily sensations from moment to moment). This relation creates the 
sense of self. (ibid.8)
36 The brain needs to create unique internal (mental) representations that otherwise do not 
exist at the level of individual sensors. Given the complexity of such internal representations, 
computational hypotheses are essential to help understand what information a neural popula-
tion encodes and how the new representation is created.
37 The term neuroscience was coined by Francis Schmitt in the early sixties at MIT (Boden 
2006,1112) 
38 Churchland 1986
39 Without knowledge of one’s own being, one can have no recollections. How can I remember 
my parents, my house, if I am not sure I exist? We must not overlook the essential nature of all 
human (and perhaps some animal) memories: Every recollection refers not only to the remembered 
event or person or object, but to the person who is remembering. (Rosenf ield 1992:41-2. Italics in 
original)
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Rosenfield stresses the importance of “self-reference” which “means that 
a brain must be able to relate to a dynamic bodily structure in terms of 
which stimuli get meaning, just as words and sentences become meaningful 
in terms of the dynamic articulatory structures of the vocal apparatus.“ 
(ibid.139) Memory is a continuing activity of the brain. The sense of self is es-
sential to memory because all private memories are of the owner, of a myself. 
They are part of the structure we accept as the sense of self. Memory and the 
self are intertwined with the sense of self. Our conscious perceptual experi-
ences are of our environment’s impact on our body. Moreover, intentional 
actions are typical of our moving body and its impact on the world. This 
conscious experience of one’s own body as an object in 4-D is constructed in 
the brain and is the key element of all conscious experiences.40 Rosenfield 
also draws attention to the development of our consciousness in youth:
At the moment of birth, a newborn infant is probably not conscious. Its bod-
ily movements, which are genetically determined reflexes, are the frame 
of reference within which the baby organizes the stimuli it encounters 
in its f irst contacts with the world; as the brain organizes these stimuli, 
newer stimuli begin to be “understood” in terms of those already organized. 
The relation between the new and the old brings the first glimmerings of 
consciounsess. Little by little, the infant becomes aware, in however primi-
tive a way, of its surroundings. For sure, this occurs so rapidly that we may 
have the illusion that the newborn infant is already conscious at birth. But 
consciousness continually builds on itself; and linguistically, for example, 
it will be many years before the child will aquire a “full” consciousness that 
permits to understand complex ideas. (ibid.60f)
The highest forms of abstraction require language, but even linguistic 
forms build on themselves.(ibid.104) a child masters size (“big” and “little”) 
before it can master color (“red”, “green”). The linguistic category of “red” is 
considerably more abstract than that of “big” or “little”. Learning complex 
relations requires f irst learning simple ones. This might explain why 
it is most unlikely that we can retain infantile or very early childhood 
memoires. It is only when linguistic structure attains a certain complex-
ity that “memory” becomes truly possible.(ibid.105)
40 Consciousness is a “happening”: “This is the case with all the higher projectional aspects 
of sensation; they form a continuous series of dispositions, determined by previous events of a 
like order. The unit of consciousness, as far as these factors in sensation are concerned, is not a 
moment of time, but a happening.” (Head H. Studies in neurology, vol.II. London,1920,754, cited 
by Rosenf ield 1992,49)
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Summarizing: body/mind dualism is not acceptable anymore and conscious-
ness is little more than a (biological) process, a quality of the brain of Homo 
sapiens, which arose in the course of Darwinian evolution with precursors 
in animals and gradually coming into being in the course of infancy.
12.6 Commuting between consiousness and perception
Most philosophers tend to take perception as a cognitive activity only, in 
the wording of Dretske (1985,181) citing and extending R.N.Haber “a form of 
recognizing, identifying, categorizing, distinguishing, and classifying the 
things around one using one’s mind”. Dretske criticizes this approach and 
continues [his ‘duck’ altered into ‘my’ ‘tomato’]:
Too many people (both philosophers and psychologists) tend to think 
about perception only in the latter form, and in so doing they system-
atically ignore one of the most salient aspects of our mental life: the 
experiences we have when we see, hear, and taste things. The experience 
in question, the sort of thing that occurs in you when you see a [tomato] 
(without necessarily recognizing it as a [tomato]), the internal state 
without which (though you may be looking at the [tomato]) you don’t 
see the [tomato], is a stage in the processing of sensory information in 
which information about the [tomato] is coded in what I call analog form, 
in preparation of its selective utilization by the cognitive centres (where 
the belief that it is a [tomato] may be generated). (italics in original)
Dretske further writes that one cannot possibly give a cognitive form of all 
information embodied in the sensory representation (experience) of – his 
example – “walking into a library f illed with books or a garden ablaze with 
flowers”.41 He further explains that from all sensory information available 
in a sensory representation everything is systematically stripped away 
from components of information (relating to size, colour, orientation, sur-
roundings [et cetera]) which makes the experience of – say our tomato – the 
phenomenally rich thing we know it to be – the one that it is a [tomato]. 
Essential to this stripping process of – his term – ‘digitalization’ (the essence 
of conceptualization) is the loss of this surplus, or redundant information. 
41 Recall the similar experience of Proust. In his memory there were still phenomena coming 
back after smelling the pertite-madeleine crumbs again. Then, for the f irst time, he experienced 
consciously phenomena he had unconsciously perceived/sensed in his past.
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(ibid.182ff) Interestingly, Dretske thereby gradually strips away a lot of 
conscious experiential phenomena in order to arrive at the unconscious part 
of his experience(s). His (second) example ‘seen as a daisy’ is the condensing 
catchphrase or labeling of the experiential information stored in one or 
more of the many networks of the brain that are continuously fed with 
new experiences in its ‘storehouse’ of memory. Effort is necessary to do 
the stripping and each step in that process (Dretske’s digitalizing) may 
lead to some (new) philosophical concept, sometimes the start of a whole 
avalanche of ‘concepts’ so that perception turns into “a form of recognizing, 
identifying, categorizing, distinguishing, and classifying, the things around 
using one’s mind”.
If we compare Dretske’s philosopher’s approach and the scientif ic expla-
nations of the homeostatic control of for instance the body temperature [§ 
5-4 (p.74)] or the human system of maintaining equilibirum [§ 5-3 (p. 70)] 
described earlier, we may see similarities. Remember that the vestibular 
system intimately cooperates with the visual system, propriocepsis (Craig 
2002, 2009) and different areas of the central nervous system (Green and An-
gelaki 2010, Cullen 2011). Dretske’s analytic stripping and the neuroscientific 
explanations are opposite ways of telling the same story. Drestke’s analysis 
on the one hand and the neuroscientif ic approach on the other, present a 
picture similar to that of the schoolboy who tries to f ind the solution of a 
mathematical problem by reasoning from either end.
Homo sapiens’ grasp of his environments is constructed in his body, using 
all his sensory faculties.42 The sensory systems’ output is coordinated by 
the ascending, cooperating and interconnected centres and maps in his 
ever adapting central nervous system. The parts of the variable maps in 
the central nervous system are wired such that after a few contacts with 
a tomato a person will immediately recognise a tomato when he sees it, 
as both our experience and scientif ic explanations show. The scene will 
even be named by the label or catchword ‘tomato’ through neural connec-
tions within the brain’s linguistic centres. One needs much rationalistic, 
phenomenological but unrealistic reasoning to ‘see’ a red bulging thing, or 
to break it down into ‘sense data’ after we learned on our mother’s knee that 
this, my dear, is called (a) tomato. It is more pragmatic and safer for Homo 
42 Sensory receptors connected to the brain select from among a stream of sensory signals 
those events in the environment that are important to the individual. The brain actively 
organizes perception, some of which is stored in memory for future reference (learning and 
experience), and some of which is transformed into immediate behavioural responses. All this 
is accomplished by interconnected nerve cells.
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sapiens who has ‘learned through evolution’ and from birth, by gradually 
developing and improving his behaviour systems [Box 5-1 (p.67)] to im-
mediately grasp the essentials in one’s overcrowded environment43 and 
to act (f ight or f light reaction), rather than complacently analyze what is 
essential and what not through speculative thought experiments and be 
killed by a local predator (in early days), a highwayman (in later days) or a 
misf it (in our days). Perception and consciousness are tools to support life 
among congeners, beset by danger, the priority being to learn from others.
Neuroscience tells us that, contrary to an intuitive analysis of our per-
sonal experience, perceptions are not precise copies of the world around us. 
Sensation is an abstraction, not a replication, of reality in the ‘language’ (= 
processes) of neurons and neural networks. The brain constructs ‘represen-
tations’ of external physical events after f irst analyzing their properties that 
are not intuitively or reasoned concepts but neurophysiological processes. 
This has been forcefully formulated by Purves D et al. (2010) as:
The evidence described in the[ir] article points to the same basic strategy 
for contending with this biological challenge: visual perceptions arise 
by linking retinal stimuli with useful behaviors according to feedback 
from trial and error interactions with a physical world that cannot be 
revealed by sensory information. In consequence, what we see is a world 
determined by the behavioral signif icance of retinal images for the spe-
cies and the percipient in the past rather than by an analysis of stimulus 
features in the present.
[and again]
[A]lthough no one would argue with the idea that vision evolved to 
promote useful behavior, the theory presented here relies entirely on 
the history of behavioral success rather than on image analysis.
12.7 Conclusion
Dretske (American philosopher), Tao (Chinese philosophy), Zazen (Asian 
meditative discipline) and science (Western branch of systematized knowl-
edge) all try to avoid the part of the brain’s activity that ‘retrospectively 
43 Such processes are called feature detection, a concept proposed by Barlow 1953, and which 
became world-known under the title ‘what the frog’s eye tells the frog’s brain’ (Lettvin et al 
1968,233-58), by Hubel and Wiesel as ‘the cat’s retina’ and Tinbergen’s ‘herring gull chick’ [§ 2-2 
(p.28)]
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rationalizes the activity of the body-including- mind’. It is synonymous with 
the ‘chatter-box-activity’ (Lamme 2011) of the left-brain44 that always tries 
to explain and to cast brain-body decisions in language, retrospectively.
Avoiding the chatter-box takes us closer to more automatic cortical-
functions of the brain. They may also be reached through massive training 
programme’s leading to experience which creates so-called ‘completely 
automatic’ reactions like an aikido-expert, the samurai of old, Polanyi’s 
‘tacit’ knowledge and Lamme’s example of the soccer-keeper Jens Lehman 
(ibid. 59ff). It also brings back to mind Hume’s bundle of sensations that 
constitutes ‘self’. [§ 7-6 (p. 93)]
Using an old Zen-metaphor ‘pointing to the moon’, different people and 
traditions point to the same feature. Dretske, Tao, Zen, Hume, Neurosci-
ence, Neurophilosophy’s materialism and Dennett arrive at an identical 
conclusion: consciousness is a construct that doesn’t exist as a thing, it’s 
the life-long process based on continuously processing by a combination of 
sensory systems and integrating neuronal maps. That might also have been 
an old nominalistic conclusion.
Recently I read the common sense formula of Tim Birkhead who charac-
terises himself as ’a behavioural ecologist f irst and an ornithologist second: 
a behavioural ecologist who studies birds’. This may be the most practical 
description of (the relationship of) sensory systems and behaviour.
The sensory system controls behaviour: it encourages us to eat, to f ight, 
to have sex, to care for our offspring, and so on. Without it we couldn’t 
function. Our behaviour is controlled by our senses, and as a result, it is 
behaviour that provides one of the easiest ways of deducing the senses 
that animals use in their daily lives.(Birkhead 2012, xiii-xiv)
The same holds true for perception and its f irm connection with conscious-
ness45 as argued above.
For the time being I will leave it at that. The future will tell if humanity 
f inds a def inite solution or continues this search until Armageddon and 
the f inal stages of our galaxy. [Box 10-1 (p.124)] Zen and the great mystic 
mechanic46 taught us that meanwhile at a certain point47 …….
44 Mind the mereological fallacy that is omnipresent in the writings of Lamme [Box 3-1 (p.47)]
45 I am aware of putative distinctions between self-consciousness and (overall) consciousness.
46 Eagleton 2005
47 ‘Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen‘. [Whereof one cannot 
speak, thereof one must be silent] Wittgenstein 1976,7
13 Twining the pieces together / 
‘Summing-up’
Many descriptions and even prescriptions try to tell us what science is 
or should be. These run from dogmatism to Paul Feyerabend’s ‘anything 
goes’ which, I think, became recently supported in Shapin’s (2010, chapter 
3) review. I tend to ignore the extensive philosophy-of-science discussions 
and to follow Bas van Fraassen’s (1980) constructive empiricism accepting 
his scientific agnostic approach that chooses the empirically most likely (= 
adequate) hypothesis for any given 4-dimensional problem.
With this approach I treated the subject of sensory systems, fully aware 
of the inherent circle so well described by Montaigne and Chisholm [§ 12-2 
(p.143)] implying a certain von Münchhausen’s manoeuvre (bootstrapping) 
to f ind solutions. Thus I recognize the tentativeness of scientific conclusions 
when they depend on the span of (aided) human organism’s sensory systems 
with which human organisms tend to build their Umwelt(s).
Hypotheses – even those that construct theories about their genesis – are 
formulated in terms of structures, functions, mechanisms and processes. 
Homo sapiens generates hypotheses. He is a living organism with a body 
that includes sensory systems and a brain.
Sensory systems are the structures and processes that enable an organ-
ism to establish contact with its environment and with all parts of its own 
body. These systems continuously gather up-to-date information. To obtain 
it the body uses intero- and exteroceptors, modif ied, mainly epithelial and 
mesothelial cells that can react to physical and chemical stimuli. Interocep-
tors constantly monitor the human milieu intérieur; without them the body 
would soon perish. Similarly, exteroceptors constantly appraise the outer 
world.
This information is continuously received in a 4-Dimensionally or spa-
tiotemporal distribution of signals to the brain, an information processing 
complex of cooperating neurons. The brain (cave the mereological fallacy) 
‘combines’ all information, ‘compares’ (= interpretates) it with earlier 
acquired information (= experience, memory, knowledge, skill), ‘decides’ 
(usually automatically, unconsciously, instinctively) and ‘sends’ instruc-
tions/signals to other structures in the body (organs, tissues, cells, f luids, et 
cetera). Thus, in the brain most ‘decisions’ are automatic, inferential choices.
Consciousness emerged as a late-evolutionary spandrel-like brain spin 
off. [§ 14-1 (p.167)] The term has been created to comprise all subjective 
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brain activities and experiences the human body ever had and has at a 
certain time t. Consciousness may occur almost simultaneously with 
obtaining information but after unconsciously inferential choices in the 
brain. It is intimately connected with experience and memory, and with 
the – relatively small – part of incoming information that the organism is 
aware of, i.e., perception.
For all processes mentioned so far the organism needs genetic, inborn, 
behavioural systems and (body-brain complex) experience. The new born 
enters the world with a (evolutionary acquired) set of sensory systems 
linked up with the brain. Gradually he structures his environment. He 
does so through continuously gathering information and steadily obtaining 
more experience, skills, knowledge and consequently consciousness. These 
functions are normal – but awe-inspiring biological phenomena of living 
(neuronal) tissue.
The main characteristic of perception then is the process of information 
assembly in an organized and coherent fashion from the environmental 
bombardment of 4-D stimuli by means of the sensory systems and the brain. 
Other phenomena that may arise in human bodies, probably as direct or 
indirect side-effects of perception, are consciousness, language, introspec-
tion, intuition, the inner eye, mysticism, et cetera.
In philosophy this view belongs to physicalism [Box 14-4 (p.172)], a 
naturalistic world-view that denies the existence of anything besides the 
natural world and its regularities (laws).
14 Addenda
14.1 Spandrel
A spandrel is:
1. the roughly triangular area of masonry that f ills the space between 
one side of an arch, a wall, and the ceiling (rectangular framework) 
surrounding it.
2. the space between the two shoulders of adjoining arches and a horizon-
tal moulding, ceiling or cornice above them. A spandrel (or pendentive) 
is found particularly between the arches supporting a dome in Gothic 
churches.
In 1978 Stephen Jay Gould visited Venice and noted that the beautiful 
spandrels of the San Marco cathedral were not planned by the architect 
but rather originated as “necessary architectural byproducts of mounting 
a dome on rounded arches.” Gould (1979). Together with Richard Lewontin 
he introduced the architectural term spandrel into evolutionary biology.
They thus def ined spandrels in evolutionary biology as any biological 
feature of an organism that arises as a necessary consequence of other 
features, not directly opted for by natural selection.
In Voltaire’s Candide, dr.Pangloss is portrayed as a scholar without com-
mon sense who, despite the evidence, insists that “all is for the best in this 
best of all possible worlds”.
Gould and Lewontin asserted that it is Panglossian for evolutionary 
biologists to view all traits as atomized things that had naturally been 
selected for, and criticised biologists for not granting theoretical space to 
other causes, such as phyletic and developmental constraints. The relative 
frequency of spandrels, so def ined, versus adaptive features in nature, 
remains a controversial topic in evolution theory.
14.2 On Sensory Substitution Devices (SSDs)
14.2.1 Introduction
Canes and crutches, spectacles, artif icial limbs, dentures, and other pros-
thetic devices are age-old expedients. Today, robots and cyborgs (a human/
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machine merger) are commonplace as movies like ‘The Terminator’ and 
‘The Matrix’ show.
Technological developments caught up on these phantasies and even 
produced some of their own. Information is readily available at computer 
sites like Youtube, Google and Wikipedia under headings like robotics, 
cyborgs, implants, artif icial intelligence, digital identity, growing brain 
tissue, deep brain stimulation, human enhancement/upgrade and a few 
others (Warwick 2010), often indicated – characteristically – by acronyms.
I will not dwell upon the impressive scientif ic and technological suc-
cesses but brief ly mention aids and appliances that over time became 
gradually more complicated: from the cupped hand, via the ear-trumpet, the 
hearing aid, the bone anchored hearing aid (Baha) to the Cochlear Implant 
(CI). Neither will I discuss the ethical problems that may accompany these 
developments. This discussion will thus be limited to aspects pertinent to 
this essay.
14.2.2 Some examples and some discoveries
The difference between amplif ication of a signal by a cupped hand and 
transforming an audible sound into an electric pulse which directly stimu-
lates the hearing nerve like a cochlear implant does, is impressive. Such 
a device circumvents the influences of the auricle, the ear canal and the 
middle ear system.
Greater transformations were achieved since the early 1960s when a 
visual image was converted into a tactile one (visual-tactile sensory 
substitution)1,2 used as an aid for blind people to ‘see’. Interestingly already 
after only f ive to f ifteen hours of training the patients ‘forgot’ the camera 
on the head and the vibro-tactile stimulation of their (abdominal) skin, the 
two exterior devices of the assembly; they distinguish 3-D images instead, 
static as well as moving.
In the eighties a comparable visual-tactile sensory substitute was 
constructed that used the surface of the tongue. This device is about f ive 
times more precise, the tongue being the most densily innervated organ 
of the body. Moreover, it uses only three percent of the voltage needed for 
1 A sensory substitution system allows information coming from an artif icial receptor to be 
processed by a different sensory organ from the one normally used to transduce this information 
(Bach-y-Rita et al 1969)
2 A sensory substitution device (SSD) replaces one or several functions of a def icient sensory 
modality by means of another sensory modality. (adapted after Auvray et al 2009)
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the abdominal skin device and the electrical resistance remains almost 
constant due to the saliva.
Other examples of converters used for blind people are visual/auditive 
and echolocation in which the reflection of emitted ultrasound are trans-
formed into audible frequencies presented to two ear phones.
An important moment during the revalidation process is the f irst time 
that the exteriorisation is perceived, i.e., the moment the subject distinguish-
es between the signals from the device and other (normal) environmental 
sounds, although much diff icult training will still be necessary. In the end, 
however, the perception of objects becomes ‘automatic’ and needs no more 
conscious analysis. The ‘signals’ of the new device are no longer perceived 
as sounds and the provided information is felt as a direct part of the self. 
One user of the device compared this feeling with climbing the stairs; “I 
needn’t slow down when reaching them and I don’t bother about how to 
adjust my legs.” (Auvray 2003) All users report that the device does not feel 
as an eye substitute or amplif ier but gives the sensation of a new sensory 
tool to get in touch with the world.
Auvray et al. (2009) performed an in-depth analysis of the literature on 
sensory substitution devices (SSDs) trying to learn which sensory modality 
the device particularly favours, the substituting or the substituted percep-
tion. Their search addressed eight aspects of sensing, i.e., the sensory organ, 
the stimuli, the properties, the qualitative experience, the behavioural 
equivalence after specif ic stimuli, the dedictation and the sensorimotor 
equivalence. Auvray et al. f irmly reject the assumption that perception 
after sensory substitution can be conceived of as equivalent to percep-
tion in any already existing modality. They argue that the effects of an 
SSD are comparable to cognitive enhancement through external devices, 
an addition, augmentation, or extension of the perceptual abilities. They 
conclude that SSDs are not ‘substitutions’ but tools, sensory extensions, 
supplements or transformers. They propose to place SSDs into the category 
of mind enhancing tools (METs coined by Clark 2003) such as sketchpads 
or computers which are means of expanding cognition in ways that would 
have been impossible without them.
Another important topic discussed in the paper of Auvray c.s. (2009) is 
the lack of emotional responses while perceiving objects which one would 
expect in the case of unaided perception. When a person blind from birth 
was shown an image of his wife, and two blind students were shown pictures 
of naked women they could describe them in detail but their descriptions 
were without emotional content. Absence of affective and emotional 
content associated with seeing colours and faces is also shown by patients 
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born blind from congenital cataract whose vision is surgically restored 
(Gregory, 1966, 2003).
Two hypotheses, not mutually exclusive, can explain these lack of emo-
tions experienced by people using a perceptual prosthesis: (1) the feeling of 
emotions needs a perceptual learning process or, (2) emotions can only arise 
by inter-subjective building of values in a community of persons with similar 
means of perception. The f irst hypothesis implies that emotions might be 
better developed if the SSD were applied earlier, e.g., in children or for longer 
periods of time. (Auvray et al 2009) Attempts to equip babies with a ‘tactile 
visual substitution system’ (TVSS) suggested that this might be the case 
(e.g., the babies smile when perceiving their mother; Bach-y-Rita et al., 2003).
14.3 Narcissus3
« (Daffodil, Jonquil, and Narcissus)
Family: Amaryllidaceae
Hardy and tender perennial bulbs
Position: sun or partial shade
Propagation: seed or division of dormant bulbs
Cultivation: very easy
Fragrant
Useful for cutting
Poisonous
O Proserpina!
For the flowers now that frighted thou let’st fall
From Dis’s waggon! daffodils
That come before the swallow dares, and take
The winds of March with beauty…
(Shakespeare, The Winter’s tale, Act IV, Scene 3)
The reader who expects to read here something of the fables concerning 
the mythical Narcissus will be desillusioned. The flower of this name has 
nothing to do with that neurotic, self-loving youth. According to Pliny the 
Elder, Plutarch, and many other Classical writers, the name of the genus 
3 Pizetti I and Cocker H 1975,880-1
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Narcissus derives from the Greek narkan, which means to stupefy (the 
word narcotic is derived from the same root), because it was thought that 
both the scent of narcissus flowers and the substances contained in them 
possessed narcotic properties. In Antiquity the flower was often associated 
with Avernus, a sort of limbo or forecourt to the Underworld, where the dead 
f irst arrived – and from where a return to earth was still possible – before 
the f inal crossing of Lethe on the journey down to Hades or Elysium. Thus, 
to the pre-Classical Greeks, Avernus signif ied a stage that was not as f inal 
as death, a strange borderland that lay on the fringes of consciousness 
and unconsciousness (a state being for which narcotics often provide the 
key). This association with the limbo-Avernus was not due solely to the 
narcotic properties of the narcissus but also to the rather deadly, almost 
lunar pallor of the flowers. There are further Classical connexions with the 
Underworld. When Persophone was abducted by Hades she was gathering 
poppies, violets, and narcissi; and it was at the moment that she plucked 
the narcissus that Hades burst forth and carried her to his domain. The 
Greeks also dedictated the flower to Hecate, Queen of the Underworld, and 
to Demeter, Persephone’s mother and goddess of fertility.
The mythological aspects of the narcissus were not always associated 
with the valley of the shadow, however. Garlands of the flower were often 
used to adorn status of Dionysus, and, according to some mythographers, 
narcissi were favoured by Aphrodite, who, to make herself even more beauti-
ful in the eyes of Paris, appeared before him surrounded by a veritable 
sea of narcissi. Poetic allusions to narcissi – associating the f lower with 
Persephone or, in the case of Theocritus, with Europa, as well as with that 
pallid youth, Narcissus – are so numerous that it would be a great effort to 
cite them all, and a still greater effort to read them. It is suff icient to recall 
such names as Virgil, Ovid, Sophocles, and Shakespeare.”
“Wilson and Bell take up more than ten pages of their book, The Fragrant Year, 
to give extremely useful information concerning narcissus perfume. They 
note that all narcissus blooms are to a greater or lesser degree fragrant. Those 
not scented constitute rare exceptions. Concerning the perfume of Narcissus 
Pseudo-narcissus, Fletcher writes that the trumpet types of narcissus have a 
fragrance diff icult to describe. It is not sweet like that of lillies, nor aromatic 
like many herbs, and it is doubtful if anybody would appreciate it bottled, 
since it is not that kind of fragrance, but it is strong, agreeable, almost earthy, 
and garden-like. The same author notes that the older varieties are the most 
strongly scented, and the types with the smallest cup or trumpet have the 
most pronounced perfume (such as the Jonquilla and Tazetta types),”(ibid, 883)
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14.4 Eliminative materialism
[T]he greatest single philosophical obstacle to getting a satisfactory 
account of consciousness is our continuous acceptance of a set of 
obsolete categories, and an accompanying set of presuppositions 
that we have inherited from our religious and philosophical tradition. 
We still start off with the mistaken assumption that the notions of 
“mental” and “physical”, of “dualism” and “monism”, of “materialism” 
and “idealism” are clear and respectable notions as they stand, and 
that the issues have to be posed and resolved in these traditional 
terms.”(Searle 1997,xif)
Dualism as traditionally conceived seems a hopeless theory because, 
having made a strict distinction between the mental and the physical, 
it cannot then make the relation of the two intelligible. It seems that to 
accept dualism is to give up the entire scientif ic worldview that we have 
spent nearly four centuries to attain.(ibid.xiif)
The term ‘elimination’ in eliminative materialism or eliminativism suggests 
that mental states do not truly exist. The concept f irst appeard in the works 
of CD.Broad, J.Cornman (who introduced the term), P.Feyerabend, WVO.
Quine, R.Rorty and W.Sellars.4 It claims two things: (1) that common sense 
mental views are not real and mental terms empty (true eliminative mate-
rialist), and: (2) that mental views can somehow be reduced to neurological 
(or perhaps computational) states of brain activity (materialist/reductionist). 
The f irst claim can be called ontologically radical, the second one ontologi-
cally conservative. An illustration of the ontologically radical claim could 
be that while lightning is no longer caused by the stroke of Thor’s hammer 
(Mjölnir), the old notion became empty. An illustration of the ontologically 
conservative is that lightning is now identif ied as electro-magnetic radia-
tion, the notion of lightning still holds.
In such discussions, the term ‘theory-theory’ often emerges, which refers 
to the putative theoretical framework used to explain and predict (intel-
ligent) behaviour. An example of this is ‘folk psychology’: the generalizations 
or laws and specif ic (daily) theoretical postulates such as beliefs. Elimina-
tive materialists argue that postulates of folk psychology are little more 
to the mind than brain activity. Moreover, mental states are irreducible 
not because they are non-physical but because they do not exist. Staunch 
4 Ramsey 2007
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defenders of this view are Patricia S. Churchland5, her husband Paul M. 
Churchland and Dennett (2005 ch 1). The last author writes:
[T]he same mismatch between means and ends haunts us today: Noam 
Chomsky, Thomas Nagel and Colin McGinn (among others) have all 
surmised, or speculated, or claimed, that consciousness is beyond 
all human understanding, a mystery not a puzzle, to use Chomsky’s 
proposed distinction. [reasoning] After all, we have now achieved excel-
lent mechanistic explanations of metabolism, growth, self-repair, and 
reproduction, which not so long ago looked too marvellous for words. 
Consciousness, in this optimistic view, is indeed a wonderful thing, but 
not that wonderful – not too wonderful to be explained using the same 
concepts and perspectives that worked elsewhere in biology.
5 Patricia Churchland once said “electrical current in a wire is not caused by moving electrons; 
it is moving electrons. Genes are not caused by chunks of base pairs in DNA, they are chunks 
of base pairs.” 
Box 14-1 Materialism, naturalism, physicalism*
Materialism can roughly be separated into:
– an ontological component based on the conviction that nothing exists but 
matter, i.e. space occupying entities and
– a psychological component which considers each and every aspect of con-
sciousness as epiphenomenal. (omitted from this consideration are the long 
history and consequently variable meanings of the term and various notions 
such as dialectical-, economical-, ethical- and historical materialism)
Naturalism can be separated into:
– an ontological component concerned with the contents of reality (no ‘super-
natural’ entities exist) and
– a methodological component; to investigate reality in which philosophy and 
science have similar goals and similar methods [note 9 (p. 146)]
Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical. Physicalism is committed 
to the sciences defined as iff it is the sort of property that physical theory tells us 
about.
* Ramsey 2011, Papineau 2009, Stoljar 2009
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Folk psychological concepts, the subject-matter of people’s everyday 
understanding of one another in psychological or mental terms could be 
explained scientif ically or ‘translated’ into scientif ic concepts.
Many philosophers believe that the mystery of ‘how action potentials 
give rise to meaning’ has still not been solved.
Neuroscience tries to formulate operational def initions of different 
aspects of mind, put them to the test by teams of collaborators of disciplines 
such as philosophy, anthropology, neuroscience, computer modelling, 
artif icial intelligence (AI) et cetera.
I strongly believe that eliminative physicalism, the naturalistic philosophy 
based in the sciences (Naturwissenschaft) including eliminative materialism is 
the optimal course to (come to) understand the mind and the sensory systems.
14.5 Process
Le monde meurt tous les jours, le monde naît tous les jours. Il n’y a pas là de 
début ni de f in extrêmes entre lesquels comprendre le déroulement, celui-ci est 
une variation de tout moment. Toute f in, en elle-même, est un début, elle débute 
en même temps qu’elle achève – la transition est continue.
F Jullien (2001,75) 6
In paragraph 4-3 dealing with evolutionary theory I stated that:
(1) the universe began with the Big Bang about 13,7 x 109 years ago and the 
earth is about 4,56 x 109 old,
(2) life on earth started about 3,8 x 109 years after the planet was formed 
and developed from a simple form to many and more complex ones, 
increasing the total biomass of animals, plants and microorganisms, 
and, thereby gradually building a ‘tree of life’ in which Homo sapiens 
has his place,
(3) natural selection is not goal-directed but a stochastic process.
The introductory statement of paragraph10.1 proclaimed that we may be 
aware that everything in the universe from the smallest particles to the largest 
6 Jullien François. Du « temps ». Éléments d’une philosophie du vivre. Grasset, 2001,75 [The 
world is continuously dying, the world is continuously being born. There is no ultimate beginning 
and ending between which to grasp its course, there is ongoing changing. Each end in itself is 
a new beginning, it commences as it completes – in a continuous transition] 
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stellar structures is subject to processes – granted – with different time scales. 
[Box 14-2] Our spatiotemporal (4-D) world, the roughly twenty kilometre 
thick layer of the earth in which all organisms dwell is tautologically called 
biosphere. Every organism is influenced by 4-D conditions from its conception. 
It will then develop, i.e., grow in size and in number of capabilities and func-
tions. We understand this development as entering into a sequence of parallel, 
successive, multiple and often complicated processes according to its genetic 
plan, ultimately leading to death and decay. Life is characterized by on-going 
processes that may be described in terminology, formulae and regularities 
(laws) from physiology, (bio)physics, (bio)chemistry, psychology et cetera.
The conclusion of paragraph 12.4 is that consciousness is not a thing; it is a 
continuing (biological) process, a quality of the brain of Homo sapiens. Con-
sciousness appeared in the course of Darwinian evolution with precursors 
in animals. In the course of infancy it gradually emerges from experiences 
which are themselves formed by what our sensory systems perceive.
From the aforementioned paragraphs I conclude that everything in the 
universe is best understood in terms of processes rather than things, of 
modes of change rather than f ixed entities. Change is the pervasive and 
predominant feature of the real, of all that exists, that what characterizes 
it. Reality does not consist of a constellation of things but of processes as 
Heraclitus Ephesus7 already saw. To understand reality the concept of 
7 Herakleitos (ca.500 BC): Everything f lows and nothing abides. Everything gives way and 
nothing stays f ixed. You cannot step twice into the same river, for other waters and yet others, 
go f lowing on.
Box 14-2 The environment of the Earth*
When life appeared on Earth the ‘faint young Sun’ only radiated about seventy 
percent of the energy it now generates. The core of the sun is gradually being 
enriched in helium. It is contracting and the temperature of the core is increas-
ing where most of the thermonuclear reactions occur. The rate of thermonu-
clear reactions is sensitive to temperature and this will cause the insolation to 
increase about one percent per hundred million years. The sun, progressing 
inevitably along its evolutionary path, before five billion more years will expand 
beyond the present orbit of the Earth and become a red giant. The oceans will 
boil away and the Earth will be cooked into lifelessness like Venus today. Life on 
earth already existed for three quarters of its allotted time.
* Repetition of Box 10-1
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processes is fundamental. They create, are productive, can destabilize and 
can be destructive. Nothing exists for ever.
14.6 Apology
Un sage [..] est sans idée. [..] « Sans idée » signif ie que le sage n’est en pos-
session d’aucune, prisonnier d’aucune. Soyons plus rigoureux, littéral: 
il n’en met en avant aucune.
F Jullien (1998,13)8
We have a habit in writing articles published in scientif ic journals to 
make the work as f inished as possible, to cover up all the tracks, to not 
worry about the blind alleys or describe how you had the wrong idea 
f irst, and so on. So there isn’t any place to publish, in a dignif ied manner, 
 what you  actually did in  order  to get to do the work.
R Feynman (Nobel lecture,1966)
1. My quest as stated in the f irst paragraph of the preface, began with an 
effort to obtain as much knowledge on the subject of sensory systems 
as I reasonably could.9 Two of my early academic readers subsequently 
advised me to formulate one or more specif ic – ‘scientif ic’ – questions.
2. The word ‘scientist’ was introduced in 1833 by William Whewell, a 
nineteenth-century Cambridge philosopher and mineralogist. At that 
time Whewell was waging a deliberate campaign to establish science 
as a professional discipline distinct from philosophy. As we now know, 
Whewell was successful and in the eyes of some even too successful.
3. Do philosophers and scientists differ in their way of posing questions? 
Do they differ in the sort of problems they want to deal with?
4. “Like every biologist,” writes the animal behaviourist Frans de Waal 
(2001,55), “I learned that one needs to build an extensive background 
knowledge before one can even begin to address detailed questions.” 
8 Jullien François. Un sage est sans idée ou l’autre de la philosophie. Éditioins du Seuil, 1998
[A wise man [..] has no opinion [..] “No opinion” stands for the wise man having no opinion 
whatsoever, he is enslaved by none. Let’s be more precise, literally: he sets none before]
9 “For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at f irst began to philoso-
phize”. This wonder is meant “to escape ignorance”. Aristotle’s Metaphysics 982b12ff (cited by 
Arendt,1958,302)
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He continues to say quoting Lorenz (1981) that one needs to grasp the 
whole before one tries to grasp its parts:
One cannot master set research tasks if one makes a single part the 
focus of interest. One must, rather, continuously dart from one part 
to another – in a way that appears extremely flighty and unscientif ic 
to some thinkers who place value on strictly logical sequences – and 
one’s knowledge of each of the parts must advance at the same pace. 
(italics added)
 I endorse de Waal’s and Lorenz’s points.
5. Personal experience taught me that explaining problems to others, 
presenting a paper or writing a text-book (on oto-rhino-laryngology)10 
led to growth of my own knowledge and understanding. Knowledge is 
comparable to a texture. As Lorenz stated, to progress with knowledge 
one should continue darting from one part to another. Haack compares 
such behaviour with the metaphor of doing a crossword puzzle.
6. Medawar (1963) in a paper with the signif icant title ‘Is the scientif ic 
paper a fraud?’ stated his belief that the scientif ic paper misrepresents 
the proces of thought that accompanied or gave rise to the work de-
scribed in the paper. He also formulates his response to the title of his 
own paper: “my answer to it is ‘yes’.” The scientif ic paper in its orthodox 
form embodies a mistaken conception, even a travesty, of the nature 
of scientif ic thought. Scientif ic discovery or the formulation of the 
scientif ic idea on the one hand, and the demonstration of proof on the 
other, are two entirely different notions. (ibid.)
7. In the same vein, Wolpert (1992,186) laments that “if perceptivity and 
curiosity are indeed critical for scientific progress, why do not behavioral 
scientists teach their students to keep an open eye? Instead, we urge 
them to develop hypotheses, faithfully list them in the introductions 
to their papers, then devote the rest of their work to a demonstration of 
the correctness or incorrectness of their predictions. Not surprisingly, 
students develop a knack of writing introductions that make them look 
prescient: it is often hard to tell whether their predictions f it the facts 
or the other way around. There is little against such neat presentations 
as long as we realize that they are only that – a way of organizing and 
presenting our work. The structure of papers is not to be confused with 
the actual process of science, with its detours, surprises and frustrations.”
10 van den Broek and Feenstra 2007
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8. Scientif ic work of an experimental or exploratory nature begins with 
expectation(s) about the outcome of the inquiry, expectation that 
form the initiative and incentive for the inquiry. The observations and 
considerations 2-6 (vide supra) are the reason to decide against too 
specif ic (and reductionistic) questions.
The process of writing this essay, much like my earlier experience (see 
number 5 above) taught me much. [Box 0-1 (p.16)] The two ‘academic’ ques-
tions [§ 1-3 (p.26)] were formulated in retrospect at a time that most of my 
understanding and most of the writing were already done, in order to please 
my two early readers. I still feel that it is better to expose than to hide the 
genesis of this essay. So after all, these two ‘academic’ questions are only 
that: academic. As for the last question of the two formulated in chapter 
one, i.e., ‘what is the basis of the unity of (conscious) perception’ a tentative 
answer might be ‘an evolutionary spandrel, a function of the brain of Homo 
sapiens, still hazy in part’.
15 Summary
Chapter 1 def ines sensory systems as those specialized parts of (plants and 
animals) that are most sensitive to variations in its environment, which are 
generally def ined in chemical or physical terms. When such a variation 
hits a sensory system leading to events in the body, the variation is called 
‘stimulus’. Perception is def ined as stimuli leading to awareness.
Chapter 2 presents a life scientif ic survey of sensory systems. Two etho-
logical examples are given: Tinbergen’s herring gull chick begging for food 
and the human baby’s f irst suckling. These newborns thus start life with 
detection mechanisms for specif ic environmental variations (‘innate re-
leasing mechanisms’) and the potential to rearrange this information into 
new meaningful schemes: new behaviour or ‘learning’. Both mechanisms 
developed during evolution, differ between species and are only sensitive 
for parts of the chemico-electro-magnetic environment of the newborns.
Environmental events outside the sensory systems’ sensitivity range can-
not be experienced although instruments may amplify or convert signals 
into perceivable ones. Classif ication of sensory systems may be based on 
the kind of stimulus, the distance between stimulus origin and receiving 
sensory systems, and on the location of the source, i.e., inside (interoception) 
or outside the body (exteroception).
Sensory systems are not mere ‘windows’ but function within the context 
of bodily actions. When the suckling infant’s nose smells the breast its whole 
body acts to feed. Thus sensory systems and motor organs cooperate as one 
coordinated system. The infant as a system unconsciously collects much 
basic experiential ‘knowledge’ although it does not yet have conscious-
ness and language. It so acquires ‘pieces of knowledge’ among which the 
Pavlovian expectancy of ‘same stimulus/same consequence’ (causality, 
induction).
Chapter 3 continues with the survey of chapter two. Some environmental 
electro-magnetic changes are not sensed but still influence the body as 
demonstrated by sequellae of radioactive and ultra-violet-radiation. No 
organism is able to experience all aspects of potential electromagnetic and 
chemically conveyed signals. Therefore, total ‘reality’ can not be known. 
Organisms notice only those aspects of reality perceivable by their sensory 
systems.
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Philosophy of perception has so far mainly been conf ined to vision; 
little attention has been paid to cooperation of sensory systems. Sentient 
organisms, however, always use all sensory systems simultaneously and 
continuously, resulting in a continuous 4-D(imensional) awareness of the 
environment and of their own body. The intensity of each sensory system’s 
reaction depends on it’s owner’s kind of activity and attention. Such bodily 
awareness regards the whole person and not merely his brain; to claim the 
opposite is called a mereological fallacy.
A whole-system approach to the study of the developing child stresses 
the inextricable causal web of perception, action and cognition. Some even 
study man connected with machines (cyborgs) and/or other people as one 
large system.
Processes occurring in the body after receiving a stimulus necessarily 
modify stimuli. The relation ‘representation’ and the ‘world out there’ has 
been of particular interest to philosophers. Sceptics stress deception caused 
by sensory systems’, other philosophers seek certainty and ‘Truth’. Scientists 
accept that their inductive way results in knowledge that is inherently 
provisional.
Chapter 4 places the birth of evolutionary theory at 1 July 1858 when both 
Wallace’s and Darwin’s manuscripts were presented in London. Creation-
ism and intelligent design criticised On the Origin of Species but science 
accepts the theory of neo-Darwinism (or evolutionary theory) almost un-
conditionally. This theory consists of yet unexplained ‘spontaneous’ simple 
beginning(s) gradually developing into many and increasingly complex 
forms building a ‘tree of life’. Natural selection operates on the abundant 
production of genetic variation in every generation, and on random genetic 
mutation. Evolution is not goal-directed but a stochastic process leading 
to the survival of relatively few individuals. Survival rests on well adapted 
specimens of a species producing the next generation. Homo sapiens is 
part of the tree of life like any other creature. Neo-Darwinism consists of a 
bundle of scientif ic theories that evolved in the course of time. Evolutionary 
theory is generally accepted as a fact.
Evolutionary epistemology is based on neo-Darwinism and def ined as 
a ‘naturalistic approach to epistemology’. It emphasizes selection as the 
generator and maintainer of the human sensory systems and cognition.
Not all philosophers accept science into their traditional domains but 
some do. Views run from “I am one of those who thinks science has no light 
to shed on either the epistemological or the metaphysical problems of per-
ception” to “I see philosophy not as an a priori propaedeutic or groundwork 
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for science, but as continuous with science. I see philosophy and science 
in the same boat.”
Chapter 5 introduces ‘ethology’ (’behavioural biology’). Biologists concluded 
that ‘innate’ and ‘rational mechanisms’ are present at birth and may be set 
into action by a particular stimulus which leads to a change of behaviour 
(‘learning’). Any animal is born with genetically based predispositions. 
Experience(s) in many combinations and predispositions becoming mani-
fest only later in life, may change behaviour. Predispositions and – contin-
gent – experiences, often in various combinations, may lead to ‘learning’ and 
‘knowledge’. Therefore, the old philosophical struggle between rationalists 
and empiricists arguing for their private road to knowledge is passé.
Biology introduced the concept of behaviour system which consists of 
a central mechanism, perceptual mechanisms, and motor mechanisms 
corresponding to structures in the brain. Many of these mechanisms and 
their connections only develop after a particular stimulus. The followers of 
Aristotle parroting the ‘holy number’ of the five senses (sight, hearing, smell, 
taste and touch) probably do not realize that equilibrium, skin sensory 
systems, nociceptors and propriocepsis are also sensory systems.
The sensory systems send coded neuronal signals to the brain that 
coordinates the incoming information, most of the time unconsciously.
In addition to the sensory systems the human body has other systems 
that gather information and deliver signals. Endocrine glands and the im-
mune system come to mind, systems the effects of which are usually not 
directly perceived although their consequences may be felt. All information 
influences ‘behaviour’ of cells, tissues, organs and the whole body (includ-
ing ‘Mind’). Most important effect of this behaviour is homeostasis, the 
maintanance of the ‘milieu intérieur’.
Chapter 6 presents a bird’s-eye view on ‘sense-datum’ and its synonyms. 
Sense data were introduced in the beginning of the 20th century, motivated 
by discussions about illusion. Sense data are def ined as ‘those things that 
are immediately known in sensations like colours, sounds etc.’ We must be 
conscious to notice them, but a biological substrate of them is not known. I 
argue that sense-data are f ictitious entities that are too far removed from 
common sense concluding, paraphrasing Laplace, “I do not need that 
hypothesis“ (“Je n’ai pas besoin de cette hypothèse”).
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Chapter 7 introduces three problems, (1) that of perception’ or illusion’, (2) 
that of content of perception or experiencing the world, and (3) that of the 
relation of environment and knowledge thereof.
I argue that ‘illusion’ and ‘real perception’ may occasionally appear to 
be similar but that they are not identical. Macbeth’s dagger, often quoted 
in this context as an illusion, a hallucination, or even a delusion is – in 
fact – an excellently portrayed pseudo-hallucination.
Representations of the environment in the central nervous system (CNS) 
on the one hand and the ‘f it’ of the CNS and the world on the other attracted 
much philosophic attention.
Justif ication strikes me as less important than the pragmatic chosen 
answer to the best solution for a given problem in a specif ic spatiotemporal 
(4-Dimensional) situation.
Chapter 8 offers an introduction to other ways of acquiring knowledge than 
directly through the use of sensory systems, i.e., by ‘introspection’, ‘intui-
tion’, ‘meditation’, ‘contemplation’ and the ‘mind’s eye’. Until the end of the 
19th century the chief method for understanding the mind was introspection 
but after the birth of psychology it is no longer accepted as reliable. Intui-
tion mainly acts unconsciously, is a creative, immediate apprehension of 
justif iable belief but must further be studied. The mind’s eye works through 
a non-linguistical grasp of Gestalts, indispensable for artists, technicians, 
crafts and trades. Wittgenstein, by training an engineer, used the term 
‘das zeigt sich’ (shows, displays, cannot be said et cetera) in the same vein. 
Through contemplation and meditation people may acquire knowledge 
seemingly of another variety than that acquired via sensory systems.
Chapter 9 begins with a review about what, according to Wittgenstein, is 
‘the inexpressible’, the realms of transcendental sensory experience.
The literary genres of mystical writings are variable and sometimes 
weird for the newcomer. The best way to acquire mystical knowledge is 
under guidance of a mystagogue or ‘guru’, a teacher with personal mystical 
experiences.
Examples are presented of such experiences; from those of atheists to 
those of a variety of religious creeds. I also describe the effects of mystical 
experience on the beliefs and behaviour of mystics. Mysticism, however, 
does not help in understanding sensory systems.
Chapter 10 takes off with the statement that everything in the universe 
is subject to processes with different time scales. In the biosphere every 
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creature is subject to the 4-D world from its conception to its decay. Life thus 
is an on-going process that may be described in formulae and regularities 
of physico-chemical laws. Any sensory system consists of a conglomerate 
of complicated, integrating sub-processes, that continuously select parts 
of the massive bombardment of incoming signals from the environment 
and the own body.
Sensory systems thus produce experiences (practice, skill, knowledge) 
many of which remain unconscious. New information and experience is 
‘automatically’, unconsciously compared with earlier ones and re-arranged 
if necessary resulting in (life-long) ‘learning’.
Experience at time t is f inally def ined as the sum of everything that 
entered the body through the sensory systems, unconciously or consciously 
up to t.
Chapter 11 discusses information as the attachment of meaning by the 
receiving organism to incoming stimuli from his environment. Information 
is a key element of the relative new biological speciality of biosemiotics. An 
introduction of biosemiotics is presented and its relation with perception 
is discussed. Resemblance and distinction between von Uexküll’s Umwelt 
and ecological niche is explained in that they correspond to RA and RU in 
chapter three. Umwelt stands for the environment as perceived by any 
organism ‘locked up’ inside its own subjective world. Ecological niche is the 
set of conditions of the environment as conceived by an observer.
Chapter 12 uses the Dutch constructs in swamps and marshes to def ine 
foundationalism, coherentism and Neurath’s ship, omitting scepticism 
since that is but indirectly constructive, if at all. A second metaphor used 
is the quintessence of Chisholm’s paper ‘the problem of the criterion’ called 
his philosophical compass. Both metaphors are used as Leitmotiv.
Introduced is the unavoidable circle of knowledge needed to understand 
sensory systems, and sensory information to acquire knowledge. Boot-
strapping like Baron von Münchhausen did before, I discuss knowledge 
and sensory systems simultaneously. Van Fraassen’s ‘scientific agnosti-
cism’ is taken as the pragmatic and tentative answer to any scientif ic 
4-D problem.
The many criteria for classif ication of sensory systems used in the 
literature are given: the empirical one of scientists is judged as the best.
A stimulus received by a receptor is conducted to the cerebral cortex, the 
f inal information processing organ. Cognition is def ined as all processes 
in the brain by which sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, 
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stored, recovered and used. Mind and consciousness are processes of the 
brain comparable to Patricia Churchland‘s quote ‘an electrical current in a 
wire is not caused by moving electrons, it is moving electrons.’ Perceptions 
in this vein would thus be more an abstraction than a replication of ‘reality’ 
and typically made up of multiple sensations; its consequences are called 
‘behaviour’ and ‘learning’.
Diff iculties arise as soon as behaviour (= body-including-brain decisions) 
is ‘retrospectively’ explained in ‘logical’ language. Many problems in the 
f ield of perception and consciousness were and are due to speculations 
caused by inadequate scientif ic knowledge.
Homo sapiens has no more than the support of his body and its processes. 
He is thus able to construct his own reality only, which is but part of the 
universal reality.
Chapter 13 presents a short conclusion of this essay already covered by this 
summary.
Chapter 14 presents the addenda:
– spandrel describes how this architectural term was introduced into 
evolutionary biology, and its signif icance;
– sensory substitution devices, describes technical inventions to lighten 
the burden of loss of sensory systems;
– narcissus, a guide’s description of the flower carrying that name;
– eliminative materialism, presents a short description of this specif ic 
epistemological view;
– process, a description of what I mean by this much used term in this 
essay, arguing that anything in the universe is unevitably subjected to 
‘birth’, ‘death’ and ‘decay’, be it on different time scales;
– apology, a defense against an insolence of a befriended early adviser 
to formulate one or two ‘academic problems’ instead of quenching my 
thirst for understanding and knowledge in the selected domain(s)….
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 Samenvatting
Het woord vooraf vermeldt de aanleiding voor dit boek: een curriculum-
wijziging binnen de medische faculteit van de Erasmus Universiteit. Deze 
vernieuwing bracht onder meer een blok ‘Hersenen en Zintuigen’. Een 
inleiding tot het zintuigdeel werd noodzakelijk geacht. Bij het schrijven 
daarvan bleek me dat mijn biologische en filosofische kennis van zintuigen 
ontoereikend was. Dit boek is de neerslag van een wat uit de hand gelopen 
poging in die leemte te voorzien. De vorm van het boek gelijkt op die van 
de Nederlandse delta: meanderende rivieren, beken en sloten, steeds weer 
splitsend en samenvloeiend.
Hoofdstuk 1 omschrijft zintuigen als de gespecialiseerde orgaansystemen van 
levende organismen (wezens, plant en dier) die gevoeliger zijn dan andere 
delen van het organisme voor specifieke veranderingen in de omgeving. Deze 
veranderingen die kunnen worden beschreven in chemische en fysische 
termen kunnen leiden tot een cascade van processen in het lichaam. Gebeurt 
dat, dan wordt de verandering ‘stimulus’ of ‘prikkel’ genoemd. Wanneer een 
dergelijlke stimulus tot bewustzijn komt spreken we van ‘perceptie’.
Hoofdstuk 2 biedt een biomedisch en ethologisch overzicht van zintuig-sys-
temen. Twee voorbeelden van specif iek gedrag na een zintuiglijke stimulus 
worden uitvoerig besproken: Tinbergen’s voedsel-bedelend meeuwenkuiken 
en het zuiggedrag van een pasgeboren mensenbaby. Daaruit wordt afgeleid 
dat deze pasgeborenen (1) verschijnselen in de omgeving kunnen waarne-
men, (2) daarop reageren en (3) daarvan leren, wat zich uit in verander(en)d 
gedrag. Deze drie ‘mechanismen’ zijn in de loop van de evolutie gevormd.
De gevoeligheid voor stimuli leidt ertoe dat individuen aan de hun om-
ringende omgeving ‘informatie’ onttrekken. Informatie wordt omschreven 
als een voor het organisme relevant verschijnsel. Als de stimuli niet kunnen 
worden waargenomen doordat ze buiten het bereik van de zintuigsystemen 
vallen ‘bestaan’ ze niet voor de eigenaar daarvan.
Mensen kunnen door middel van instrumenten sommige niet waar-
neembare verschijnselen zichtbaar maken zoals (1) door te vergroten met 
een microscoop of (2) door om te vormen zoals röntgenstraling met een 
Geigerteller.
Zintuigen kunnen worden onderscheiden naar (1) de aard van de stimulus 
waarvoor zij gevoelig zijn, (2) het soort zintuigsysteem, (3) de afstand tussen 
stimulusbron en zintuigsysteem en, tenslotte, (4) de locatie van de stimulus-
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bron (exteroceptief versus interoceptief, respectievelijk van buiten- of van 
binnen het lichaam komend). Zintuigsystemen nemen deel aan processen. 
Zo maakt de reuk van de zuigende baby deel uit van het zuigproces waarin 
ook (o.a.) verschillende spiergroepen, de smaak en het maagdarmstelsel als 
één geheel worden ingezet om te drinken. Daarbij wordt onbewust ervaring 
opgedaan. Filosof ie heeft aan onbewust verkregen ervaring nauwelijks 
aandacht geschonken.
Hoofdstuk 3 vervolgt het overzicht van zintuigen. Infrarood, ultraviolet 
licht en röntgenstralen kunnen door de menselijke zintuigen niet worden 
waargenomen. Het leidt tot de conclusie dat geen enkel levend wezen op 
aarde alle verschijnselen van zijn omgeving direct kan waarnemen. Ieder 
organisme wordt begrensd door zijn zintuigelijke mogelijkheden, al zijn die 
voor de mens ‘verrijkt’ door vele en veelsoortige instrumenten.
Filosofen hebben zich vooral toegelegd op denken over het visuele 
systeem maar minder aandacht geschonken aan andere zintuigsystemen 
en de onderlinge samenwerking ervan. Nochtans werken in elk levend 
wezen ten principale alle zintuigsystemen altijd, zij het niet steeds alle even 
intensief. Gezamenlijk – gecoördineerd door de hersenen – zorgen zij voor 
een continue 4-D(imensionale) oriëntatie. Terloops wordt opgemerkt dat 
het gehele individu waarneemt èn reageert, en niet uitsluitend de hersenen 
(centrale zenuwstelsel, CZS of, ‘angelsaksisch’ leenwoord in deze ‘brein’). 
Het misbenoemen van ‘waarnemend en/of reagerend brein’ inplaats van 
‘individu’ staat bekend als mereologische drogreden. De samenwerking 
van zintuigsystemen en hersenen kan worden uitgebreid door gebruik te 
maken van hulp-middelen.
Informatietheorie kent het verschijnsel ‘ruis’. Filosofen hielden zich 
veel bezig met de verhouding van de ‘werkelijke’ omgeving en datgene wat 
wij daarvan (kunnen) waarnemen. Vooral sceptici leggen de nadruk op 
zinsbegoocheling en andere f ilosofen op ‘zekerheid van kennis’. Weten-
schappers wijzen op de ‘tijdelijkheid’ en daarmee intrinsieke onzekerheid 
van wetenschappelijke uitspraken.
Hoofdstuk 4 neemt als begindatum van Darwinisme 1 juli 1858 toen de 
manuscripten van Wallace en Darwin’s in Londen ten doop werden ge-
houden. ‘Creationisme’ en ‘Intelligent Design’ gaven en geven beide veel 
tegengas maar de wetenschap erkent evolutie als een feit. Neo-Darwinisme, 
evolutietheorie gekoppeld aan genetica, gaat ervan uit dat het leven eens 
’spontaan’ ontstond zonder bekende oorzaak en dat daaruit alle levensvor-
men ontstonden via vele tussenstappen. Natuurlijke selectie verloopt via 
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genetische variabelen in elke generatie, ongericht, toevallig en als gevolg van 
lukrake genetische mutaties. Slechts een beperkt aantal individuen blijft in 
leven en komt tot voorplanting. Homo sapiens is in deze ‘boomvertakking’ 
van levensvormen één van de vele soorten. In de loop der tijd zijn op de 
evolutie-theorie van Darwin – zoals altijd in de wetenschap – modif icaties 
aangebracht waarvan enkele worden beschreven. Zoals alle nu (nog) be-
staande species (plant- en diersoorten) heeft ook de mens zijn overleving 
te danken aan zijn eigenschappen, waaronder zijn zintuigsystemen.
Evolutionaire epistemologie, een vorm van naturalistische f ilosof ie 
ziet de mens en zijn cognitieve functies als product van de evolutie. 
Daarnaast bestaat een door mij niet aangehangen vorm van evolutionaire 
epistemologie die ook sociaal-maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen onder een 
evolutionaire paraplu poogt te brengen.
Naast f ilosofen die menen dat f ilosofie en wetenschap elkaar niet veel 
hebben te bieden zijn er, vooral de laatste decennia, filosofen die met 
wetenschap(pers) samenwerken en vinden dat zij ‘in hetzelfde schuitje’ zitten.
Hoofdstuk 5 beschrijft de vooral door Lorenz, Tinbergen en von Frisch 
gegrondveste ‘ethologie’, later ’gedragsbiologie’ genoemd. Omdat zowel ‘ratio’ 
als zintuiglijke prikkels nodig zijn voor leergedrag valt de grond van het 
oude rationalisme/empiricisme dispuut weg; beide zijn evenzeer nodig. 
Biologie voerde het begrip ‘gedragssysteem’ (behaviour system) in dat bestaat 
uit een centraal-, perceptueel- en motorisch deel dat – gezamenlijk – een 
bepaalde omschreven functie vervult. Het wordt opgevat als één – cognitief 
– mechanisme. Veel van dergelijke systemen ontwikkelen zich pas nadat de 
luxerende stimulus als contactsleutel ‘de startmotor ervan’ aanzette. Mijns 
inziens is speelgedrag van dier en mens een van de manieren waarop de 
natuur een nieuw gedragssysteem ontwikkelt en ‘inslijpt’. Het leergedrag 
omvat tegelijk ‘leren wat’ en ‘leren hoe’. Het bezit gemeenschappelijke 
kenmerken met verwerving van ‘stilzwijgende kennis’ (‘tacit knowledge’) 
conform Polanyi.
Via een excursie naar het evenwichtszintuig en de zintuigelijke infor-
matie vanuit huid, spieren en banden wordt aangetoond dat de mens meer 
zintuigen heeft dan de vijf van Aristoteles. Het onderscheid tussen enerzijds 
het zintuigsysteem en anderzijds het immuunapparaat en de hormonale 
systemen is niet scherp.
Het in stand houden van het milieu intérieur is de belangrijkste taak van 
de gezamenlijke informatie-systemen.
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Hoofdstuk 6 beziet in vogelvlucht het concept ‘sense-datum’ dat in het 
begin van de 20e eeuw intensief door f ilosofen werd besproken. Het betreft 
het ‘zuiver’ fenomenologische aspect van een zintuigelijke gewaarwording. 
Bruikbaar wellicht in discussies over het onderscheid tussen illusie en 
feitelijke waarnemening, heeft het ‘concept’ sense datum mijns inziens 
geen waarde. Reductionisten verklaren sense-data neurofysiologisch, 
epiphenomenalisten als ‘superveniënt’ op hersenfuncties en dualisten als 
immateriële verschijnselen. Mijn conclusie, Laplace parafraserend is: “Je 
n’ai pas besoin de cette hypothèse”, ik heb zo’n (qualia-)hypothese niet 
nodig.
Hoofdstuk 7 behandelt drie problemen, (1) het ‘probleem van perceptie’ 
alias ‘illusie-probleem’, (2) het probleem van de inhoud van perceptie, het 
ervaren van de wereld, (3) het probleem hoe perceptie tot kennis van de 
omgeving kan leiden.
Het eerste probleem is gebaseerd op de vermeende overeenkomst 
tussen (1) illusie en hallucinatie enerzijds en (2) de ‘werkelijke perceptie’ 
anderszijds. Ik stel dat die twee inderdaad in de verte op elkaar kunnen 
lijken, maar nooit aan elkaar gelijk zijn. Een illusie betreft nagenoeg altijd 
één zintuigsysteem; waarnemingen zijn altijd multi-zintuigsysteem-
activiteiten. Shakespeare’s ‘dolk van Macbeth’ is in tegenstelling tot wat 
daarover vaak wordt geschreven geen illusie, geen hallucinatie, geen waan 
maar een leerboekvoorbeeld van een pseudohallucinatie.
De relatie tussen ’afbeeldingen’ van de omgeving in de hersenen van 
de waarnemer en die omgeving zèlf hebben in de f ilosof ie veel aandacht 
ontvangen. Het komt mij voor dat de rechtvaardiging (justif ication) van 
uitspraken (proposities) van minder belang is dan de – pragmatische – 
beslissing over de beste keuze in een bepaald 4-D(imensionaal) probleem.
Hoofdstuk 8 geeft een inleiding over volstrekt andere manieren van kennis 
vergaren dan tot dan toe behandeld. ‘Introspectie’ geldt niet (meer) als 
betrouwbaar. ‘Intuïtie’ heeft zeker zijn mérites maar dient altijd achteraf te 
worden beproefd. Het niet-talige ‘geestesoog’ werkt uitstekend in het lezen 
van werktekeningen, bouwplannen, constructies en modellen.
Wittgenstein die tot ingenieur was opgeleid maakte later in zijn f ilosofie 
vaak gebruik van terminologie zoals ‘das zeigt sich’, (dat toont zich, dat 
is zichtbaar, dat kan niet in woorden worden weergegeven). De werking 
van het ‘geestesoog’ logenstraft de dominante (f ilosof ische) visie dat ken-
nisvergaring uitsluitend talig kan zijn.
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Contemplatie en meditatie berusten (onder andere) op uitschakelen 
van zintuiglijk waarnemen. Beide zouden leiden tot – intuïtieve – kennis 
die anders is dan die welke wordt verkregen via zintuiglijke perceptie. 
Voor verkrijgen van mystieke ervaring kan enige theoretische achtergrond 
handig zijn maar is vooral belangrijk praktijkervaring te verwerven onder 
leiding van een mystagoog (guru).
Hoofdstuk 9 geeft een literatuur-overzicht van mystiek, volgens Wittgen-
stein ‘het onuitsprekelijke’, het gebied van transcendente ervaring. De 
literatuur over mystiek is op zijn zachtst gezegd apart en (mede) daardoor 
vaak moeilijk begrijpbaar.
Mystiek is een oeroud verschijnsel dat in elke cultuur en in elke religie 
voorkomt. Een mystieke ervaring kan op zeer verschillende wijzen tot stand 
komen en wordt op zeer veel verschillende wijzen beschreven, vaak in de 
taal van de religie waarin de persoon was opgevoed, ofschoon – nadruk-
kelijk – ook atheïsten en agnosten een dergelijke ervaring kunnen hebben. 
Vaak laat zo’n ervaring diepe sporen na en een blijvende verandering in 
gedrag. In de monotheïsteische religies is mystiek altijd met enig wantrou-
wen benaderd; elke religie heeft onder zijn mystici slachtoffers gemaakt.
Hoofdstuk 10 stelt dat alles in het universum deel uitmaakt van een of 
meer processen, zij het met verschillende tijdschalen. In de biosfeer is 
elk levend wezen vanaf de conceptie tot en met uiteenvallen na de dood 
bepaald in de tijdruimte (4-D). Levensvormen zijn doorlopende processen 
die kunnen worden beschreven in formuleringen van regelmatigheden 
zoals die in de natuur kunnen worden aangetroffen. Elk zintuigsysteem 
bestaat uit een samenstel van ingewikkelde processen, die elk ook 
weer zijn opgebouwd uit (deel)processen. Uit het ‘bombardement’ van 
binnenkomende signalen afkomstig van de inwendige en uitwendige 
wereld worden door de zintuigsystemen continu signalen geselecteerd 
en aan de hersenen doorgeleid. Werkzaamheid is de stimulans voor elk 
orgaansysteem.
Activiteit van zintuigsystemen, gecoördineerd door hersenactiviteit 
waarin nieuwe ervaringen worden vergeleken met eerdere, kan leiden tot 
theoretische kennis en practische vaardigheden. Het merendeel daarvan 
wordt onbewust verworven. Leren, dat wil zeggen verwerven van nieuwe 
kennis- en practische ervaring zijn continue, grotendeels onbewust ver-
lopende processen; nooit statische. Ervaring op tijdstip t wordt tenslotte 
omschreven als de som van alle stimuli die het organisme tot op dat tijdstip 
ooit hebben bereikt via de zintuigen, onbewust of bewust.
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Hoofdstuk 11 bespreekt ‘informatie’ als het/de proces(sen) van betekenisver-
lening door het ontvangende organisme aan stimuli vanuit de omgeving (en 
vanuit het eigen lichaam). Informatie is de hoeksteen van het relatief nieuwe 
biologische specialisme genaamd biosemiotica. Een inleiding daarop wordt 
gegeven en de verhouding tot perceptie belicht.
Overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen von Uexküll’s begrip Umwelt 
en ecologische ruimte worden besproken. Umwelt is de omgeving zoals 
waargenomen door een organisme dat ‘opgesloten is in de wereld zoals die 
door zijn zintuigen wordt aangeboden’ en ecologische ruimte komt overeen 
met de omgevingsvoorwaarden voor het organisme zoals die door een 
observerende wetenschapper kunnen worden vastgesteld.
Hoofdstuk 12 gebruikt voor de opbouw van kennis de metafoor van Neder-
landse oplossingen voor bouwen in drassige ondergrond. Een artikel van 
Chisholm, ‘Het probleem van de toets’ (‘the problem of the criterion’) wordt 
als ‘f ilosof isch kompas’ gekozen.
Opgemerkt wordt dat er een onvermijdbare circulaire redenering ontstaat 
als men kennis eist voor begrijpen van zintuigsystemen en zintuigen behoeft 
om kennis te vergaren. Als men beide tegelijk wenst te bespreken moet men 
zich als baron von Münchhausen uit het moeras trekken. Uitgaande van 
wetenschappelijk agnostische empirie (van Fraassen) stel ik dat elk antwoord 
op een wetenschappelijke (4-D) vraag voorlopig is.
Opnieuw wordt een overzicht geboden over de diverse criteria die zijn 
toegepast om verschillende zintuigsystemen van elkaar te onderscheiden. 
Ik kies onomwonden voor de wetenschappelijke indelingscriteria zoals 
verwoord in Deel I van dit essay.
De stimulus, aangeboden aan een zintuig wordt gevolgd op zijn weg 
tot in de hersenschors. De hersenen worden opgevat als een informatie 
verwerkend systeem, cognitie als het geheel van alle processen dat stimuli 
verwerkt, verandert, bewerkt, opslaat in het geheugen en weer terugvindt 
in dat geheugen.
Het verstand en het bewustzijn worden opgevat als hersenprocessen, 
ongeveer zoals Patricia Churchland schrijft dat ‘een electische stroom in een 
koperdraad niet wordt veroorzaakt door bewegende electronen, maar dat 
het bewegende electronen is.’ Analoog wordt perceptie – eerder abstraheren 
dan afbeelden van de werkelijkheid – opgevat als te zijn opgebouwd uit vele 
gewaarwordingen; ‘gedrag’ is daarvan het gevolg.
Problemen in het begrijpen van processen op het terrein van perceptie 
en bewustzijn rijzen vaak als gevolg van logisch lijkende verklarende spe-
culaties achteraf zonder dat voldoende wetenschappelijke kennis daarover 
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beschikbaar was/is. Principieel kunnen wij slechts als mens de menselijke 
werkelijkheid construeren met behulp van het ons ter beschikking staande 
lichaam waarin het orgaan dat hersenen wordt genoemd.
Hoofdstuk 13 bevat de conclusies van dit essay zoals vervat in deze Neder-
landstalige samenvatting.
Hoofdstuk 14 bestaat uit enkele addenda:
– zwik (hoekvulling, boogvulling, vulstuk, tympaan, angelsaksisch 
‘spandrel’) beschrijft hoe een bouwkundige term werd ingevoerd in 
de evolutietheorie ter verklaring van sommige (toevallig) ontstane 
biologische vormen en functies;
– zintuigelijke vervangingsinstrumenten beschrijft apparaten die werden 
ontwikkeld ter (gedeeltelijke) vervanging van aangeboren of verkregen 
uitval van bepaalde zintuigen;
– narcissus is een lang citaat over de narcis uit een bloemengids;
– eliminatief materialisme beschrijft kort een specif iek kennistheoreti-
sche opvatting;
– proces beschrijft een veel gebruikte term in dit boek en bepleit de 
overtuiging dat alles in het heelal onherroepelijk onderhevig is aan 
‘geboorte’, ‘dood’ en ‘verval’, zij het dat er grote verschillen bestaan in 
de tijdas;
– apologie is, zoals het woord aangeeft, een verweer(schrift) tegen het 
advies van een bevriende lezer de gebruikelijke vorm van een ‘gelikt’ 
wetenschappelijk artikel te volgen, uitgaande van (onder andere) en-
kele gericht ‘wetenschappelijke vraagstellingen’. Ik heb dat geweigerd. 
Het ging mij er om, zoals verwoord in de inleiding, meer kennis en 
meer inzicht te verwerven over zintuigen. De deelvragen, te weten: (a) 
hoe kijken de levenswetenschappen – gebaseerd op natuurkunde en 
evolutie-theorie – aan tegen zintuigen en wat zijn daarvan de f iloso-
f ische achtergronden, (b) wat is de basis van de eenheid van bewuste 
perceptie, zijn apocrief geformuleerd, waarvan acte.

